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ABSTRACT 
Two ideological blocs the Capitalist bloc led by United States 
and Communist bloc headed by Soviet Union emerged in the wake 
of World War II. Both started striving to expand their hegemony 
and the Cold War was the result of their mutual antagonism. 
To have an upper hand in the global security system the 
Cold War strategy demanded that the US carried forward the 
containment policy outside Europe. Consequently, the US become 
actively engaged in the security affairs of South Asia. Initially, the 
US attempted to befriend both India and Pakistan. It was 
envisaged by US policy makers that if both countries were 
available it was fine. If not, at least one of them must be brought 
into the US global security system. When India turned down US 
proposal to'become its satellite to serve its interest, the latter 
found in Pakistan a willing partner. The geographical location of 
Pakistan provided added strategic advantage to US to contain the 
expansionist policies and to encircle Soviet Union and China. 
Pakistan's strategic location is such from where US could fulfill 
many objectives, it could contain Soviet Union and pursue oil 
interests in the Persian Gulf. 
Pakistan's perception about joining United States was 
absolutely different. The obsession of India always haunted the 
policy makers in Islamabad. Pakistan from its very birth perceives 
India a threat for its very existence. It was in order to counter this 
threat and remove its sense of insecurity, that it moved towards 
the US. Moreover, Pakistan was desperate to establish a fair degree 
of parity in its military power vis a vis India. Thus, Pakistan in 
quest of military and economic assistance joined United States. It 
can be said both countries needed each other, though with 
divergent policy perspective and orientation. 
To the United States strategic nexus with Pakistan was 
needed as it was supposed to facilitate a key element in the global 
chain of anti-communist alliance. However, Washington by making 
Pakistan a Cold War partner did not help in improving Indo-Pak 
strained relations. US defence pacts with Pakistan and its supply 
of sophisticated weapons to the latter unleashed arms race and in 
turn increased the probability of war in South Asia. 
This work attempts to examine the factors which were 
responsible for changing US interests and priorities in Pakistan 
and latters dependence on the former, and causes which compelled 
Pakistan to acquire sophisticated arms and forge strategic 
relations with a Super Power far from Pakistan. The whole study is 
divided into five chapters. Each dealing with a specific period 
covering significant events of bilateral relations. 
The First Chapter endeavours to present an overview of the 
evolution of US-Pakistan strategic relationship in historical 
perspective, focusing how both countries came together, and how 
shrewdly Pakistan used the various opportunities intrinsic in the 
Cold War for becoming member of military blocs (CENTO, SEATO) 
which resulted in massive security assistance from the USA. It also 
gives a brief account of US military aid to Pakistan and 
implications of embargoes imposed in the wake of war with India in 
1965 and 1971. This chapter ends with Symington-Glenn 
Amendment which terminated all US military aid to Pakistan in 
1979 for its alleged attempt to acquire nuclear enrichment 
technology. 
The Second Chapter attempts to analyse how the past 
deterioration in the strategic and security relationship between the 
United States and Pakistan over nuclear programmes came in for 
reappraisal. It also sees how fall of Shah of Iran and the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan ultimately become turning 
point' in US-Pak strategic relations, when Carter administration 
discovered Pakistan's strategic significance as 'Front Line State'. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses the genesis of the Afghan Crisis 
and its implications on the relations of the superpowers, and 
perception of Washington and Islamabad regarding Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and how this become the question of survival for 
Pakistan and for United States to maintain its superpower status. 
The Third Chapter deals with the evolution of close US-Pak 
strategic relations during two consecutive terms of President 
Ronald Reagan. How Afghan Crisis increased the bargaining 
position of Zia vis a vis Reagan administration. And how Pakistan 
managed to acquire the two massive aid packages of ($3.2 billion 
and $ 4.02 billion) excluding other military and economic 
assistance along with sophisticated weapons including F-16 fighter 
aircrafts. This Chapter also discusses nuclear issues which 
become a major irritant between two countries. 
The Fourth Chapter tries to examine the factors which 
radically altered the US-Pakistan strategic relations. The end of 
Cold War and disintegration of Soviet Union diminished Pakistan's 
strategic significance for US. The imposition of Pressler Sanctions 
and its impact on Pakistan has been discussed in detail. This 
chapter also analyses the efforts of Pakistani policy makers to 
wriggle out of Pressler Sanctions and subsequent passage of Brown 
Amendment is also dealt with. Finally the issue of shipment of 
Ring Magnets and MTCR are also mentioned. 
The Fifth Chapter examines the Post Brown development in 
the US-Pak strategic relations. An endeavour have been made to 
deal with the major factors of co-operation and irritation such as 
issue of F-16, India and Pakistan Nuclear Test and how Taliban 
became a factor in US-Pakistan relations. Fourth Military Coup in 
Pakistan and US attitude towards it, Clinton's visit to South Asia 
and bilateral relations is discussed. This Chapter ends with 
September 11, 2001 attack on America and its grave implications 
on global security system and how ultimately Washington 
reinvented Pakistan's strategic significance. 
The future course of US-Pakistan relations is hazardous to 
predict because of wide swing of the past half-century. What we 
can note are certain constant factors that will remain important. 
Geography will continue to give Pakistan strategic importance as 
the juncture of Western, Southern and Central Asia. There are 
three reasons why geo-strategic location of Pakistan will be 
important to the US. To tackle the growing influence of Russia-
China-India in the region and preempt China, Iran, India axis. 
Pakistan's geo-political proximity to the Central Asian Republics 
and Middle East is also a plus for it. The US needs to gamer 
support of a moderate Muslim country to fight International 
terrorism. As Pakistan is a leading Islamic state, the coming of an 
extremist Islamic regime in Islamabad would have profound 
negative impact not only on the sub-continent, but throughout the 
Islamic World. US interest lies in avoiding such a development. 
Since India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states, how 
Islamabad and New Delhi manage their nuclear rivalry will have an 
implications far beyond the subcontinent. Averting a nuclear 
holocaust on the subcontinent will be a key US policy goal. This 
will keep Pakistan and US engaged in the years to come. The 
future course of the US-Pakistan strategic relations would also 
depend on whether the interest of the two countries are 
complementary or divergent. Further, American assistance to 
Pakistan would depend on the utility of Islamabad to promote US 
foreign policy objectives. What shape the Kashmir imbroglio takes 
would also have a bearing on the countries in future. It seems 
Afghanistan is going to loom large in near future on bilateral 
relationship as both countries have agreed to fight against the 
menace of terrorism. 
It must be clearly understood by US-Pakistan policy makers 
that to establish reliable, creditable and durable relations both 
countries have to leave all real or imaginary apprehensions, fears, 
suspicions and mistrust. Irritants should be removed through 
diplomacy, co-operation, negotiation and attitude of give and take. 
US has greater responsibility to carry the burden of relations 
because of its power and influence. It is only then and then alone 
that lasting, durable, strategic relations beneficial for both can be 
ensured. Hence, a long term objective of conciliation and strategic 
friendship should not be lost sight of, which is essential for 
peaceful co-existence. ^^ T»« Azadl^ 
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PREFACE 
The end of the Second World War saw the division of world 
into two ideological blocs known as Capitalist bloc led by United 
States and Communist bloc headed by the former Soviet Union. 
Both started striving to expand their hegemony and their mutual 
antagonism led to the Cold War 
The Cold War strategy demanded the spread of the 
containment policy outside Europe in order to broaden the sphere 
of global security system. US became actively engaged in the 
security affairs of South Asia. Initially the US attempted to befriend 
both India and Pakistan. It was envisaged by US policy makers 
that if both countries were available it was fine. If not, at least one 
of them must be brought into US global security system. When 
India turned dovm US proposal to become its satellite to serve its 
interest, th.e latter found in Pakistan a willing partner. The 
geographical location of Pakistan provided added strategic 
advafitage to US to contain the expansionist policies and to 
c4icircle Soviet Union and China. Pakistan's strategic location is 
/ 
such from where US could fulfill many objectives, it could contain 
Soviet Union and pursue oil interests in the Persian Gulf, 
Pakistan's perception about joining United States was 
/absolutely different. The obsession of India always haunted the 
policy makers in Islamabad, Pakistan from its very birth perceives 
India a threat for its very existence. It was in order to counter this 
threat and remove its sense of insecurity, that it moved towards 
the US. Moreover, Pakistan vi^ as desperate to establish a fair degree 
of parity in its military power vis a vis India. Thus, Pakistan in 
quest of military and economic assistance joined United States. It 
can be said both countries needed each other, though with 
divergent policy perspective and orientation. 
To the United States, strategic nexus with Pakistan was 
needed as it was supposed to facilitate a key element in the global 
chain of anti-communist alliance. However, Washington by making 
Pakistan a Cold War partner did not help in improving Indo-Pak 
strained relations. US defence pacts with Pakistan and its supply 
of sophisticated weapons to the latter unleashed arms race and in 
turn increased the probability of war in South Asia. 
This work attempts to examine the factors which were 
responsible for changing US interests and priorities in Pakistan 
and formers dependence on the latters, and causes which 
compelled Pakistan to acquire sophisticated arms and forge 
strategic relations with a Super Power far from Pakistan, The whole 
study is divided into five chapters. Each dealing with a specific 
period covering significant events of bilateral relations. 
The First Chapter endeavours to present an overview of the 
evolution of US-Pakistan strategic relationship in historical 
perspective, focusing how both countries came together, and how 
shrewdly Pakistan used the various opportunities intrinsic in the 
Cold War for becoming member of military pacts (CENTO, SEATO) 
which resulted in massive security assistance from the USA. It also 
gives a brief account of US military aid to Pakistan and 
implications of embargoes imposed in the wake of war with India in 
1965 and 1971. This chapter ends with Symington-Glenn 
Amendment which terminated all US military aid to Pakistan in 
1979 for its alleged attempt to acquire nuclear enrichment 
technology. 
The Second Chapter attempts to analyze how the past 
deterioration in the strategic and security relationship between the 
United States and Pakistan over nuclear programmes came in for 
reappraisal. It also deals with overthrow of Shah of Iran and the 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan ultimately become 
turning point' in US-Pak strategic relations, when Carter 
administration discovered Pakistan's strategic significance as 
'Front Line State'. Moreover, this chapter discusses the genesis of 
the Afghan Crisis and its implications on the relations of the 
superpowers, and perception of Washington and Islamabad 
regarding Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and how this become the 
question of survival for Pakistan and for United States to maintain 
its superpower status. 
The Third Chapter highlights the evolution of close US-Pak 
strategic relations during two consecutive terms of President 
Ronald Reagan. How Afghan Crisis increased the bargaining 
position of Zia vis a vis Reagan administration. And how Pakistan 
managed to acquire the two massive aid packages of ($3.2 billion 
and $ 4.02 billion) excluding other military and economic 
assistance along with sophisticated weapons including F-16 fighter 
aircrafts. This Chapter also discusses nuclear issues which 
become a major irritant between two countries. 
The Fourth Chapter tries to examine the factors which 
radically altered the US-Pakistan strategic relations. As the Cold 
war ended and disintegration of Soviet Union diminished the 
Pakistan's strategic significance for US. The imposition of Pressler 
Sanctions and its impact on Pakistan has been discussed in detail. 
This chapter also analyses the efforts of Pakistani policy makers to 
wriggle out of Pressler Sanctions and subsequent passage of Brown 
Amendment is also dealt with. Finally the issue of shipment of 
Ring Magnets and MTCR are also mentioned. 
The Fifth Chapter examines the Post Brown development in 
the United States Pakistan strategic relations. An endeavour have 
been made to deal with the major factors of co-operation and 
irritation such as issue of F-16, India and Pakistan Nuclear Test 
and how Taliban became a factor in US-Pakistan relations. Fourth 
Military Coup in Pakistan and US attitude towards it, Clinton's 
visit to South Asia and bilateral relations is discussed. This 
Chapter ends with September 11, 2001 attack on America and its 
grave implications on global security system and how ultimately 
Washington reinvented Pakistan's strategic significance. 
The method of study has been historical, descriptive and 
analjrtical. Efforts have been made to collect all the relevant data 
and interpret it both in historical perspective and from the point of 
current relevance. Most of the research materials have been 
collected from different libraries in India especially American 
Centre Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis, Indian Council of World Affairs in Delhi and 
Centre for West Asian Studies, Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., 
Aligarh. 
CHAPTER - I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
EVOLUTION OF US-PAK STRATEGIC RELATIONS 
Introduction 
The most remarkable consequence of the Second World War 
for post War international relations was the emergence of the USA 
and Soviet Union as the two mutually antagonistic superpowers 
dominating the world scene. The post Second World War world was 
witness to many other things, in an accentuation of nationalism in 
Asia and Africa and the emergence of India and Pakistan as two 
sovereign independent states. The United States of America, now 
being easily the greatest world power, started involving itself not 
only in all affairs of Europe and Latin America but also in all 
significant developments all over the world. The era of American 
"Isolationism" was at an end. The United States was playing a new 
role as the leader of the advanced industrialized countries of the 
West. The supremacy of the United States was not; however, 
universally accepted. It was challenged by the socialist countries 
led by the Soviet Union. Confrontation between the USA and Soviet 
Union resulted in the emergence of Cold War era, and containment 
of communism became the chief objective of the US foreign policy. 
The United States having checked the advance of 
communism in Europe through the Marshal plan and North 
Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), was now turning its attention 
towards Asia. But the task was not so easy as the Soviet Union 
was also striving to expand its sphere of influence, or at least to 
deny the United States the friendship of as many countries in Asia 
as it could. 
United States Posture 
After the Second World War the thinking in the US 
government circles was that China should be united and made a 
democratic country to serve as a counter-weight to Japan and the 
Soviet Union in the Pacific. China did become united, but it did not 
become a friendly China. Infact the collapse of the Chiang regime 
£ind the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 
1949 was a shattering blow to the diplomatic and military policy of 
the United States in East Asia. The loss' of China forcefully 
brought to the consciousness of American policy-makers the 
importance of strengthening relations with the two countries of 
Indian sub-continent, the only states whose combined population 
and resources could nearly match those of China. ^  
The United States of America was thus desperately in need of 
friends to stem the advancing tide of communism in Asia.* In the 
early years of independence the United States undoubtedly tended 
to attach more importance to India than to Pakistan primarily 
because of its larger size, its industrial potential and the general 
impression about India. ^  However, India's non-aligned posture was 
quite disappointing to the American Leaders. The last hope of the 
US was belied when Prime Minister Nehru, during his visit to the 
US in October 1949, made it clear, both in his public speeches and 
in his private talks, that India would definitely not align itself with 
one block against the other and remain non-aligned following an 
independent foreign policy* 
Since India was not prepared to be satellite, or a client of the 
US to be used against communist countries by means of bilateral 
alliance and regional pacts, America moved towards Pakistan, the 
only alternative in the region. Moreover, the strategic location of 
Pakistan on the door steps of the Soviet Union and the Peoples 
Republic of China was considered important. For US Military 
strategists Pakistan represented a centrally positioned landing and 
launching site for aircraft and missile aimed at either Russia or 
China.* The proximity of North-West Pakistan and 'Azad Kashmir' 
(Under Pakistan control) to Soviet Union, Central Asia, and that of 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Tibet and Sino-Burma border 
had been important strategic reasons for American interest in 
having a military tie with Pakistan. Apart from strategic 
importance, many Americans thought that it could be also used as 
a link between South-East Asia and Middle Eastern defence 
system* as the eastern wing of Pakistan formed the Western 
boundary of South-East Asia. 
8 
The North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) was formed in 
1949 in the Western Europe as a part of anti-communist regional 
defence system of the United States world strategy"'. In the Eastern 
Sector the US signed defence treaties with Japan, Thailand, 
Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea. But in the Southern Sector, 
comprising the Middle East and the South Asian countries which 
were strategically important from the American viewpoint were still 
undefended. Between Western Turkey and Eastern Thailand there 
was a wide gap which had to be filled so that the policy of the 
containment of communism might succeed. American saw that the 
leading Arab states were busy with their preoccupation with Israel, 
and therefore, were not inclined to listen to the Western reasoning 
of bringing these countries into its alliance system in defence of the 
free world'. They also knew that India was 'positively' neutral. In 
such circumstances importance of Pakistan certainly increased in 
the US strategic calculations. 
Pakistan's Posture 
Pakistan's thinking was quite different from that of the USA. 
It did not feel any threat either ideological or territorial from any of 
communist power. Whatsoever apprehensions Pakistani leadership 
had from Chinese and Soviet quarters, it was clear that they were 
not so much because of their being communist countries as they 
seemed to be, but because of their close relations with immediate 
neighbours India and Afghanistan with whom Pakistan had long 
standing disputes. 
The perceived threat of India, however, has been the main 
factor in Pakistan relations with United States. India has been the 
principal preoccupation of Pakistan's defence and foreign policies. 
Its overall weakness® and strategic vulnerability vis-a-vis India, the 
continuance of several disputes in which it accused India of having 
changed the rules of the game according to its convenience', and 
lingering memories of partition disturbances and communal 
hysteria, have combined to present India as the most important 
threat to its existence and security. This has often loomed large 
over the political horizon of Pakistanis and impelled it to seek allies 
and military aid.^* 
Among the varied reasons for the Pakistan Government 
seeking US miUtaiy aid, the decisively and most important was to 
strengthen itself militarily against India. Both official spokesman 
and unofficial sources have committed enough indiscretions 
publicly and privately in support of these reasons, foreign 
(especially American) observers and journalists have also testified 
to this ." 
Pakistan hoped that its strategic relationship with the United 
States would bring several benefits: (a) a guarantee against Indian 
aggression i=* (b) military aid to establish parity with India, and^* (c) 
10 
pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ^ ^ it was this 
Pakistani outlook and posture which led Pakistan to appear pro-
west and anti-communist, to give up its erstwhile policy of non-
alignment**, seek and accept US military aid and eventually to join 
the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). This was done on the 
one hand to strengthen itself militarily against India, and on the 
other to ensure Western support to its stand on Kashmir. When 
the Pakistani Government, found that the sympathy and support 
of the Western powers (in particular of the USA and UK) would not 
go as far as backing publicly and fully the Pakistan stands on the 
Kashmir disputes (as the Soviet Union did in favour of India at the 
end of 1955). Pakistani leaders not only complained against and 
denounced the West but threatened to walk over to the communist 
camp.*'' 
It is evident that Pakistan was less moved by Ideological 
interests which were in any case subsidiary to its Indo-centric 
goals. Pakistan's Foreign Policy makers took advantages of the 
many opportunities inherent in the Cold War environment by 
using the right rhetoric in the right place at the right time. 
One aspects of Pakistan's rhetorical tactics was to emphasize 
the strategic value of Pakistan and the danger of the Russian drive 
toward the Indian Ocean. Another was to assert that Pakistan was 
the most dependable friend, the staunchest ally of the United 
States in Asia. Moreover, Pakistan's Policy makers often stated that 
11 
future of Pak-US relations was very bright because as one of 
Pakistani finance minister commented, "we have the same way of 
looking at things and we are the two peoples who talk the same 
language"^*, that the same language was the language of 
communist threat-
This rhetorical tactic has an impact, American Official heard 
and appreciated them. For instance, Philip Talbott, then Assistant 
Secretary of State made the following comments during 
Congressional Hearings: "Pakistani Statesman have spoken 
strongly in defence of the free-world, both privately and at various 
world forums'^'. American officials were defending military aid to 
Pakistan on the basis of Pakistan's supposed anti communist 
stand. For example, in discussing military aid to Pakistan, David 
Bell AID Administrator, stated that despite flirtation with China, 
Pakistan was strongly anti-communist and Pakistan's military 
forces should be improved through additional aid^o. 
Thus the United States and Pakistan were moving in the 
same direction for different reasons; the United States was guided by 
its global policy of containing international communism; and Pakistan 
was motivated by problem of national security and defence. 
Korean War 
Pakistan's outspoken support to the USA on its stand on 
Korean War and signing of peace treaty with Japan was a 
significant factor in promoting friendly relations between 
12 
Washington and Karachi. The out-break of Korean War in July 
1950 and the developments that followed sharply intensified the 
interest of the American leaders in the reaction of the two States of 
the subcontinent. The involvement of the United States and the 
profound emotional impact of the conflict on American opinion 
provided an opportunity that was skillfully used by Pakistan to 
build and image of itself as a "trust worth}^" friend in south Asia^i. 
However, in the beginning American did not pay much attention to 
the attitude of Pakistan, actually, it was busy in applauding India 
because of its acceptance that the aggression had been committed 
by North Koreans. 
American enthusiasm for India diminished when India 
abstained from the vote on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution and 
even more, when Nehru urged a ceasefire and negotiations in 
Korea as well as seating of representative of the Peoples Republic of 
China in the United Nations. The proposal, however, reportedly 
aroused considerable misgivings among American policy makers 
and was turned down by the then Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson*^. 
In contrast to the Indian attitude, the American policies in 
Korea were vigorously supported by the Pakistani Government 
without any reservation. Pakistan was not slow to judge how much 
a movement of American public opinion could be turned to its own 
advantage. At the outbreak of war, Liaquat Ali Khan who was in 
13 
America itself, lost no time in declaring in a public statement thai. 
his government will back the US to the fullest, in any action it may 
take in Korean War.** Pakistan also expressly supported the US on 
"Uniting for Peace Resolution" in the General Assembly in 
November in 1950.25 xhe United States needed the support of 
important Asian countries and now considered Pakistan's 
usefulness as a potential ally. 
On August 29, 1950, Pakistan informed the Security Council 
that it could not spare any ground troops to help fight, the War in 
Korea because of grave danger that confronted it.** It shrewdly 
sought to spread the impression in the United States that unlike 
India it was ready to send troops to fight alongside the UN soldiers 
in Korea, but that only its difficulties with India stood in the way*'^ . 
United States-Japan Peace Treaty 
Another important development which caused 
disenchantment between the USA and India and brought the 
former closer to Pakistan was the signing of peace treaty and a 
military pact between the United States and Japan. With the 
emergence of a potentially strong communist China and the 
outbreak of the Korea War, the United States felt impelled to take 
urgent steps to convert Japan into an ally against communist 
inroads in the Far-East**. Since the days of Japanese surrender, 
the American policy in the Far-East had been to keep Japan in a 
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state of perpetual impotency, both militarily and industrially, but 
here after US sought to rehabilitate the Japanese industrial and 
military power and make use of that power to contain communist 
China. US called in a conference of 51 nations in San-Francisco to 
discuss how the status of war between Japan and Allied Power 
could be brought to an end. While Pakistan accepted the invitation. 
India refused to participate. 
Pakistan not only signed the Japan Peace Treaty but also 
voiced powerful support for it from the floor of the conference. 
Foreign Minister ZafaruUah Khan claimed it was a "good treaty" 
offering justice and reconciliation. He held the American proposal 
as an "evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and 
West" and "harbinger of even happier consummations'.*' 
Contrary to Pakistani view, Nehru held that defensive 
alliance openly aiming some other country or countries defeat their 
own purpose of trying to maintain peace through strength*". The 
authorities in New Delhi interpreted the treaty as an extension of 
"power politics" and expressed grave apprehensions that it would 
lead to an era of new tensions in Asia. India considered these 
measures of Washington as acts of provocations against 
communist China which in addition brought the Cold War into the 
Indian Subcontinent thereby threatening India's Security. The 
outright opposition of India to the treaty and Pakistan's 
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unequivocal support at a critical juncture and enthusiastic 
approbation for it, certainly left a deep impression on the mind of 
American policy makers. The diametrically opposite stands of India 
and Pakistan on the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty 
accelerated the process of US estrangement from India and 
friendship towards Pakistan.^^ 
Military Alliance 
Pakistan moved for US help in its search for security, after 
being disappointed by Britain and the Muslim countries of the 
Middle East. Pakistan wanted to gain support from these countries 
but they refused to do so. The Commonwealth refused to take side 
with Pakistan because the dispute between India and Pakistan had 
involved two of its members.** xhe Middle East Countries, which 
had just achieved their independence after prolonged struggle 
under the banner of Arab Nationalism, did not like the concept of 
Pan-Islamism of Pakistan. They had several internal problems of 
their own to cope with. They were, therefore, not in a position to 
bear responsibilities abroad and give material help to Pakistan in 
case of an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan or 
between Pakistan and any other country. 
Pakistan's attempt to secure friends among the Islamic 
States to take its side against India did not achieved much success 
because they attached greater value to friendly relations with India 
which was bigger and took more active interest in their anti-
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colonial struggle. Another reason which can explain the failure of 
Pakistan's efforts was its inability to give stout support to Egypt 
and Iran in their disputes with Britain concerning military bases at 
Suez and the nationalization of oil. 
Thus, Pakistan left isolated and friendless,^^ decided to enter 
into military alliance with the US in its desire to strengthen itselt 
vis-a vis. India on the question of Kashmir for bargaining from a 
position of strength. The United States with its enormous military 
and economic resources and political influence was seen as the 
only Big Power with whom an alliance would enable Pakistan to 
meet its defence and economic requirements as well as boost up its 
international status. 
It was the realization of its isolation and inadequacy of its 
own resources to guarantee its security in the context of its 
relation with India, which impelled Pakistan to seek the support of 
the USA. It had nothing to do with Soviet Union or threat of 
communism. One Pakistani scholar accepting this fact, had 
remarked that in Pakistan the danger of conquest by a communist 
power was very remote compared with the inmiediate and 
continuing danger of forcible merger with India.** Pakistan's 
alignment, thus was not based on genuine anti communism. The 
occasional flurry of anti-communist statements and the pledge to 
defend freedom, democracy and individual liberty were more a 
nature of lip services to their allies.®^ 
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On the other hand US strategists also saw Pakistan as a 
valuable asset in their global search for allies and bases around 
the USSR.** In their view the communist success in China had 
already increased the threat of communist expansion in Asia. The 
events in Egypt, Iran and Jordan in 1951 and 1952, and the 
disturbing situation in South East Asia created by Korean War, 
emergence of China a regional power, called for a reconciliation 
and reinforcement of the Western position in Asia. India had 
refused to line up with the United States anti-communist front, 
and remained unshaken in its non-alignment attitude. Pakistan 
appeared the most suitable as an alternative, commendable more 
for its willingness to join military pact and its strategic advantages 
than for its resources or stability. 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement: 
Beginning of US MiUtary Aid 
Against this backdrop it was only natural that Pakistan and 
United States should proceed to forge a military tie up. Pakistan 
took the first step to secure US military assistance in September-
October, 1953 during a visit by General Ayub Khan to Washington 
D.C. He held discussions, among others, with General Mathew 
Bunker Ridgway, the US Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Arthur 
Redfort, and John Foster Dulles. 
The next major step was taken during Governor General 
Ghulam Mohammad's November visit to Washington accompanied 
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by Foreign Minister ZafruUah Khan. He met President Eisenhower 
as well as Secretary Dulles. President Eisenhower appreciated 
Pakistan geostrategic location at the cross roads of Central, South, 
and South-West Asia. And an era of close US-Pakistan military 
security relationship was inaugurated. During all these visits by 
the head of the states and other officials, the establishment of 
Middle East defence and possible role of Pakistan in that was 
discussed. However, Middle East defence could not be realized. 
Meantime, Pakistan made some informal request for military aid 
from US, during autumn of 1953, US administration, considering 
Pakistan as part of "Northern Tier", began to discuss the idea of 
providing some military aid to Pakistan. 
Americans no doubt had for long agreed that their global 
strategy against communism demanded of a militarily stronger 
Pakistan but they still hesitated to take the final plunge for fear of 
offending India. A State Department officials admitted that 
informal discussion had been going on for last year or two,'*'' but 
President Eisenhower said at the press conference that the US 
would be most cautious about-doing any thing that would cause 
hysteria in India.®® 
It was the visit of Vice President Nixon in December, 1953 to 
Pakistan and India, tipped the seals in favour of Pakistan. Nixon 
told the Pakistanis that he was convinced that the people of 
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Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart communist ambitions, 
and that the USA would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial 
development and also in defence.®' 
Nixon was successful in persuading President Eisenhower 
that Pakistan was the best available option in South Asia in 
containment of communism and a suitable reply to India's policy of 
"neutralism" or non-alignment.*° it was finally decided to offer 
military assistance to Pakistan.^^ 
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra 
announced at a Press conference in Karachi, on February, 22, 
1954, that his country had formally requested the United States 
for military assistance within the scope of the Mutual Security Act, 
"for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a 
higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster 
international peace and security within the framework of the 
United Nations Charter"**. Three days later President Eisenhower 
announced in Washington that the United States had decided to 
respond favourably to Pakistan's request.** 
In a statement before the Lok Sabha on March 1, 1954, 
Nehru vehemently criticized the US decision to supply arms to 
Pakistan. Commenting on Eisenhower assurance to him and his 
offer to similar military aid to India, he said "if we object to military 
aid being given to Pakistan, we could be hypocrites and 
unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves."'** 
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On May 19, 1954 after months of intense negotiations, 
Pakistan and the United States signed an agreement on US aid, 
called the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in Karachi: The 
agreement which consisted of seven Articles, came into force with 
immediate effect. It obliged United States to supply to Pakistan 
only "such equipments, materials, services or other assistance as 
the government of the US may authorized in accordance with such 
conditions and terms as may be agreed**. It was stipulated that 
Pakistan should not undertake any act of aggression against any 
other nation and that it should use American Military aid 
exclusively for internal security and its legitimate self defence or to 
participate in the defence of area or in UN Collective Security 
arrangements and measures. Pakistan also agreed not to transfer 
American arms received under the agreement to any other country 
without the prior consent of the United States. In short the 
agreement bound Pakistan to the regional and global diplomatic 
and security objectives of the US^. The US, thus found in the 
military alliances an opportunity to maintain its military and 
political presence on the territory of its allies. 
SEATO, CENTO, and Pakistan- US Strategic Relations 
The Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 was the basis on 
which Pakistan received military equipment from the United 
States. In the belief that membership in American sponsored 
multinational arrangements would bring fourth an expanded 
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programme or arms supplies and more vigorous US support for its 
own diplomatic and military objectives, Pakistan became a member 
of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad 
Pact (later CENTO, Central Treaty Organization in 1955). 
South Bast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
The ceasefire in Korea in July, 1953 enabled the Chinese to 
concentrate on South East Asia and consequently China increased 
the scale of its assistance to North Vietnam, making the French 
position in Indo-China progressively worse. With a view to 
checking the perceived Chinese expansion, the Americans decided 
to extend the containment policy to South East Asia. The 
Americans thought that if any of the local state, battling 
communists, were allowed to fall then not only would the emerging 
communist regime in the region be eventually all linked 
ideologically, militarily, and politically with the USSR and Red 
China and deny the entire area to the USA, but there would also be 
a Chain reaction throughout the area. In responding to this 
perceived threat the Americans not only extended active support 
but also encouraged the States in the area to form a regional 
security alliance that would include the USA. 
Thus, a conference at Manila resulted in the South East Asia 
Collective Defence Treatj^'' on September 8, 1954, creating an 
alliance consisting of Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, US, UK, 
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principles entitled the pacific charter**. 
Most interesting thing with SEATO was that almost all 
members of this pact joined it to attain their own objectives. 
Perhaps it would be true to say that SEATO had as many 
objectives as it had members. Admittedly, the American objectives 
was to foster collective efforts in the region to check the perceived 
expansion of communism but the objectives of the other members 
of SEATO were all different. Pakistan's decision to join SEATO 
appears to have been influenced by a desire to please the 
Americans than a conviction of its utility to cater for Pakistan's 
security needs. 
Pakistan, however, was not too much happy with the SEATO 
because Pakistan was knowing well that it would receive no 
protection from SEATO against an Indian attack, which was its 
most immediate concern. No where in the entire document was 
there to be found even indirectly a hint of a suggestion that the 
treaty address itself to Pakistan's proclaimed concern-Hindu 
expansionism, Indian imperialism, helping Pakistan to recover 
Indian occupied Kashmir or even defending in case of unprovoked 
Indian attack. Moreover, the United States wrote a reservation into 
the treaty that its obligation under Article rv(l) would extend only 
to cases of communist aggression. 
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Pakistan's justification to join SEATO was that East Pakistan 
geographically could be regarded as part of South East Asia. 
Further it signed for development of economic measures and basic 
defence structure promotion. Art 29 of this Collective Defence 
Treaty lays down that "In order to be more effective to achieve the 
objective of this Treaty, the parties separately and jointly by means 
of continuous and active self help and mutual aid will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack and to prevent the counter subversive activities directed 
against their territorial integrity and political stability^' 
Three factors seem to have influenced the decision makers to 
opt for membership of SEATO. First, the desire to please the 
America, after the successful conclusion of the military aid 
agreement. Second, the purpose of signatories was to win more 
friends, as Pakistan was certainly looking for friends in order to at 
least strengthen its case on Kashmir Third, the development in 
East Pakistan which necessitated not only extra US aid but also 
strengthen fears regarding communist activities. A combination of 
the above mentioned factor could have influenced Pakistan 
decision makers to opt for membership in SEATO. That would at 
least please the USA, help procure much needed arms and to gain 
a kind of psychological defence against India. 
The Baghdad Pact (CENTO) 
Middle East has always been an area of great concern for US 
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due to presence of huge oil resources and its strategic location 
attracted more. After the Second World War both super-powers 
fully realized the strategic significance of oil for their own sake and 
as a means of den3ring vital oil supplies to the adversary. General 
Eisenhower, even commented that there was no area strategically 
more important than the Gulf. 
In order to protect the interest of its own and its friends and 
allies, the USA, after the withdrawal of the UK, decided to establish 
military alliances with the countries of the region. First step in this 
direction was taken when it signed Mutual Defence Agreement with 
Iraq on April 21, 1954, subsequently Turkey and Iraq signed a pact 
of Mutual co-operation at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, for the 
purpose of collective defence arrangements for the Middle East. 
The same was later joined by the Britain on April 5, 1955, Pakistan 
on June 30, 1955, and Iran on November 3, 1955 which popularly 
came to be known as Baghdad Pact. After Iraq formally 
relinquished its membership, head quarter was shifted to Ankara 
and name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty 
Organization in August 1959. 
The Baghdad Pact provided that "the high contracting 
parties will cooperate for their security and defence, but that such 
measures as they agreed to take may form the subject of special 
agreements with each other (Art 1), also that this pact shall be 
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open for accession to any member state of the Arab league or any 
other state actively concerned with the securities and peace in this 
region and which is fully recognized by both the high contracting 
parties,*" 
Although the USA had canvassed for Baghdad Pact and later 
fully participated in its work, but never officially signed the treaty. 
Then Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman, United States observer at 
the council meeting in November 1955, gave two reasons why the 
US thought that it could contribute more by remaining out of the 
pact (i) It was perceived that formal US adherence to the Pact was 
likely to further estrange Egypt and other Arabs and (ii) It was 
thought that US participation might invoke an Israeli counter-
demand for a Mutual Defence Treaty especially in view of the fact 
that the Baghdad Pact came into existence through the effort of an 
Arab country Iraq, and it could become an issue in the next 
presidential election. And a treaty with Israel would cause the 
Arabs, including Iraq, to reject alliances with the US and make 
them receptive to Soviet overtures.*^ 
Pakistan's perception of Baghdad Pact was different from 
that of the United States. The fear of communist aggression on 
Pakistan was only a m)^h. The raison de'tre of Pakistan's entry into 
military pacts was explained by Mohammad Ayub Khan who 
himself had vouched his close association with Baghdad Pact 
(CENTO) According to him "the crux of the problem from the very 
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beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us: Sve had 
to look for allies to secure our position'^a. Hence the primary 
motive of Pakistan's participation in the SEATO and CENTO was 
the result of an extreme pathological "Indo-Phobia". The other 
consideration seemed to have influenced the Pakistani decision 
makers to opt for formal membership of the pact were many. 
Pakistan has always stood for special ties with Muslim countries. 
Right from its birth, it had tried hard to forge stronger bonds with 
most Muslim countries in the Middle East and consequently it 
always demonstrated a keen interest in participating in all the 
schemes relating to the defence of the area. Moreover, having 
secured the most desired military assistance treaty with the USA, 
the Pakistan's had been demonstrating overtly to undertake such 
ventures that would please the Americans. 
By becoming member of Baghdad Pact, Pakistan became 
truly America's "most allied ally in Asia" because Pakistan 
strategically located and only Asian country to be a member of 
SEATO and CENTO. Just like Turkey links the NATO and CENTO, 
Pakistan, however, never disguised the motivating compulsion that 
pushed it to join SEATO and the Baghdad Pact; what is more 
interesting to note that Americans were also fully aware of these 
when they decided to encourage Pakistan's participation. As far as 
Pakistan was concerned the reason had little to do with the avowed 
objective of the pact which was to contain "international 
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communism" in the area. As usual, Pakistan's foreign minister 
Firoz Khan Noon, asserted that "enmity of a powerful neighbouring 
country had obliged Pakistan to enter into defence alliances to 
preserve its freedom' and that "Pakistan will not agree to commit 
suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact which is its defence 
against India"'® 
The reason, thus why Pakistan joined the military alliance 
was very different from the reason why the United States created 
the alliances. Why then alliance if the aims and objectives of the 
two parties were so doubly divergent? Infact, the United States 
recognized Pakistan's pre-occupation with India, but felt that it 
would be able to keep the Indo-Pakistan rivalry under control and 
that in any case, it would not allow that rivalry to interfere with its 
own global anti-communist strategy. In its anxiety to create the 
various military organization it ignored Pakistan's special 
motives.^ 
It was against this background that the United States took 
steps to extend military assistance to Pakistan. 
MiUtary Aid to Pakistan 
Pakistan's bilateral treaty with the United States and 
former's membership of SEATO and CENTO made it eligible to 
receive massive military and economic assistance from 
Washington. According to a document of National Security Council 
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(USA) the total value of US military aid programmed for Pakistan 
during the period of 1950-58 was $411.6 million. Items valued at 
$276.4 million had been delivered during the period, leaving an 
undelivered balance as of 30 June, 1958 of item worth $135.2 
million**. 
According to consolidated statistics pubhshed in December 
1979 by the Comptroller of the Security Assistance Agency, 
Department of Defence, total deliveries and expenditure on the 
military assistance programmed for Pakistan (excluding "training") 
amounted to $650.28 million during the period 1950-1969.*^ 
Assuming that all the deliveries had been made by the time the 
embargo was enforced in 1965, in the wake of Indo-Pak War and 
deducting the figures of $276.4 million acknowledged to have been 
expanded during 1950-1958, we get $373.88 million as the outer 
limit of grant military assistance that Pakistan could have received 
the United States during the period July 1, 1958 to September 
1965. 
During the period 1954-1965, the United States provided 
military grants assistance valued at $650 million, defence support 
assistance valued at $619 million and some $55 million worth of 
equipment on cash or concessional basis between 1954 and 1965. 
The USA also maintained a Military Assistance Advisory 
Group of about 100 personnel in Pakistan. The entire aid was 
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furnished under aide-memoirs signed in 1954, 1960, 1961 and 
1962, in which the USA agreed to equip four specific units of 
Pakistan armed forces.*''' 
The increase of US economic aid to Pakistan was also not 
without military implications. It seemed to have been subsidy to 
the main percentage of the huge War machinery which Pakistan 
had tried to set up during 1954-1964. American economic aid to 
Pakistan until the end of fiscal year 1965, was estimated worth 
$2.5 to 3 billion«8. 
The US interest in Pakistan as strategic partner in South 
Asia diminished gradually and steadily around 1959-1960. 
Pakistan which was termed as "most allied ally" of USA and 
pumped massive security, economic assistance by later fall of this 
trap owing to numerous development at international Scene. The 
thaw in the Cold War during that period changed the US 
perception towards Pakistan, resulted in the cut in military 
assistance programme. 
The efforts of Kennedy administration to win over "non-
aligned" India brought watershed in Pakistan US security and 
strategic relations. The Sino-India War of 1962, was perceived by 
US as a change in geo-political condition of South Asia power 
status. Moreover, Sino-Soviet rift and China's adventure in Taiwan, 
Tibbet convinced US policy makers that principal antagonist and 
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threat to the United States strategic interest was assumed by 
Peoples Republic of China in Asia. 
The role of China in Asia and War with Vietnam loomed large 
in the United States major foreign policy dilemma of the 1960s. 
Hence US policy in the 1960's was much more concerned with the 
future of Asia than it had been previously. 
Irritants and EfTorts Towards Rapprochements 
US-Pakistan relations received a serious setback when the 
former announced an embargo on the supply of military equipment 
to both India and Pakistan, in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak War. The 
US embargo affected Pakistan more than India because of two 
reasons. Firstly, Soviet Union had not imposed any restriction on 
arms supply to India, and secondly, since Pakistan was almost 
dependent upon the US for military hardware, spare parts and 
other ammunitions. Thus, United States betrayed Pakistan. It 
closed the pipeline, with its arms supply dried and US threatening 
to release modem aircrafts and heavy armaments to India, 
Pakistan had to call off its counter offensive and go for ceasefire*^. 
However, one thing is important to note that inspite of embargo, 
US continued supplying military hard wares to Pgikistan through 
Iran, Turkey, West Germany and Italy.*° 
When US imposed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan 
during 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan became conscious of inherent 
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dangers of too much reliance on single source of supply of 
weapons. With their traditional source of supply cut off. Pakistan 
looked for new sources of arms procurements, with China, France, 
Soviet Union (1968-69) and European markets. Henceforth China 
became very reliable and trusted friend of Pakistan. 
After President Richard Nixon's visit to Pakistan in August 
1969, and conscious of Soviet, China inroads made into what had 
been an exclusive US sphere of influence, American tried to win 
back Pakistan by giving more armaments.** Richard Nixon, who 
was known as a firm supporter of military aid and alliance with 
Pakistan.** Efforts were soon made by Nixon administration to lift 
embargo on lethal weapons that had been imposed in 1965.*^ In 
1970, Pakistan was given military hardwares worth $15.40 million 
from the US at throwaway price as the market value of these arms 
was estimated to be $150 million, probably to save of opposition in 
the Senate.®* 
Bangladesh crisis was another test of US-P£ikistan strategic 
relationship. US "tilt" towards Pakistan in 1971 War was not 
committed for its integrity. America took half hearted interest when 
Pakistan's very survival as a nation state was being questioned. 
Although an embargo was imposed in 1971 by the USA but in 
March 1973, it returned to the 1967 policy. However, a section of 
policy makers in Islamabad saw US role in the 1971 crisis with 
suspicion. Pakistan thought that the US had covertly connivec 
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with the Indian government in its plan for the creation of 
Bangladesh. It deliberately fed disinformation about the move of its 
seventh fleet in support of Pakistan. This disinformation turned 
into embarrassment for Pakistan when it was dismembered.®* 
However, it is ironical that while the US was covertly 
conniving with and supporting India in the breakup of Pakistan, 
the latter, even while in the thick of battle of its survival, went out 
of its way to further US interests by laying the historical bridge for 
Sino-US relations by arranging Chou-enlai-Henry Kissinger 
Summit". 
Rather than beefing up Pakistan's defence to enable it to 
maintain the minimal defensive deterrence. From now on US policy 
towards South Asia gradually shifted from a balance of power 
model in the fifties and sixties to a position of greater recognition of 
India's pre-dominance since 1971. Kissinger refers to the 
Bangladesh crisis as the most difficult of Nixon's first term, as far 
as US South Asia policy was concerned.*^ Thus, the warming of 
relations between US Pakistan during Nixon period was lost with 
bitter experience of Pakistan in 1971 War with India. Similarly 
America also followed policy of disengagement in 70s in Asia 
because of frustrating experience in the Vietnam War. 
The announcement of the lifting of the US arms embargo in 
1975 stated that the US had no interest in upsetting the strategic 
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balance in the subcontinent or resuming America's pre 1965 role 
as the major arms supplier to the region. Now US was more 
interested to play role of a reconciliator between India and 
Pakistan. 
In the War of 1971, Pakistan had lost a large part of its 
military equipments worth $ 200 million, with its military 
demoralized and India proving its ascendance. Once again Bhutto 
needed American military assistance. Since Pakistan had been 
striving hard to acquire arms from the USA and other sources. 
With the lifting of the embargo, Pakistan was free to get US lethal 
weapons short of nuclear ones. In 1975, just after lifting the 
embargo the US Defence Department approved sale of 1 lOA-7 light 
bombers and it contracted with Pakistan worth $700 million for 
military aid." 
Ford administration faced a complex problem of Nuclear 
Development in South Asia. As India had already successfully 
conducted nuclear test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974, which 
completely changed the strategic balance in favour of India. On 
learning that Pakistan want to obtain nuclear device at any cost, 
Henry Kissinger, then US secretary of State, and US President Ford 
warned of making a horrible example out of Pakistan, if it persisted 
with its nuclear policy. This forced American foreign policy makers 
to deter Pakistan and India from acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
and US made non-proliferation a central issue in bilateral relations 
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with Pakistan and India. Since 1974, successive US administration 
have pushed for restrain by both countries, utilizing a range of 
policy tools including diplomatic pressure, embargo on the export 
of nuclear technology, and the leverage of US assistance and arms 
sale. Infact, the United States had sought to oppose proliferation in 
South Asia through all available means at its disposal.*' 
In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Symington 
Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act, which forbade US 
military and economic assistance to any country receiving, 
"nuclear enriched equipment' which was not subject to Atomic 
Energy Safeguards. Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with 
the result that all US assistance was terminated in April, 1979. 
There was however, a revival of US interest in security co-
operationwith Pakistan in the wake of downfall of the Shah regime 
in Iran and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the same 
year.^° 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shot Pakistan to immediate 
prominence in the US perception once again. From a totally 
ignored and forgotten ally who till recently was being bullied and 
served warnings on nuclear issue and whose President had 
spumed disdainfully paltry economic assistance as "peanuts' 
suddenly became the champion of free world and declared to play 
most decisive role in furtherance of US interests in fighting its 
proxy^ War.^ ^ 
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CHAPTER - n 
SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: 
PAKISTAN GETS 'FRONTLINE' STATUS 
Pakistan and the United States came even closer in the wake 
of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 
1979. Eventually, Afghan crisis became a 'turning point' for United 
States-Pak strategic relations. The past deterioration in US-Pak 
relations on account of Pakistan's nuclear programmes came in for 
reappraisal. The Soviet 'adventure' in Afghanistan brought a 
dramatic sea change in the geo-strategic situation and led the 
American policy makers to "rediscover" the strategic importance of 
Pakistan. The Carter Administration emphasized Pakistan's new 
role as a "front line state" against the possible Soviet expansion. 
Pakistan, according to Thomas Perry Thorton, an American 
scholar, now became "an essential line of defence and an 
indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the 
Soviet for their action". ^  
Before the Soviet intervention Pakistan-US relations were 
fraught with deep cleavages over the former's covert acquisition of 
Uranium enrichment technology, when Carter Administration 
suspended American aid to Pakistan under the Symington-Glenn 
Amendment to Security Assistance Act. However, in its efforts to 
re-establish close military and economic ties with the Pakistan 
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government, Washington over rode its nuclear and human rights 
concerns which had inhibited their relations in the past so much. 
Similarly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed both 
challenges and opportunities for Pakistan, an endemically unstable 
country situated uncomfortably at the juncture of South, West and 
Central Asia. The Soviet intervention under scored Pakistan's 
strategic importance as never before. Pakistan responded with a 
much more cautious and subtle policy. The Zia government 
immediately moved to repair its strained ties with Washington and 
other friendly countries to bolster its defence and form a tjroad' 
front against Soviet Union.^ 
The American response towards the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in general and towards Pakistan in particular has to 
be examined in the wider context of other developments in the 
region. The fall of Shah government in Iran, a strong and close 
American ally in West Asia and Persian Gulf, and coming into 
power of a revolutionary regime under AyatoUah RuhoUah 
Khomayni, which was extremely critical of the USA. American's 
political and strategic interest in Gulf suffered a further set back 
when the US embassy personnel were taken hostage in Tehran by 
supporters of Ayatollah Khomayni in November 1979. The 
spiralling events were coupled by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. The Soviet action raised the spectre of renewed Soviet 
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expansionist strategy in the Middle East and had signaled a 
change in the strategic balance in the region.^ 
Genesis of the Afghan Crisis 
Afghan crisis had its genesis in the pro-Soviet elements in 
the Afghan armed forces when they staged a successful coup on 
April 27, 1978, in collaboration with the Afghan communist party 
against President Mohammad Daud. Although, Pakistan 
recognized the new regime and expressed the desire to improve 
relations, still Pakistan was seriously perturbed over what it 
regarded as the Pro-Soviet leanings of the new government in 
Kabul,'* Islamabad was fearful of grave repercussions of the 
establishment of a leftist, a pro-Moscow regime in neighbouring 
Afghanistan. From Pakistan's point of view the coup in Kabul 
caused a historic readjustment in this part of the world as 
Afghanistan ceased to be the traditional iDuffer' between South 
Asia and Soviet Union. The Pakistani establishment apprehended 
that once the new Afghan government had consolidated its position 
it would create difficulties for Pakistan by fanning political 
grievances and ethno-national tension by reviving the 'Durand 
Line' issue between the two countries. As expected by Islamabad 
Afghanistan soon expressed support to the ''Baluch and Pukhtoon 
brethren" from the very out set.^ 
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The change in the guard in Kabul did not go well with the tribal 
and religious conservative society of Afghanistan. They organized 
an armed resistance against the new regime which was denounced 
as communist and atheist. Soon the tribals posed great problems 
for Afghan government and it became quite difficult for it to 
strengthen its foot hold due to the stiff resistance. The Kabul 
government alleged that Pakistan was sheltering and supporting 
mercenaries against Afghanistan. The allegations were not 
completely baseless as there were evidence that Pakistan organized 
Afghan resistance fighter from among the refugees, living in 
Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, bordering 
Afghanistan with the cry of "Islam in danger". Islamabad also 
supplied other assistance through American's CIA and ISI of 
Pakistan, to strengthen the resistance and enabled it to survive the 
Afghan government's effort to wipe it out. Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan provided both opportunities and fear for Islamabad. 
Pakistan and Afghanistan had long standing border dispute along 
the North-Westem part of Pakistan. To pre-empt future Afghan 
demand Zia administration organized and trained number of 
Pushtoons on the both side of the border under Pakistan control. 
Zia government used these fighters for its advantage to not only 
end Afghanistan claims across line but also create a formidable 
'buffer' between it and the Soviet imperial domain to the North.^ 
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Pakistan perceived the communist government in 
Afghanistan as a serious threat to its security. Pakistan tried to 
formulate international opinion against Soviet threat to its security 
and enforce Afghan resistance fighters. Zia wanted the United 
States to take a serious note of the grave situation arising from the 
installation of a communist government in Kabul and respond 
forcefully in collaboration with Islamabad. Pakistan officially 
sought to impress upon the US officials, the need to hold their 
country as it had virtually became "a front line state".^ 
The Carter administration was comparatively slow to 
appreciate the implications of the Afghan coup and did not 
comprehend the grave threat inherent in that. Since at that time 
the 'Cold War' was as its lowest ebb and there was detente between 
the super powers. Due to reduction in conflict in other parts of the 
world the Afghan coup was viewed in Washington as an internal 
event without Soviet Union's role. There was no immediate official 
reaction by the US to the communist coup in Kabul. The US 
economic, cultural, educational and peace programme in 
Afghanistan continued. This studied silence maintained by 
Washington showed that it was unconcerned that another country 
apparently had joined the Soviet bloc. 
The Shah of Iran was the first to draw Carter's attention 
towards Soviet intention in Kabul. But American officials did not 
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pay heed to Iranian version of the coup. Tehran considered it one 
more example of the Soviet grand design and a further proof of the 
Soviet drive to encircle Iran. To Iran's surprise US urged Shah to 
co-operate with Afghan government. 
There appeared to be no serious thinking in Washington to 
review the US South Asia policy, particularly relations with Iran 
and Pakistan in the rapidly changing strategic scenario in this 
region. The US was well convinced by the Soviet Afghan assurance 
that the "Saur revolution" was an internal development committed 
to promote democracy and security and to pursue a non aligned 
policy.^ 
Assassination of US Ambassador in Kabul 
However, the events that followed made it very evident to the 
US policy maker's that their Afghan assessment was erroneous. It 
was the murder of Ambassador Dubbs in Kabul in February 1979, 
which made the Carter administration to realize the ground reality 
and grave implications of the coup. He was first kept as hostage in 
Kabul and subsequently assassinated by four Afghan's in Kabul on 
February 14, 1979. Dubbs assassination cast a spell on the 
already deteriorating US-Afghan relations. As it posed many 
unresolved questions about the role of Afghan government in the; 
affairs and its consequent uncooperative attitude. Dubbs was kept 
hostage in a hotel and kidnappers demanded release of the 
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arrested leftist member in exchange for Dubbs. The US embassy 
advised the Afghan government to prolong the negotiations while 
applying rescue operations. But the Afghan forces along with 
Soviet advisers stormed the hotel which resulted in the death of 
Dubbs. According to Richard P. Comin, Soviet Security advisers 
appeared to be directing the operation and the Afghan government 
disregarded US suggestion that an attempt to rescue Dubbs by 
force be delayed. The United States was highly provoked by this 
act. The outraged Carter administration blamed Moscow's 
involvement in the murder of Dubbs. On July 23'^, 1978 
Washington announced the withdrawal of most of its diplomatic 
personnel from Afghanistan because of security reasons. Thus, US 
relations with Afghanistan reached at its nadir. Now Washington 
recognized effect of the coup on Afghanistan's neighbours.^ 
Given the anti-American orientation of the Iranian 
Revolution, and India's pro-Soviet stance, Pakistan was seen as the 
one country with which to work closely in order to protect US 
interest in the area. The development in Iran and Afghanistan 
forced the Carter administration to resume aid to Pakistan on 
October 24, 1978. This decision was taken to align closely with 
Pakistan. 10 Carter administration took time to implement the 
decisions. 
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United States issued a warning to the Soviet Union of the 
adverse consequences of their expanding role in Afghanistan. In 
early September 1979, the United States consulted Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia regarding the resistance in Afghanistan. This 
consultation could be construed as the beginning of US aid 
programmes for the Afghan resistance forces against the 
communist government. The United States under took this 
operation through other countries to deliberately avoid a direct 
dependence on Pakistan for its implementation. It implies that 
American concern for the Afghan situation did not meaningfully 
influence its relations with Pakistan. 
Despite its growing concern with the Afghan issue, the 
Carter administration remained unmindful of the need, even after 
the fall of Iran, to discover the strategic importance of Pakistan and 
improve relations with it. The development in Afghanistan since 
the April 1978 coup, including the amassing of the Soviet troops 
along the Afghan border which was a clear indication of a large 
scale Soviet operation in late 1979, did not prove a catalyst 
towards an improvement in Pak-US security relations. A crisis of 
confidence persisted between Islamabad and Washington until the 
Afghan situation assumed a qualitatively new dimension after the 
Soviet intervention in December 1979.^^ 
US Perception of Soviet Intervention 
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The American official view point regarding Soviet intention 
behind the intervention in Afghanistan was nothing less than as 
"invasion". To the US, States Department the activities had 
increased to the extent of "political threat to the security of nations 
in the region and the world's access to vital resources and shipping 
routes". 12 
Carter Administration interpreted the offensive 'invasion' as 
part of Soviet master plan to undermine and overwhelm the West 
by increasing control of the oil rich Persian-Gulf and warm water of 
the Arabian sea. Richard Nixon former American President, 
remarked that the incident marked the assertion of the Soviet 
Union global power which posed a challenge to America's status as 
a super power. 
Thus, the United States drew the worst possible scenario of 
the Soviet arms intervention and objectives in the occupation of 
Afghanistan. To the US, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was 
an event full of repercussions and implications for the region. The 
crux of these implications was that the occupation of Afghanistan 
gave the Soviet Union an objective capability to threaten important 
US interest in the area which it did not have before. 
The US perceived that the Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan presented dangerous prospects of further Soviet 
advancement in the South and East, threatening the security of 
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the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region and jeopardizing the 
supply of oil to the West. The Soviet move was seen to have altered 
the geo-political situation in the area in very ominous fashion, 
eliminating a "buffer state" Afghanistan between the Soviet Union 
and Pakistan, and presented a new threat to Iran. It was argued 
that even if the Soviet's did not exercise military option arising out 
of the occupation of Afghanistan, the strategic map of the world 
would have been irrevocably changed for the worse,^^ 
President Carter before the joint session of the Congress on 
January 23, 1980 stated that the region which is now threatened 
by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. 
The Soviet efforts to dominate Afghanistan has brought its forces 
within 300 miles of Indian ocean and close to the strait of Hormuz-
a water way through which most of the world's oil flows. The Soviet 
Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position. That 
poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. ^ '^ 
Apart from maintaining geo-political implications the US 
administration also interpreted Soviet invasion in terms of a 
serious threat to world peace and violation of norms of 
international behavior. Carter observed that "the explosiveness of 
the region, its great natural wealth and Soviet willingness to use 
the forces which have been developed during the Kremlin's 
enormous military buildup during the last fifteen years are what 
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combine to make the invasion of Afghanistan so unsettling to the 
future of international peace".'^ 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also represented to 
Washington a new departure in Moscow's policy. The use of Soviet 
military force in Afghanistan was interpreted as a signal of Soviet 
policy entering a more aggressive and overtly expansionist phase. 
This was the first use of Soviet forces since the 1940s in an effort 
to extend the Soviet domination beyond the traditional socialist 
camp. In this context the Soviet move represented an extension of 
the "Brezhrev Doctrine" outside the Soviet dominated Eastern 
Europe. 1* 
Some US analysts also concluded that Soviet intervention 
could lead to superpower struggle resulting in war in South Asia. 
Therefore, the US formulated policy response cautiously so that 
Moscow could not succeed in its desired goal and threaten vital US 
interest in the West and South Asia. Washington soon realized that 
regional co-operation is essential to check further, the expansionist 
policy of the Soviet Union. Carter administration sent back 
diplomatic envoys to win support of strategically located countries. 
American policy makers took steps that no country is frightened or 
neutralized in the wake of steadily growing Soviet Military power 
and Soviet proximity of the region. Washington was of the view that 
if the regional countries were ever neutralized or threatened into 
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inaction because of the Soviet proximity it would facilitate 
consolidation of Soviet position in Afghanistan and enable it to 
wield greater influence at the cost of US position in South-West 
Asia. So all the policies were made keeping in view the role of the 
regional countries in general and Pakistan in particular. 
Pakistan and Iran the two strategically located countries 
with a friendly disposition towards the US could be further target 
of Soviet expansionist policy through Afghanistjm. The Carter 
administration did not want to loose its strategic allies at any cost, 
because their co-operation was essential to make the Afghan 
venture a bitter pill for the Soviet to swallow. As America was still 
to recover from the shock of losing its old friend Iran when a 
revolution brought AyatoUah Khomayni to power in Tehran. 
Hence, in the period when Soviet armed forces were engaged 
in a protected effort to conquer Afghanistan, when a revolutionary 
Iran was openly hostile to the American presence in West Asia, and 
when the Middle East was highly flammable, the interest of the 
United States lay in strengthening it ties with Pakistan. The US 
assured large scale economic and military assistance for Pakistan 
to preserve its independence and integrity to bring about a 
withdrawl of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. ^ ^ Thus eventual entry 
of Soviet army in Afghanistan brought sea change, resulted in 
close US-Pak strategic relationship. 
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Pakistan's Perception of the Soviet Move % . ^7 
Pakistan's perception of the Soviet intervention was different 
from the US. It was question of survival for the former and 
maintaining superpower status for the latter. President Ziaul 
Haque felt "the Soviet intervention had brought Soviet troops to the 
Pakistan frontier presenting Pakistan with a most critical 
situation." 18 Feverish construction of infrastructure and steady 
process of sovietization of Afghanistan force shadowed a long term 
Soviet military presence in that country. As the Soviet would stay 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan was fearful of becoming the *periphery' of 
a super power, with all the implications of super power rivalry. 
Another worrisome prospects from Pakistan's stand point was the 
possibility of active Soviet support to Afghanistan on the Baluch 
and Pukhtoonistan issue. 
In the mean time, a large number of Afghan refugees had 
begun to cross into Pakistan soon after the April 1978 coup it 
increased substantially, and after the Soviet intervention and the 
intensification of resistance in Afghanistan it reached alarming 
proportions. With the passage of time Pakistan became a safe and 
readily accessible sanctuary for the Afghan refugees and resistance 
fighters. Since the popular resistance against the Soviet troops 
would continue, Pakistan's abiding fear was that the conflict in 
Afghanistan might spill over into its territory. This fear became 
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more pronounced in view of Moscow-Kabul allegation of Pakistani 
involvement in the war and threat of grave consequences for its 
alleged involvement. The threat turned into reality when Moscow-
Kabul forces engaged in air violations and cross border raids 
against resistant Mujahideen fighters in Pakistan's territory. 
The Pakistani establishment perceived four possible threats 
which could materialize in any form. 
(a) A direct full fledged attack to amputate and isolate 
Mujahideens in Baluchistan or North West Frontier Province. 
(b) Cross border reprisal to intimidate Pakistan, or crossing into 
its territory into hot pursuit of the resistance forces and 
destruction of sancturies of fighters. 
(c) Standard practice of subversion and integration of 
secessionist forces: 
(d) Pakistan also foresaw the future where Pakistan could face 
two front attack. 
Zia government envisaged a situation where Soviet Union 
and India could attack in collaboration at two fronts. 
Although the risk of Soviet attacks incursions and 
subversions was high in Pakistan still its policy establishment 
down played the gravity of a direct Soviet attack in public. The 
underlining thinking was to keep people ignorant about anticipated 
Soviet attack because that could have created serious law and 
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order problems in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Provinces. 
Pakistan had vowed to fight back in case Soviet, attacks its interest 
any where. 1^  
The Soviet Union threatened Pakistan repeatedly that 
upholding of "imperialist aggression' against Afghanistan from its 
territory was increasingly drawing it into a dangerous 
combination.20 it was feared that the Soviet Union would not 
tolerate for long the resistance to its domination over Afghanistan. 
Pakistan also perceived the possibility of Indo-Soviet 
collaboration against it. There was report that Soviet leaders were 
persuading the Indian leadership to help them dissipate opposition 
against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to put pressure 
on the eastern border of Pakistan to make things unbearable for 
Islamabad.21 Hence, Pakistan was faced with three front attack 
scenario viz. an Indian threat, threat from Afghanistan and 
internal threat on account of huge Afghan refugees sheltering 
there. 
Pakistan which shares a 2400 km long border with 
Afghanistan felt directly exposed to Soviet military pressure. This 
affected greatly the security considerations of the military regime in 
Islamabad. The Zia regime perceived drastic shift in the regional 
balance of military power and the emergence of growing security 
situation far beyond its ability to manage on its own. 
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Pakistan realized that without adequate defence it was 
fumbling towards a position in which its security would rest on the 
good will of the Soviet Union and India. The state of Pakistan's 
feeble defence could not remain unremedied because a weak 
Pakistan would increase the temptation for any power pursuing its 
strategic designs. It was argued that Pakistan capable of self 
defence could deter hegemonic and expansionist ambition in the 
region. 22 
Besides it was clear to the Pakistan authorities that if 
Pakistan wanted to hold steadfast against the Soviet pressure and 
pursue its Afghan policy, it needed international diplomatic as well 
as material support. Among available options Islamabad found the 
US as an effective and willing partner which could shore up its 
defence and help it counter the mounting Soviet pressure on it by 
establishing a close security relationship. Thus, it was natural for 
Pakistan leaders to improve relations with their erstwhile ally and 
benefactor. 
A Revived Friendship 
Moscow's adventure totally changed the situation for 
Pakistan and for the US-Pakistani military and strategic 
relationship. Over night Zia obtained internal political breathing 
room and an opportunity to refurbish his external ties. The United 
States moved quickly to revitalize the moribund US Pakistan 
58 
security relationship. Pakistan drew closer to its regional friends. 
Thus, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan became a watershed in 
US-Pakistan strategic relations. President Carter reversed his 
foreign policy priorities in the light of changing international 
scenario. There was convergence in US-Pakistan security 
perceptions. Once again Pakistan suddenly became a frontline and 
an essential anchor of the US in South West Asia. Pakistan was 
up-graded dramatically in the United States global strategic 
designs within few days of the Russian invasion. Carter 
categorically announced that the US was committed to the security 
of Pakistan and other aid to Pakistan to defend its territorial 
integrity. He also emphasized the US commitment to Pakistan 
under 1959 executive agreement.23 (which had remained operative 
only on paper in the past) and declared that the USA's willingness 
to use force if necessary to protect Pakistan against Soviet attack.^^ 
The first aid package of $ 400 million to Pakistan which was 
made on January 12, 1980, had three components. An American 
commitment to guarantee Pakistan's security. Secondly, $ 200 
million worth of America's economic aid to Pakistan spread over 
two years. Thirdly, $ 200 million worth of military hard wares to be 
supplied to Islamabad by Washington. 
Besides this. Carter urged the Congress to reconfirm the 
1959 executive agreement with Pakistan on January 31, 1980, the 
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Carter administration informed key Congressional leaders that, it 
intended to enter into long term military support relationship with 
Pakistan.25 Congressional sources said that originally the US 
administration had thought of seeking only an emergency 'onetime 
exception' of the law^^ barring Pakistan from America aid because 
of its nuclear weapons programmes but ultimately the 
administration planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to 
Pakistan without any time limit. 
However, much to US surprise about revival of friendship 
with Pakistan through US aid programmes President Zia-ul-Haque, 
dismissed American aid offer of $ 400 million as "peanuts". He felt 
that the aid package was "terribly disappointing" and that it could 
not buy security for Pakistan.27 He added that it was too small to 
be effective but large enough to buy greater animosity from the 
Soviet Union which is more influential in the region than the 
United States.^s A few days later foreign minister Agha Shahi 
phrased the rejection more diplomatically telling the Washington 
post "the assistance must be commensurate with the size of the 
threat.29 
The obvious reason for his rejection were that Pakistan 
found the level of aid pledged by the USA insufficient and the USA 
was still resisting Pakistan's pressure for formalizing the 1959 
security agreement into a treaty.^o President Zia, infact, thought 
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the leaders of the United States wanted to give a little aid, "let 
Pakistan bum its bridges forever with the Soviet Union and then 
leave it in the lurch". Zia held the view that Carter administration 
was in a state of panic after the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan and that it was the most opportune time for him to 
extract the maximum commitment from them. Washington was 
expected to "prove its credibility" as an ally before Pakistan 
accepted US aid^i. 
Zia's dismissal of the aid offer as "a quibble" perturbed the 
Carter administration. However, Carter still sounded optimistic 
about the revival of friendship with Pakistan, in his State of the 
Union speech before US Congress on January 23, 1980. Jimmy 
Carter said that one of "highest legislative priorities"32 was a new 
military and economic assistance programmes/package for 
Pakistan. He also sent a military and diplomatic mission headed by 
his National Security advisor Zbignew Brzezinski to Pakistan in 
February, 1980 to reaffirm American commitment to the security of 
Pakistan under the 1959 agreement and to negotiate the proposed 
aid package. Although, Zia expressed satisfaction over the renewed 
US commitment to Pakistan, but did not accept the offer^ a. 
Nevertheless, American authorities continued to negotiate with 
Pakistan to improve relations. 
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The rejection of U.S. aid offers by Pakistan, effectively, 
scuttled the revival of friendly relations, Pakistan had bitter past 
experience when Washington had let it down in 1965 and again in 
1971. Pakistan was also irritated over the hypocracy of the non-
proliferation policy of the United States. It was also feared that 
President Carter would not be very forthcoming in extending strong 
political and military support to Pakistan in view of its keen 
desired to maintain its friendly relation with India. A number of 
explanation for Zia's rebuff of the aid package could be given: 
(1) Pakistan was vary of developing a close and formalized 
association with the United States at the very outset of Soviet 
intervention. The rejection suited the Pakistani rulers as they were 
interested in the formation of a broad international diplomatic 
front against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As of now when 
world opinion was building against Soviet Union, alignment with 
US would have hit badly the Afghan cause and Pakistan's stand on 
it. Thus, hurting Pakistan's efforts to muster support for a broad 
based front against Soviet Union.^^ 
According to another viewpoint Pakistan had sufficient 
reasons to reject the aid offer. In view of a magnitude of the 
problems posed by Soviet move, the consequent US assistance was 
not "commensurate with the size of the threat". Pakistan expected 
the Carter administration to put together a substantial aid 
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programmes but that fell well short of Pakistan's expectations and 
needs. The Pakistani officials termed the proposed aid programme 
as inadequate it would, unless substantially modified and 
increased, instead of reducing Pakistan's security problems 
enhance Pakistan's insecurity. 
Moreover, the aid package had been announced without 
prior consultation with Islamabad. To Pakistan's dismay US 
refused to supply Pakistan the F-16 aircraft which Pakistan 
considered extremely important to bolster the country's defence 
capability. 
Pakistan wanted to upgrade the status of 1959 defence 
agreement to a formal treaty endorsed by the Congress. In view of 
its expectations not coming true at the hands of the United States, 
Pakistan insisted for guarantees against Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis, 
which weighed high in its security calculations. Perhaps the most 
important reason for refusal of aid package was Zia government's 
low confidence in the Carter administration. Pakistan's past 
disappointment made it to realize that the United States was 
fundamentally an 'unreliable' partner in international politics and 
should not be taken seriously.^^ 
The officials of the Pakistan foreign office were less 
enthusiastic about the prospect of realignment with the United 
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states, believing there existed profound doubt in Washington 
about the wisdom of deeper involvement in South Asia. 
Pakistan was reluctant to credit the pledges and assurance 
to an administration that swung almost overnight from a position 
of neglect to one of over reaction. It seemed inconceivable to policy 
makers in Islamabad that the same administration which had 
failed to acknowledge the transformation of Afghanistan into 
'Soviet satellite' from 1978 to December to 1979 branded the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan as the greatest challenge facing the free 
world since world war II.^ ^ 
In the light of this shaky faith of Pakistan in US, Brezezinski 
urged Carter to ensure that no ambiguity should be left in 
Pakistan's mind regarding US position.^^ 
To assuage Pakistan's suspicion about the seriousness of the 
US intentions, the President spelled out the "Carter Doctrine" the 
new policy under which a Soviet attack against the Persian Gulf 
would be regarded as on attack on US vital interest. He reaffirmed 
the security commitment to Pakistan, declaring "The United States 
will take action consistent with our laws to assist Pakistan to resist 
any outside aggression.^* 
Carter Doctrine was primarily regarding American's own 
military power, the five specific parts of the doctrine's architecture 
amply justified this^^. These were, first, the Rapid deployment 
64 
force, to improve American's capability to deploy US military force 
rapidly to distant areas, Second, enhanced naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean and acquisition of base facility in the Gulf and the 
North East Africa. Third, it was recommended that the Congress 
should approve a strong defence budget for 1981 encompassing a 
5 percent real growth in authorization without any reduction. 
Fourth, the creation of security framework in the region with the 
countries with different values and political belief under the US 
auspices and fifth, defence commitment to Pakistan in order to 
assist it in resisting any outside aggression and accordingly a 
reaffirmation of the USA 1959 executive agreement with the 
Pakistan.'*^ By using the label "a frame work of regional 
cooperation for his doctrine Carter seemed to imply what USA did 
not intend, to wage a global Cold War with the Soviet Union, rather 
than its intention was to contain Moscow in the Persian Gulf 
region. In essence, therefore "Carter Doctrine" conferred doctrinal 
justification on the USA to intervene in the Arab, Persian Gulf, 
South West Asian region to protect the interest of the West. 
Consequent upon Pakistan's stubborn attitude Carter 
administration suspended Congressional approval of $ 400 million 
in order to hold further talks and reach an agreement with 
Pakistan. Islamabad was assured that $ 400 million package was 
only a beginning and more would be available in later years.^i 
Thornton an American scholar said that the offer was not 
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munificent but was surely not "peanuts" as Zia described. Further 
more, Carter administration was prepared to form a group of 
donors to assist Pakistgin.'*^ 
Minor Disafrreexnents and Misunderstandings 
The Pakistani establishment were not convinced by these 
assurances and initiatives taken by Washington. An impasse was 
created where by Zia noted that the invasion of Afghanistan has 
brought the Soviet Union to our doorstep.'*^ He stated that in the 
absence of "active participation" by the United States, Pakistan 
may have to adopt itself to the new reality. "If you live in the sea 
you have to learn to swim with the whales", became a part of his 
lexicon. He cited the fact that "history has taught us not to 
harbour any illusions",'*'' regarding US participation. Zia 
administration looked towards China and Islamic Nations for 
support. 
Pakistan's effort to forge a strategic alliance with the China 
as a bulwark against the Soviet threat created more gulf than 
friendship vis-a vis the US. Apart from this, the issues of non 
proliferation, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and India's 
objection over military assistance to Pakistan continued to imperil 
Pak-US security relations. All this led to the fear that either the 
Carter administration failed to fully comprehend Pakistan's 
enhanced strategic importance and security problem in the new 
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setting or was intentionally not doing enough for her. It appeared 
that the Afghan issue did not elevate Pakistan in the list of 
American priorities and it was still of 'peripheral' interest to the 
United States. 
Thus no significant breakthrough in Pakistan-US strategic 
relations was achieved during the Carter administration. Despite, a 
mutual desire and a clear recognition in Islamabad and 
Washington to revive friendship in order to meet the challenge 
posed by the Soviet intervention. However, the Afghanistan issue 
appeared to be changing the US attitude towards Pakistan when 
the Carter administration supported the rescheduling of Pakistan's 
foreign debt and the $1.6 billion IMF credit for Pakistan.''^ 
The Carter administration also strongly supported Pakistan's 
stance against recognizing the Soviet installed regime in Kabul. 
Pakistan and the US also co-operated in creating a broad 
international support for the Afghan cause and provide material 
assistance to the Afghan resistance fighters. Though, the co-
operation remained confined to the Afghan issue only and could 
not make solid impact on Pakistan-US security relationship. It did 
create a land of dependence on each other for implementation of 
Afghan policy. This dependence in return facilitated the 
establishment of a close security relationship between Pakistan 
and the United States under Reagan administration. 
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CHAPTER - III 
PAKISTAN 'REDISCOVERED': 
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 
The victory of Republican Party in the Presidential election 
reflected the change from liberalism to conservatism in American 
foreign policy. The assumption of power by Ronald Reagan as 
President brought sea change in US-Pak relationship. The process 
started by the Carter administration to forge a closes security and 
strategic relations with Pakistan was given a distinct momentum 
by the new administration. The United States under Reagan was 
firm for close relationship with Islamabad as a key partner in 
South Asia in opposing the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. 
The new administration decided that American response would not 
be half hearted boycott of sporting events and ineffective trade 
embargoes but whole hearted efforts to roll back the Soviets from 
South Asia, and full-scale support for Pakistan. ^  
The Reagan administration believed that Carter's efforts to 
construct a new world order had adversely affected American 
interests and image around the world. A fresh appraisal of the 
world strategic realities and challenges convinced Reagan that the 
Soviet Union still constituted a primary and formidable threat to 
vital US interests and that the promotion of these interest was 
becoming increasingly difficult. In such a scenario Reagan 
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administration decided that countries in strategic location needed 
to be supported with military and economic assistance to stem 
possible attack against them by the Soviet Union. 
In a reappraisal of US policy towards Pakistan, Reagan 
administration neglected Carter's arms restriction on Pakistan, 
issue of non-proliferation and human rights, which loomed large 
on US Pakistan relations during past years. Thus, Pakistan 
because of new permissive policy frame-work, emerged as a 
strategically *Front line' state in South and West Asia.* 
Thus, change of guard in America brought cheers and 
optimism in Islamabad. The renewed interest of US in Pakistan 
enhanced Pakistan's bargaining position vis-a-vis USA. By 
recognizing its potential role in American foreign policy Pakistan 
was able to manoeuvre successfully on Reagan's strong anti 
communism, to continue on its nuclear programme, increase its 
security vis-a-vis India, military and economic aid to cope with the 
refugees crisis, consolidate the regime in Islamabad and most 
significantly, secure its Western flank against potential Soviet 
Afghan encroachment^. 
For Zia regime, the implications of the Reagan Presidency 
were vast. With the Reagan administration, Islamabad found 
consistent partner with which to pursue goals in South Asia. For 
Reagan, an opportunity to confront the Soviet and force them out 
of South Asia represented a chance to re-establish containment as 
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a doctrine and America's prestige as a force capable of initiating 
change in far comers of the world.* 
With the overthrow of Shah regime in Iran, the most 
important pillar of US strategy in the Gulf region had collapsed 
long before. Thus, Afghan crisis posed a great threat to the region. 
However, the United States had evidently recuperated sufficiently 
from the experience of the Vietnam war so that it was ready to try 
its hand once again at a major foreign policy objectives. This time 
America was determined to ensure that same mistakes and 
misperception were not committed. Here the administration found 
willing and capable allies in the Afghan resistance in Islamabad. 
US thought that since Pakistan had earlier been assigned this role 
in the 1950s and 60s it could again assume that role. Further the 
United States could pursue its foreign policy objectives, attempt to 
reestablished a measure of international prestige and confront the 
Soviet Union, without committing troops with the help of Pakistan 
and the Afghan resistance fighters. Hence, Washington found it 
self in a comfortable situation; it could engage in a major foreign 
campaign but still satisfy domestic isolationists. The Afghan crisis 
was an opportunity for the US to re-established much of what it 
had lost in the decade since Vietnam. 
The coming of US-Pakistan as close friends resulted in 
substantial increase in the US arms and economic aid to Pakistan 
in the 1980s and a considerable strengthening of its defence 
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capabilities. Pakistan accepted revised aid package which was 
earlier rejected by Ziaul Haque as "Peanuts". 
Thus, the US establishment started to lay down the basic 
work that would facilitate the eventual extension of substantial 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan. In the large strategic 
interest of USA, the Secretary of the State Alexander Haig urged 
the Congress to soften the ban on aid to Pakistan imposed under 
Symington Amendments Act, which prohibited US assistance to 
countries which pursued nuclear enrichment technology and 
refused to give assurance that they were not developing nuclear 
weapons. Jane A. Coon Deputy Secretary and South Asia 
specialist, said that American now realizes that imposition of a ban 
on aid had not really accomplished the anti proliferation objective 
of the US policy. The sanctions had only led to a growing sense of 
isolation and insecurity in Pakistan''. 
The acceptable solution of nuclear problem was the foremost 
issue between two countries, which had bedeviled relations during 
the Carter years, with Pakistan making evident that it would not 
compromise on its nuclear programme. Washington, in great need 
of Pakistan replied that the issue would not become the centre-
place of US-Pakistan relationship. Moreover, it said that if 
Islamabad did not develop nuclear weapons it would have made 
easier for Reagan administration to establish close relationship 
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with Pakistan, This was a radica! qhange in the yS;^?bhcy towards 
Pakistan, in effect a tacit understanding that America could live 
with Pakistan's nuclear programme as long as Islamabad did not 
take the extreme decision of exploding a bomb.' 
Another irritant in bilateral relations was Pakistan's record 
of human rights and democracy. The Carter Administration had 
been critical of Pakistan on both of these. So Zia wanted to be sure 
that Reagan administration did not continue this type of 
interference in internal matters of Pakistan. General Arif told Haig, 
"we would not like to hear from you the tj^je of govemment-we 
should have" In response, the Secretary of State said, "General, 
your internal situation is your problem"* 
There was convergence of interest between US and Pakistan 
on the issue of covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters. Americans 
agreed, on maintaining the modus operandi, established during 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Reagan administration also 
accepted the Pakistan's insistence that Central Intelligence Agency 
would serve only as a quarter master, to supply arms, equipment 
and munitions for the Mujahideen, whereas supply would be 
funneled through Pakistan's inter Services Intelligence Directorate. 
It was further decided that CIA would train Pakistan's intelligence 
agency in the use of weapons and equipment and ISI in turn would 
instruct the Afghan fighters. This was a great tactical move of Zia 
regime, as Pakistan did not want to lose its new found strategic 
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significance by giving free hand to CIA in dealing with 
mujahideen^. 
The Reagan administration's understandably flexible and 
conciliatory approach towards Pakistan dissipated all the previous 
fears and suspicions in the minds of foreign policy maker in 
Islamabad. Now there was no issue of US 'credibility' and 
'reliability'. With this Pakistan give up long standing demand of 
security assistance to Pakistan under 1959 bilateral agreement. 
This was result of altered atmosphere 'as Pakistan had already 
become strategically inevitable for America. So no need was felt to 
seek a security guarantee beyond a pledge made by Reagan 
administration against a communist attack. America-Pak strategic 
friendship now moved forward on a durable basis. 
The Aid Package 
The US military and economic assistance to Pakistan started 
when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted on May 14, 
1981 by 10 vote to 7 to lift restriction on aid to Pakistan and 
approved the administration's request for $100 million in 
Economic Support Fund for 1982 and $600,000 for the 
International Military Training and Education Programmes (IMET) 
for Pakistan.8 
Thus, the rapprochement which had resulted from the Soviet 
intervention assumed the tangible form of aid based relationship. 
78 
Pakistan officially accepted the US economic and military 
assistance in September 15, 1981. Initially the Reagan 
administration offered a five year $2.5 million package to Pakistan 
which was later raised to $ 3.2 million beginning with Financial 
year 1983*. The new package included inter alia an additional $ 
500 million worth of commodity assistance^**. 
The policy of $ 3.2 billion was divided equally between 
economic assistance and foreign military sales credit guarantees of 
1.6 billion. Each of the $ 1.6 billion economic aid component of the 
package, $ 1 billion was in the form of a grant the remaining $ 600 
million had a 10 years grace period and 20 years repayment period 
at 2 percent interest respectively. The military sales component of 
$ 1.6 billion carried an interest rate of 14 percent with a re-
payment period of 30 years with 7-10 years grace period on the 
principal. ^ ° 
The American aid package was designed in large measure to 
meet Pakistan's air defence need. A large proportion of the total 
military credit (some $ 1.1 billion) was to go for the acquisition of 
40 F-16 aircraft. Pakistan made it clear that it regarded the F-16 
transaction as a "test of American earnestness" and American 
political commitments. The high performance aircraft was 
considered by Pakistan as best suited to their defence requirement 
over the long haul.i* 
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Since there was need to modernize ground and naval forces, 
America promised 100 M48A5 tanks, 35 m88 AI recovery vehicle, 
20 M901. I-two vehicle (together with 1005 1-Two missiles) 64 
M109 A2 self-propeled Howitzers, 75 M198 towed Howitzers and 
10AH-15attack helicopters. Other items which were under 
discussion included tanks helicopters, A-10 close support aircraft, 
APC's surface to air missiles anti aircraft and new naval 
ordnance^^ 
This agreement with Pakistan was logical and necessary 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Reagan 
urged the Congress to approve the five year economic and military 
aid package, in precaution. As in case of failure to respond to 
Pakistan's imminent need for external assistance at the critical 
time would "jeopardise important American Security interest"^3. 
Pakistan received massive military aid from USA during the 
Financial year-1984. In a fervent appeal to the Congress to keep 
the aid commitment to Pakistan at the agreed levels and not to 
make any cut the State Department officials said that the relation 
between the USA and Pakistan had been volatile and that it is 
crucial' as we move to re-established our ties, that we do all we 
can to built trust and confidence in each other's reliability we need 
to alloy any lingering Pakistani doubt about the depth of our 
commitment to the revived relationship. He revealed that Pakistan 
has already made financial commitment to totaling $550 million in 
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1983 alone to be paid to American arms contractors for weapons 
purchase, and that any cuts in that would put them in difficulty. 
Pakistan received $745 million from the Reagan 
administration during 1984 Financial year. Out of this aid $225 
million was for economic assistance and remaining $520 million in 
military assistance. Besides, it was proposed to give $ 57.4 million 
by way of PL-480 assistance. In addition a budgetary provision of $ 
800,000 had been made to train Pakistani military officers in 
USA.i* 
Pakistani establishment asked Reagan administration in 
December 1984 to be permitted to acquire the E-2C airbase early 
warning system, other wise known as Hawkeye to guide its long 
range F16 attack bomber. By the middle of November 1984 25 F-
16 aircrafts had been delivered to Pakistan. USA was apparently 
impressed with President Ziaul Haque's plea for more sophisticated 
weapons systems and war system. But Islamabad received set 
back in 1985 when its endeavour of obtaining Hawkeye was turned 
down by Reagan administration on the recommendation made by a 
SP visiting Pentagon team to Islamabad. The team was of the view 
that the Hawkeye-E2 aircraft for early warning border surveillance 
was not suitable for Pakistan^'. 
Beside routine on going aid package Washington on various 
occasions provided substantive aid to Pakistan to keep it focused 
and prepared to fight against any misadventure of Soviet Union. 
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President Ronald Reagan in October 1985 had asked the Congress 
to approve a $ 106 million aid package to Pakistan which was 
supplementary to the ongoing $ 3.02 billion aid package and $ 50 
million AIM 92 Side Vinder missile sale.*® 
In the mean time, when it became evident over the years that 
the Afghanistan issue would persist beyond the completion of the 
six-year aid programe in 1987, the two countries initiated 
negotiations to conclude a new aid package even before the expiry 
of the old one*^. As result of these negotiations an aid deal of 
$ 4.02 billion was signed on March 24, 1986, a tremendous 
increase over the existing package, which further strengthened 
relations between Pakistan and United States. The package carried 
more relaxations on payment than the previous aid deal. It was 
more favourable to Pakistan because, it underlined Pakistan's 
penciled stand on the Afghan issue and steadfastness against 
pressure^®. 
The strategic and security relations between US-Pakistan 
entered new phase with purpose and resolve when Pakistani Prime 
Minister M.K. Junejo paid a visit to Washington in July 1986 to 
acknowledge the American aid package. President Reagan's 
message at that time reaffirmed the US "commitment to Pakistan's 
independence, security and territorial integrity. Washington and 
Islamabad expressed satisfaction over the successful conclusion of 
negotiation over six year period assistance package for 1987-1993. 
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President Reagan stressed that this unique multi-year 
programme provided tangible evidence of the durability and 
continuity of US commitment to strengthen Pakistan's defence 
capability in the face of Soviet pressure from Afghanistan. Reagan 
expressed his administration's admiration for Pakistan's courage in 
standing up to Soviet pressure through Afghanistan and for its 
selfless provision of humanitarian relief to the nearly three million 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan^®. 
During 1988 financial year Pakistan was proposed $ 670 
million in economic aid and military sale package by Reagan 
administration, which was on increase of $12 million over its aid 
for financial year 1987. US administration proposed $ 666 million 
for financial year 1986 as aid for Pakistan but the Congress 
approved only $638 million, as in the house of Representative and 
Senate Committee, Democrats were in control. In the figure 
presented for the financial year 1988, Pakistan was to received 
$ 290-92 million in military assistance. The bulk of it was in the 
form of military sales credits and 386-95 million in economic aid. 
However, it was not made clear that how the military funds would 
be spent but an airborne early warning system, sophisticated 
tanks and additional F16 fighters were under consideration.^^ 
Nuclear Issue 
The dilemmas the United States faced in its relations with 
Pakistan have been political and strategic, the nuclear issue was 
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by and large the most serious. The US-Pakistan strategic alliance 
suffered a serious set back on nuclear issue in August 1987. When 
on July 10 the US authorities arrested a Pakistani bom Canadian 
citizen Arshad Parvaiz in Philadelphia on charge that he tried to 
export to Pakistan weapon grade uranium. Pakistan officials, 
however denied any link to the suspect in that case. Before this 
another Pakistani Mr Nazir Ahmad was arrested in Houston while 
trying to smuggle Krytone electronic switches, that can trigger a 
nuclear bomb. 
The Reagan administration expressed serious concern over 
attempts at an illegal export of the goods which would have 
increased substantially Pakistan's ability to manufacture a nuclear 
device, and said that Pakistan needed to take concrete steps to 
restore its credibility and further asked Islamabad to give 
assurance that it was not trying to develop a nuclear weapon. 
In 1985 American Congress passed a law (Pressler 
Amendment) that prohibited US aid to nations that possessed 
nuclear device. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs sub 
Committee on Asia Stephan J. Solarz said that Pakistan appeared 
to have exhibited "a blatant disregard for American law if we do not 
enforce the law it will make mockery of our non-proliferation 
policy" Mr. Solarz Urged President Reagan to act and halt the aid 
to Pakistan. 
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In a surprise move US authorities took serious turn over 
Pakistan's nuclear programme when it stalled all its aid to 
Pakistan till January 15, 1988 in the wake of latters attempts to 
smuggle out nuclear weapons oriented materials and its refusal to 
allow the inspection of its Kahuta nuclear plant. The two aid 
programmes which had been put off were the $540 million military 
and economic aid and the renewed $ 4.02 billion aid which was to 
commence from October 1, 1987, this was the first concrete action 
against Pakistan since 1979. 
Thus, despite certain strong evidence available to 
Washington that Pakistan was involved in a clandestine weapon -
oriented nuclear programmes, the Reagan administration accepted 
Islamabad's argument that it was not going nuclear. The US 
Congress on the desire of Reagan administration cleared the $ 4.02 
billion military and economic aid package for Pakistan. With the 
approval of both Houses the aid to Pakistan resumed for the next 
six years. 
The Reagan administration continued to certify that Pakistan 
did not possess a nuclear device in order to satisfy the 
Congressional requirement for release of aid. The most repeated 
and persuasive justification which the US government offered for 
aid to Pakistan was the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The aid 
programme was defended as a part of an overall American policy of 
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making available efficient and comparatively low cost aid 
programmes to friendly countries in order to help them make 
better use of their scarce resources and meet security threats 
within or on their borders. 
Strengthening of Pakistan was viewed as the key to its ability 
to maintain its integrity and stand against potential external 
threats. The most immediate and potential external threat Pakistan 
then faced was the Soviet threat from Afghanistan. It was argued 
that Pakistan's nuclear programme was in large part prompted by 
its sense of insecurity, further aggravated by the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan US aid was expected to reduce the sense of 
insecurity, and consequently the chance of Pakistan going nuclear. 
The Reagan administration repeatedly cautioned Congress that any 
restriction on aid to Pakistan to curb its nuclear programme would 
be self defeating^i. 
It was in US national interest to ensure sustained support to 
the Afghan resistance through Pakistan so that they could survive 
the Soviet might and put up a struggle against the Soviet forces. 
Consequently prompting Moscow to withdraw as a part of 
negotiated settlement. Termination of aid to Pakistan, the Reagan 
administration forcefully argued, would have seriously undermined 
the Afghan resistance forces and would have damaged US strategic 
interest in the area.^^ 
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With the clearance of $ 4,02 billion US military and 
economic aid package in October 1988 for the next six years 
Pakistan proceeded with its plan to buy 100 more F-16 aircraft 
What was significant in this deal was that the new rates quoted for 
each F-16 at $ 10.5 million which was much lower than the $ 25 
million a piece Pakistan paid for the 40 F-16 purchased under the 
first military economic aid package of $ 3.20 billion which ended in 
September 1987. Till January 1988 out of the 40 F-16 aircraft that 
were to be supplied to Pakistan during the first aid package period, 
so far 35 F-16 aircraft were reported to have arrived. 
The United States Congress approved $445 million military 
and economic aid to Pakistan for the financial year 1989. A greater 
share of the aid of $ 230 million was allocated for military supplies 
which the balance of $ 215 million was in economic assistance. In 
the financial year 1988 Pakistan was given $ 480 million of which 
$ 260 million was in military supplies. The reduction in the aid for 
1989 was the result of US budgetary constraint which had affected 
all the recipient countries.^a 
Recognizing the Reagan administration's zeal to fight 
communism and desire to re-establish its prestige, Pakistan found 
an opportunity to maximize its own status and act as a broker in 
the Afghan crisis. It was successful enough in this effort that it was 
able to play a leading role in negotiating a settlement.^* 
87 
Geneva Peace Negotiations 
Pakistan joined the Geneva negotiation held under the UN 
auspices to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict, despite 
certain reservations of the US administration and Congress. The 
US authorities were skeptical about the chances of achieving a 
settlement at Geneva for they believed that the Soviet side was not 
serious in negotiation.^' However, the American administration 
publicly extended full support to Pakistan's viewpoint. This 
support enabled Pakistan to negotiate a political solution to the 
crisis from strength and with confidence. This support also served 
a diplomatic purpose. Any opposition from Washington in this 
context could have propaganda advantage to Soviet Union. The 
Reagan administration affirmed US support to a political 
settlement which would lead to restoration of genuinely 
independent, non-aligned Afghanistan with a government 
acceptable to the Afghan people. American officials of and on 
supported international efforts for a peaceful settlement as long as 
these efforts were consistent with the United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan^^. 
Pakistan and the United States maintained regular 
consultations with each other on Afghanistan issue including the 
UN sponsored negotiation. They proceeded in co-ordination with 
each other and the cooperation was so close that many Pakistanis 
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dubbed Islamabad's Afghan policy as hostage to the American 
aspirations. It was argued that the negotiation, settlement to the 
Afghan conflict to the Geneva talks was not possible unless 
Pakistan removed its "American connection"**. This argument was 
seemingly predicted on the perception that the United States would 
not seek settlement of the Afghan issue in isolation from other 
global issues. 
The extent of American influence on Pakistan's Afghan 
policy, in general, and American role in influencing the Geneva 
negotiations, in particular, is difficult to determine for various 
reasons. However, one can safely say that Washington's support to 
Pakistan was a significant factor which enabled it to resist Soviet-
Afghan pressure and participate in the negotiation with confidence. 
The then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, 
acknowledged that US support to his country for its efforts to find 
a political settlement to the Afghan issue was a source of 
strength's. 
The Smooth course of Pakistan-US close cooperation and 
coordination on the Afghanistan issue came under serious strain 
on the question of formation of an interim government prior to the 
signing of the Geneva accords. During the last round of Geneva 
negotiations, Pakistan refused to sign the accords unless there was 
a prior agreement on interim arrangement in Kabul. This 
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standpoint evoked a very discouraging response from the US 
administration and several Congressmen. Both the countries 
looked at the question from such conflicting perspective that it 
tended to erode the mutual cooperation of the Afghan issue. The 
difference were so serious and importance of the issue of the 
interim government was so great for Pakistan that prior to putting 
signature on the Geneva agreement the Pakistani authorities 
publicly expressed frustration over American attitude and 
exhibited a sense of betrayal at the hands of the United States. 
Pakistan complained that the United States was not fully 
endorsing its proposal of the interim government. President Zia 
was on record sajdng that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
delinked the issue of a coalition government from the withdrawal 
only a day after his meeting with President Reagan in December 
1987 and that this was a result of a deal between superpowers 
which sullied the reputation of his country.®° It was widely 
speculated that the United States had struck a separate deal with 
the Soviet Union over the interest of Psikistan and the Afghan 
resistance. 
Pakistan's insistence on the formation of an interim 
government emanated from its concern with the presence of three 
million Afghan refugees on its soil. It was apprehended that if the 
Afghan war continued even after the agreement and the 
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consequent Soviet withdrawal, the refugees would not go back to 
their homeland and Pakistan would continue to shoulder their 
burden. It was clear that the Geneva agreement would not bring an 
end to the war in Afghanistan. What Pakistan wanted was not only 
an appropriate but an effective solution which could ensure the 
return of the refugees to their motherland. 
Not only the Zia government but certain hawkish elements in 
Washington were also opposed to signing of the Geneva agreement 
without installing an interim government in Kabul.^^ however, the 
US authorities were opposed to linking the formation of the interim 
government to the Geneva agreement. At the time when the issue 
of the interim government was high on Pakistan's agenda, one 
senior US official stated that there "is no interest of Washington in 
trying to promote or construct an interim government in Kabul".^^ 
Another American official opined that the United States did not 
support Pakistan in making the formation of the interim 
government in Afghanistan a pre-condition of the Soviet 
withdrawals^. For the US, Soviet withdrawal was the issue. 
Washington feared that any effort to set an interim government 
was likely to cause further delay in the agreement and 
consequently in the withdrawal. The United States also opposed 
the idea because the popular view in Washington was that the 
Najib government would collapse once the Soviet forces left 
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Afghanistan. Pakistan's insistence on the formation of the interim 
government, therefore, seemed unnecessary.^* 
An understanding between the superpowers on the broad 
contours of the settlement could also account for US opposition to 
the Pakistani proposal. In private the US government reportedly 
put pressure on Pakistan to delink the formation of the interim 
government from the Geneva accords.^' This is not to suggest that 
the United States was altogether indifferent to Pakistan's concerns. 
At time, US officials publicly appreciated the proposal as a good 
idea and sought to assure their Pakistani counterparts that the 
United States was not averse to the idea of an interim government 
as was proposed by Pakistan.^* The US administration discussed it 
with the Soviet authorities. As a result, both the superpowers 
agreed that Diego Cordovez would provide his good offices in his 
personal capacity in promoting an agreement between mutually 
antagonistic Afghan parties on a broad-based government. After 
American assurance that negotiations would continue towards this 
goal, Pakistan signed the Geneva accords on April 14, 1988. It was 
pledged that the parties to the Geneva accords would support and 
facilitate this process. These assurance provided Pakistan a way 
out from an isolated position in the Geneva talks.^^ 
The above analysis suggests that apparently differing 
perspective on the question of the interim government did not 
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cause a crack in Pakistan-US relationship. But differences forced 
the Pakistan government to modify the position on the question of 
interim government. Even during this period of serious differences, 
Pakistan and United States maintained a regular and close 
dialogue and officially expressed a unity of views regarding the 
Afghan issue. At one stage, when both the superpowers were 
locked over the symmetry issue, the Soviet Union expressed its 
readiness to pull out its troops without US guarantees. This was 
interpreted in Islamabad and Washington as a Soviet ploy to 
induce Pakistan to sign the agreement, and oust the United States 
from the whole process. Pakistan declined the proposal, and 
suggested that both the superpowers should agree on the 
symmetry issue.®* This analysis is not meant to determine whose 
interests were protected at what cost, rather to suggest that 
through different stages Pakistan and the United States managed 
to amicably resolve their differences on the Afghan issue and 
successfully worked together towards the conclusion of the Geneva 
agreement and the consequent Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. 
Post-Geneva Accords Phase 
The Geneva Accords in April 1988 and the subsequent Soviet 
puUout in February 1989 were the obvious result of the successful 
Pakistan-US collaboration against the Soviet Union on the Afghan 
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issue. According to one viewpoint, popular among Pakistani 
analysts, the Zia ul Haque regime's confrontational posture 
towards the Soviet intervention did not correspond to the national 
interests of the Pakistan, rather it was designated and pursued to 
suit American interests and requirements. Until shortly after the 
Benazir government assumed power in December 1988, there had 
been a hope that any democratic government succeeding the Zia 
regime through a genuine electoral process would question and 
change the basic premises, assumptions and the framework of 
Pakistan's Afghan policy.^ ® Hence, a genuine political process was 
likely to disturb Pakistan-US cooperation on the Afghan issue. A 
political process tending to complicate the process of Pakistan-US 
collaboration on the Afghan situation was certain to strain bilateral 
relations. It was widely believed that American interest in Pakistan 
would wane and its aid programme would not outlive the Geneva 
accords and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.*" 
Contrary to this pessimistic projection American as well as 
Pakistani officials sounded positive about Pakistan-US relations in 
the post-Afghanistan era. Before and after the conclusion of the 
Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal, US officials continued 
to underscore that Pakistan would not become irrelevant to the 
United States in the post-Afghanistan era. They claimed that while 
the Afghan issue was an important factor the rapport between 
countries went beyond this issue. Pakistan was assured that it 
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would continue to receive a high level of aid even after the Soviet 
withdrawal.'*^ During his Presidential compaign, George Bush 
pledged that he would preserve and further strengthen Pakistan-
US relations. He retained his commitment to Pakistan in these 
words: "Long after the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan, the 
US-Pakistan partnership will endure an important bilateral and 
regional association.*® The then Pakistan Prime Minister 
Muhammad Khan Junejo expressed similar sentiments at the 
conclusion of the Geneva agreements. Pakistan and United States, 
he hoped, would remain steadfast in support of the Afghan 
nation's right to a government of their choice. He visualized that 
the effectiveness and success of co-operation between the two 
countries would strengthen the government and people of Pakistan 
in their resolve to further fortify their partnership with the United 
States for peace and stability in the region.** Even after the 
dismissal of the Junejo government, Islamabad expressed hope for 
a continued aid relationship with the United States in the post-
Afghan period. 
A number of significant development took place in 1988-89, 
signing of the Geneva Accords in April 1988, Zia's death in August 
1988, the change of governments in Islamabad in December 1988, 
coming of the Bush administration in power in January 1989, and 
the Soviet puUout from Afghanistan in February 1989. Pakistan-
US aid relations did not witness any setback as a consequence. 
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Benazir government did not exhibit any immediate indication to 
reorient Pakistan's Afghan policy and disturb the existing 
relationship with the United States. If anything, there was a hint of 
further improvement in Pakistan-US relations. Reaffirming her 
election pledge to continue to assist Washington, Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto urged the Americans to continue to support 
Pakistan.'*' Despite the fact that she vehemently criticized the 
former military regime and its legacies and did not entirely agree 
with Pakistan's Afghan policy, she lauded Pakistan-US 
collaboration of the recent past, appreciated the goodwill nurtured 
in the two countries in their joint collaboration in support of the 
freedom of Afghanistan and did not upset or modify policy on the 
Afghan issue.^ Contrary to fear expressed by some, Ms. Bhutto 
assured the Bush administration of her determination to support 
the Afghans resistance and also urged Washington not to abandon 
the Afghans in the critical post Soviet withdrawal period.*'^  
Instead of falling apart as was speculated, Pakistan and the 
United States moved closer in their approaches towards the Afghan 
issue. Though Benazir pursued more or less the Afghan policy of 
the previous governments, including the emphasis on the military 
dimension, she gave the impression that her government was all 
out for a political solution of the Afghan issue. The political 
settlement which she envisaged contained the removal of the Najib 
96 
regime as an essential element.^ During her visit to Washington in 
June 1989, she exchanged views with the Bush administration on 
the prospects of a political solution. The Bush administration 
supported the idea of the political settlement that would lead to the 
establishment of a non-alinged representative government 
replacing the "illegitimate" Najib regime."*' The visit revealed the 
unanimity of views between the two governments on the question 
of resolving the Afghan settlement.*^ 
The Reagan administration in view of all these new 
developments in Pakistan and outside proposed a large amount of 
$ 626.7 million military, economic aid to Pakistan for 1990. This 
included $ 50 million of development assistance $ 80 million of PL-
480, $ 20 million of Economic Support Fund (ESF) $ 240 million of 
foreign military sales grant. $ 1 million IMET programmes as well 
as $ 5.7 million for antinarcotics. Testifying before the House 
Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on Asia and Pacific. Mr. Haward 
Schaffer the US deputy Secretary for the near East and South Asia 
said that "Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan remained vital for achieving our goals of a 
non-aligned, independent and stable Afghanistan and to our broad 
goals in South and South West Asia. For these reasons we must 
continue to honour our commitment to support Pakistan's security 
and economic needs.*^ 
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CHAPTER - IV 
ESTRANGED FRIENDS: 
THE BUSH YEARS AND CLINTON'S FIRST 
TERM 
The Bush administration did not bring any substantial 
change in US-Pakistan strategic partnership. Initially, like Reagan 
administration, the new administration continued in awarding 
precedence to Pakistan for its geo-strategic location and vital role it 
played in withdrawl of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Bush 
administration also recognized the pressure that Pakistan was 
facing because of presence of millions of Afghan refugees on its 
territory. He declared that military support to the Afghan 
resistance would continue as would non military assistance for 
increasing urgent humanitarian needs. 
In February 1989, barely a month after coming to office the 
Bush administration requested to Congress for $ 1.2 billion in 
foreign assistance for South Asia for 1990 Financial Year. Out of 
this amount $ 782 million was for economic assistance and 
remaining $ 242 million was for military assistance, with major 
portion going to Pakistan. Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, testifying before 
the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on Asia and Pacific 
Affairs in February, 1989, noted that even after the withdrawal of 
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Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan remained vital to 
achieving American goals in Afghanistan and broad objectives in 
South Asia.i 
However, the international scenario was vSwiftly changing 
with far reaching implications. The 'Cold War' was winding up, one 
after another the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe were shedding 
their communist rulers. The Iron curtain' was crumbling, US 
Soviet conflict in Third World' in general and Afghanistan in 
particular was rapidly moving towards settlement favourable to 
United States. Further, unification of Germany brought a rapid 
succession of events that led to an era of unprecedented Soviet-
American rapprochement. All these events were fundamentally 
altering the global balance of power.2 
In the changing world the United States not only abandoned 
its Cold War strategies but after the departure of the Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan its perspective towards Pakistan changed 
radically. The US and other Western Allies backed out of post war 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan no longer enjoyed the 
strategic exclusiveness that it had enjoyed during the last decade, 
since the disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of Central 
Asian states opened up new avenues for the US, Pakistan was left 
on its own to face and solve the post Afghan civil war problems. 
Thus, in less than a decade Pakistan's dream of acquiring a 
'strategic depth' in Afghanistan was to end in nightmare. 
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Consequently the relations with one time "most allied Ally" reached 
at lowest ebb.® 
Meantime the development in the Persian Gulf, in the form of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 re-opened the US 
stakes and strategic interest in Middle East and South West Asia. 
For Islamabad this was an opportunity to develop close military 
and economic alliance with Washington in post Afghan crisis 
period, although Pakistan provided logistic support to US led allies 
in the Gulf War, the Pakistan ambition of playing a major role in 
the Gulf crisis as an American Ally as well as in capacity as an 
Islamic country was foiled when President George Bush sent an aid 
cut massage in 1990.* 
Relations between two countries further deteriorated when 
Pakistan witnessed political upheal on August 6, 1990. President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan in one stroke dismissed the elected 
government of Benazir Bhutto and announced dates for holding 
national election on October 24, 1990. US Congress took keen 
interest in political turmoil of Pakistan when it sent a message to 
the caretaker government in Islamabad demanding among other 
things "a. free and fair election" and warning that election would be 
test of US- Pakistan relations to continue smoothly in future. A 
some what similar stand was taken by the US State Department as 
well.* 
105 
As the Gulf War intensified along with it the pro-Saddam 
and anti-American sentiments were aroused in Pakistan. Moreover, 
the statement made by President Ishaq Khan did irreparable 
damage to the already shaky relations, when he remarked that the 
integrity and solidarity of all the Muslim countries is an article of 
faith with Pakistan and its heart bleeds at the spilling of Muslim 
blood any where. With this tough posture Pakistan lost all hopes of 
receiving American assistance. Once the Gulf War ended with the 
tremendous American victory the US which led the coalition war 
efforts against Iraq successfully emerged as the undisputed leader 
of the world in political and strategic matters. The tone of 
American foreign policy in the post Gulf War, infact began to 
smack of Superpower arrogance in the absence of a countervailing 
power, a role that the Soviet Union used to play earlier. 
Thus, through the Gulf War the US attempted to create a 
"New World order". Now Washington assumed the role of world 
policeman to subordinate Europe to the US power and intimidate 
the Third World into submission. In a sense it was an attempt to 
regain the position of global supremacy held by the United States 
at the end of the Second World War. The Gulf War in its broadest 
contours was an attempt by the US to define a new military-
centered global order.* 
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Infact, by this time US Pakistan strategic relations had 
already got into rough weather. President Bush did not issue the 
annual certification to the US Congress giving a clearance to 
Pakistan that it did not possess a nuclear device, nor requested the 
Congress for waiver of the Pressler Amendment. More over, the 
emerging pattern of relations between the India and the United 
States and increasing American pressure on Pakistan nuclear 
programme made it clear that the United States would re-orient its 
strategy in South Asia and signalled that the strategic significance 
of Pakistan had considerably declined in American calculations. 
With this US-Pakistan strategic relations completed a full circle, 
which had started with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
1979.'^ 
Pressler Amendment 
The nuclear issue had placed unusual strain on relations 
between the United States and Pakistan, after years of growing ties 
following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan's nuclear 
programme had been an issue of contention throughout. In the 
past Pakistani officials had given assurance that they are not 
developing an atomic weapon, and the Reagan Administration had 
consistently waived the aid restriction. However, once again, in a 
surprise move the US Administration on October 1, 1990 decided 
to suspend all military and economic aid to Pakistan, worth 
between $ 564 million and $ 578 million in 1991, following 
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renewed fear that Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon. The 
decision was the result of the failure on the part of President Bush 
to certify that Pakistan's nuclear programme was designed 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
Under the 1985 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistant Act, it was made clear that "no assistance shall be 
furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology 
shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, unless the President shall 
have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of the 
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance 
was to be furnished or military equipment or technology was to be 
sold or transferred that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
explosive device*. On October 9, 1990 the US Secretary of State, 
James Baker informed Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sahibzada 
Yaqub Khan that future aid would be impossible unless convincing 
new evidence was provided that no "nuclear device'existed.' 
Undoubtedly the US has stringent laws to bar aid to 
countries suspected to be engaged in a nuclear weapons 
programme, but they have always been subordinated to its 
strategic interest. The US administration had been aware since the 
autumn of 1986 that Pakistan was producing weapons grade 
uranium at Kahuta. The Washington Post, reported that Pakistan 
had detonated a high explosive device between September 18 and 
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21, 1986.10 Moreover, Mr. Reagan in 1988and Mr. Bush in 1989 
personally declared that evidence about Islamabad continuing 
pursuit of weapon was making it difficult to give the certificate that 
the President is required to provide annually that Pakistan "does 
not possess a nuclear explosive device". During 1989, voices were 
being raised in the Congress, notably by Mr. Stephen Solarz and 
Mr. John Glenn, that Pakistan must make fresh promises of good 
behaviour to qualify for a certificate. The Washington Post" had 
meanwhile, editorially called for a termination of aid "clearly and 
without regret". But there were many who had been lobbying 
Congress for continuance of aid under a temporary waiver to give 
time to the regime that took office in Islamabad after the October 
24, election to respond to US concern. 
The certificate was given in 1988 on November 18, two days 
after the conclusion of Pakistan's general election of that year. 
Possibly by doing so. President Bush wanted to claim to be 
champion of Pakistani democracy, that he was using the leverage 
of the certificate for a good purpose. In fact the US administration 
in the past had used several excuses to get over the US Laws 
which specifically prohibit aid to countries which possess or are 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Till the presence of Soviet forces 
in Afghanistan it was argued successfully that continued aid to 
Pakistan was necessary to buy its support for Afghan rebels. 
However, that excuse no longer existed after the Soviet withdrawal. 
109 
And when Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister, US 
officials gave another excuse that it was necessary to continue the 
aid to support democracy in Pakistan. The sale of F-16s at Mrs. 
Benazir Bhutto's request was said to be as much for helping her to 
consolidate a democratic order as for meeting the country's 
"legitimate" security needs. 
Mrs. Benazir Bhutto after becoming the Prime Minister 
assured the Congress and the White House that we do not possess 
nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. But in the subsequent 
months the CIA had gathered sufficient evidence indicating that 
Pakistan was still working on the bomb. There had been reports 
that Pakistan had been modifying its (US) supplied F-16 Jet so 
that they could carry nuclear weapons. In September 1990 some 
fresh evidence of Pakistan's suspected procurement efforts came 
into light. It was reported that in early 1990 Pakistan made several 
clandestine efforts to buy high-temperature furnaces from Consarc 
Crop, of New Jersey. The furnaces were capable of producing 
metals for nuclear weapons system. Consequently US military and 
other aid to Pakistan was suspended in October 1990. 
Thus, for more than a decade, the US officials found reasons 
to look the other way while Pakistan moved steadily closer to 
becoming a nuclear power. That was particularly true during the 
war in Afghanistan, when Pakistan served as a key staging area for 
supplying anti-Soviet guerillas with American made weapons. But 
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now that the Cold War apparently was over, Washington was no 
longer willing to turn a blind eye. Washington may now have felt 
that it no longer needed to worry so much about staying on good 
relations with Pakistan. The end of Cold War, in fact, had made it 
more difficult for Third World countries to play Moscow and 
Washington against each other. Moreover, the Gulf crisis of 1991 
had taught Washington the danger of looking the other way while 
countries such as Iraq developed chemical warfare programmes or 
nuclear capabilities. 
The imposition of Pressler Sanction since O.ctober 1990, was 
a heavy blow on the Pakistan's defence establishment. The US 
stopped with immediate effect the delivery of 28, F-16 fighter 
aircrafts and other military equipments for which Pakistan had 
already paid $ 1.4 billion. Further with October 1, 1990 the $ 564 
million economic and military aid programmes approved for fiscal 
year 1991 was frozen. Nonetheless, in view of the delay over the 
implementation of the Pressler Amendment Pakistan received an 
estimated $ 3.3 billion American aid during 1985-1990 of which 
over $ 2 billion was in the form of military aid.** 
Pressler Sanction had less immediate impact on economic 
development since the amendment stopped only new assistance 
commitments. Aid was able to continue to implement programmes 
that were already under way and to disburse funds from roughly 
$ 1 billion still in the pipeline. Nevertheless, the sanction had 
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considerable negative effect on projects run by the US assistance. 
These projects were related to agricultural and rural development, 
engineering, health, population, nutrition, human resource 
development.^® 
The adoption of the Pressler Amendment was considered by 
Pakistan as another betrayal and its old fear revisited that as long 
as Pakistan served America's strategic interest the latter 
deliberately ignored every things but as soon as its objectives were 
accomplished it deserted Pakistan in oblivion. That is what 
happened after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
consequently disintegration of Soviet Union changed the US 
perception towards Pakistan. 
The reaction in Islamabad to the imposition of sanction was 
one of disbelief, shock and anger because of its discriminatory 
nature. The sanction was country specific leaving-India untouched 
who had conducted nuclear test way back in 1974. Moreover, 
Pressler Sanction was too severe and unhke earlier sanctions^* or 
embargoes it was longer one. Although the Bush administration 
said that apparent reason why the amendment covered only 
Pakistan and none else was that Islamabad was the recipient of 
billions of dollars in name of military and economic assistance. The 
press in Pakistan also critically denounced the US action as unfair, 
anti-Islamic and discriminatory. They charged that the United 
States had once more proved to be a "fickle friend". A Pakistani 
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observer commented acidly, "with the Afghan war over, the United 
States no longer needs Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us 
like a piece of used Kleenex". General Aslam Beg expressed a view 
that most Pakistani agreed that with the Afghan war over the 
United States no longer needed to look the other way on the 
nuclear issue and it let the Pressler axe fall.^'' 
Pakistan's Efforts Against Pressler Sanction 
As the Pressler Sanction began to bite, Pakistan tried 
desperately to wriggle out of its implications and repercussions on 
its economy. First such move was made in June 1991 when the 
Chairman of Pakistan Senate, Wassem Sajjad visited Washington 
with Nawaz Sahrifs ambitious diplomatic initiative, calling for a 
five power conference to consider a ban on nuclear weapons in 
South Asia. The proposed countries were the United States, Soviet 
Union, China, India and Pakistan. Washington showed interest in 
the idea, however, due to India's reluctance, the proposal remained 
moot. Thus, he utilized his visit to impress upon the American 
policy makers about Pakistan's interest in non-proliferation and 
the Indian intransigent attitude. 
Although Sajjad could not-convince the US Congressmen 
regarding resumption of the US aid, nonetheless he did not return 
empty hands. As a result of his intensive discussion and persistent 
lobbying with the US officials, the Bush administration finally 
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agreed to supply some military spare parts and equipments to 
Pakistan on commercial basis by providing a self serving 
interpretation of the Pressler Amendment." Moreover, on October 
« 
6, 1992 the US Congress approved an amendment providing a 
"minor break" for Pakistan in terms of renewed US assistance 
through waivers on two items for the Pressler Sanctions. The 
Congressional waivers, as part of the 1993 Foreign Aid Bill, were 
applicable to "assistance to non governmental organization and 
under Public Law - 480". 
The strategic significance of the Congress move gets reflected 
in the fact that the amendment containing the waiver also 
stipulated a provision that requires an annual report from the US 
President on the State of the nuclear and the ballistic programmes 
of Pakistan India and China, i'^  This provision pleased the policy 
makers in Islamabad. It was regarded as an achievement of the 
Pakistan lobby which was apparently making efforts to reduce the 
excessive focus of the US policy making on Pakistan's nuclear 
programme. 
This waiver was a clear indication that Washington would 
take gradual step in time to come to normalize the relations with 
Pakistan which had been strained since October, 1990 in the wake 
of suspension of the US military and economic aid to Pakistan. 
There seemed to be growing realization in the United States that 
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Pakistan had already suffered for quite sometime and that 
normalcy in the relations between the two countries had to be 
restored before they were seriously ruptured. In September 1992, 
the then US Ambassador to Pakistan John C. Manjo had made it 
already clear that "while we hope new economic and security 
assistance to Pakistan suspended under Pressler Amendment can 
be resumed. We will not compromise our non-proliferation 
principles to do so.'^* This statement was significant in context of 
US Pakistan relations. The first part of Manjo's statement is 
perhaps more important £ind carries the real message than the 
second part which was often repeated. It was also known that 
rules, regulations and amendments are suitably changed or 
appropriately interpreted when any compromise over principles or 
national interest becomes necessary. The same was done during 
the prolonged Afghan crisis. 
The non-proliferation issue was not the only serious 
impediment in the US-Pak strategic relations. Problem of terrorism 
in Kashmir was at the top of Bush administration's priorities. US 
expressed serious concern over the covert help by Pakistan for 
Kashmir insurgency which was destabilizing the peace and 
security of the region. Under Secretary of State for political affairs 
Arnold Kanter warned that if Pakistan continued its help for the 
Kashmir insurgents "it ran the risk of being declared a country 
officially supporting terrorism" i^  His comments were based on 
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credible intelligence reports that the ISI was continuing to provide 
direct assistance to the anti India insurgents through training and 
infiltrating them across the line of control. 
In the mean time, the war in Afghanistan was dragging on 
with no near end in sight and due to infighting among 
Mujahideens along ethnic lines, NajibuUah government could not 
be ousted. In September 1991, the United States and the Soviet 
Union finally agreed that they would both stop the supply of 
military equipments to Afghanistan. With this the US-Soviet Cold 
War confrontation came to an end. Now Afghanistan became a 
second or third tier foreign policy issue. As one top State 
Department official told then Pakistan country Director John 
Holzman "Afghanistan is no longer on our radar screen'. 
The subsequent events of disintegration of the Soviet Union 
had great repercussions in store. On one side it radically reshaped 
the regions geo-political landscape. On the other hand Afghanistan 
gained importance as a potentially important corridor for trade and 
other links with newly independent Central Asian countries. 
However, the sudden demise of the Soviet Union undermined 
the NajibuUah regime. The government collapsed in April 1992, 
after the infighting within the government. NajibuUah's fall did not 
usher in era of peace instead it began a new phase of what would 
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become an Afghan civil war in which rival factions battled each 
other. 
Thus withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 
subsequent change in the US-Pak relations did not mean that 
Afghan factor will not influence future course of US-policy towards 
Pakistan rather it loomed large in the wake of continued civil war 
for Kabul among ethnic groups. 
Bush administration thus could not cement US-Pakistan 
strategic relations which was created against the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan. Bilateral differences were all too apparent during 
Bush administration. Pakistan had not only lost strategic 
importance but had become a nuclear trouble maker and a source 
of regional instability for US policy makers. Islamabad perceived 
the imposition of sanction as the change in US perspective and 
more a evidence that the United States was Hckle', 'unreliable' and 
not a friend in need of Pakistan. 
In the mean while, there was change in administration in 
Washington. The incoming Bill Clinton administration brought no 
substantial change in US policy towards Pakistan. The new 
President's re-emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, human 
rights, democracy^ and cross border terrorism did not helped in 
improving relations with Pakistan. Thus, the Clinton-
administration tookup from where George Bush had left. 
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Pakistan in its quest of improved relations with Clinton 
administration sent foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan to 
Washington in August 1993, to wriggle out of the US pressure and 
to strive for resumption of the US aid. He succeeded in convincing 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's for further dialogue to 
tackle the problems created by the implementation of the Pressler 
Amendment. The Foreign Secretary, Warren Christopher 
underscored the "Vital role" that the United States could play in 
resolving the Kashmir question.^o These statements were regarded 
in Pakistan an important development towards normalizing 
hitherto, strained relations between the two countries. While 
assessing his visit Shahryar Khan himself claimed that he sensed 
a "breath of fresh air" from the Clinton administration in 
addressing both bilateral and regional issue. The Pakistan's 
Foreign Office was reportedly pleased over the outcome of the wide 
ranging bilateral talks between the US and Pakistan, which in its 
understanding, would develop a "new more mature and durable 
relationship" between the two countries.21 
Less than a month after Khan's visit to Washington, The US 
Senate sent to President Bill Clinton for signature a bill that would 
exempt Islamabad from the operation of the Pressler Amendment 
for some specific purposes. The Bill authorized the sale of wheat 
and soyabeen worth $ 40 million to Pakistan. Other items that 
were exempted from the Pressler Law were funds for non-
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governmental organizations working for population planning, child 
welfare and adult literacy programmes. Infact, these exemption 
were already working in the outgoing fiscal year as well. It was in 
August 1992, when Washington sent a friendly feeler to Islamabad 
administration over the US aid cut issue by conveying the US 
Department of Agriculture's decision to increase by $ 50 million 
credit guarantee available to US exporters for the sale of wheat to 
Pakistan.22 
The US policy makers had found other ways to redress 
Pakistan's grievances. While refraining from giving any official 
military and economic assistance to Islamabad, the US State 
Department had authorized the commercial sales of military spare 
parts to Pakistan and had not discouraged US private 
businessmen from other countries as well as multilateral funding 
institutions from dealing with the country. 
Shahiyar Khan's visit to Washington was coincided with the 
new US sanctions (August 1993)*3 against a few Chinese 
companies and Pakistan on the issue of transfer of M-II missile 
technology to Pakistan. It was only an addition to the existing 
irritants between the two countries. However, it was common 
knowledge that the later sanction under Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) would not affect Pakistan. Nation, a 
leading Pakistani daily had rightly commented that the US 
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sanctions will hardly make any material difference to Pakistan, the 
real rub will be on the political level where despite the best efforts 
by Islamabad, relations between Pakistan and its erstwhile patron 
will further deteriorate. Responding to the sanction, the then 
Pakistan Prime Minister, Moeen Qureshi, in a statement in 
Islamabad on August 26, 1993 said, "The Missiles that Pakistan 
received over a year ago are well within the parameter of MTCR. 
China, which agreed to supply a small number of Missiles to meet 
our legitimate self-defence requirement, told the US that the short 
range tactical missile it supplied to Pakistan did not exceed the 
MTCR criteria. We ourselves have given the same assurance to the 
USA".24 
Generally, the Pakistani reaction to imposition of the US 
sanction over the M-11 missile issue was at very low-key. First, 
because it had no practical effect on Pakistan and secondly, it was 
imposed only after the real transfer of the missile technology took 
place. 
The whole issue of missile transfer to Pakistan from China 
brought the USA in the unenviable position of being subjected to 
pressures by three nations. Pakistan by deploying its M-11 missile 
could jeopardize the US-China relations. India by deploying the 
Prithvi could trigger off such a reaction on the part of Pakistan.** 
China which was already annoyed with the US on the issue of the 
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Taiwanese President, Lee Teng Hui's visit to the US and the lifting 
of certain curbs on high technology transfer to Taiwan, could well 
supply more missiles to Pakistan. In other words, the MTCR which 
was touted as a great US initiative in curbing missile proliferation 
was now causing it headaches.^^ 
Discussion Draft 
Only a few months after Shahryar Khan's visit to 
Washington, the State Department sent a 130-page bill labeled 
"discussion draft" of a new foreign Assistance Act to key members 
of the US Congress. This draft adopted new approaches to foreign 
aid with a view to best utilizing the US money to serve the nation's 
interests. Interestingly, this new approach included removal of the 
country specific language of the Pressler Amendment. In the past, 
Presidents of both Republican and the Democratic parties had 
complained that the Congress had attached rather too many 
conditions to foreign aid. The rationale behind the "discussion 
draft' was that the President needed to have greater flexibility in 
the matter of providing assistance to foreign countries and since 
the Pressler Amendment, unlike other similar legal measure, did 
not have any similar provision of waiver, it needed to be done away 
with.27 
While there was widespread agreement that the time for 
restructuring the US aid programmes had come and the six 
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objectives of the aid programmes outlined in the "discussion draft" 
such as "promoting sustainable development", "promoting 
democTQcy', "promoting peace", "providing humanitarian 
assistance", "promoting growth through trade and investment" and 
"advancing diplomacy" were acceptable. The efforts to do get away 
with the Pressler Amendment met with severe opposition in the 
Congress.** The Clinton administration, in the face of 
Congressional opposition and the adverse reaction in the Indian 
Subcontinent, decided to drop the idea at least for the time being, 
removing the Pressler Amendment from the Foreign Assistance Act. 
Nonetheless, these development in the USA provided a sense of 
relief to the Pakistanis as their case was being advocated by some 
Americans themselves. 
It is interesting to note that the Pakistani leadership felt that 
they would not prevail over their patron on resumption of economic 
and military aid, they tactfully tried to link up the issue of nuclear-
non-proliferation and the problem of Kashmir together.2* Pakistani 
officials reportedly conveyed their American counterparts that both 
regional peace and the future of nuclear proliferation depend on a 
settlement of the Kashmir issue between Indian and Pakistan. Pak 
Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi during his private visit to 
Washington had stated that: "There was a linkage between 
Kashmir and non-proliferation and that the lasting solution of the 
proliferation issue rested in the resolution of the Kashmir 
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problem." Muslim, a leading Pakistani news paper argued that "as 
long as contentious issue between India and Pakistan-notably 
Kashmir issue remains unaddressed and continues to spite fire 
there will always be incentive for arms built-up, including 
proliferation of nuclear weapons... If the political cause of 
proliferation, notably the Kashmir problem are removed in 
accordance with UN resolutions, there will be no nuclear 
weapons".^ ** 
We are still left with the question, why did Pakistan unveil 
its nuclear capability in connection with the Kashmir issue, and 
why the Pakistani politicians link the bomb and Kashmir? While 
answering these questions Prof. Stephen P. Cohen quoted some 
Pakistanis as saying their nuclear capability would provide the 
umbrella under which Pakistan could re-open the Kashmir issue.^^ 
Another reason behind this Pak ploy could be diversionary tactics 
to withstand the tremendous US pressure on the proliferation 
issue. 
The US administration made unsuccessful attempt in 1994 
to seek a one - time exception to the Pressler Amendment to 
deliver F-16 aircrafts and to resume suspended military and 
economic assistance aid to Pakistan. Thanks to Larry Pressler and 
his colleague Senators, who succeeded in aborting the 
administrations effort to scarp the Pressler Amendment through a 
new Foreign Assistance Act, There was in fact a growing sense in 
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Washington that the Pressler Amendment had outlived its utility as 
a diplomatic lever. There were many in the American foreign policy 
establishment who had accepted the Pakistani argument that the 
Pressler Amendment punishes Pakistan unfairly without including 
India to change its behaviour on nuclear non-proliferation. In the 
last five years Pakistan attempted, though without success, to coax 
the US Congress on to either extending the Pressler Amendment to 
India or to dropping it altogether. 
Over the years there has been sustained interaction between 
the USA and Pakistan to end the nuclear dispute. Two factors 
might have worked to facilitate a nuclear modus Vivendi between 
the USA and Pakistan. One was the new positive attitude in 
Washington to put its relationship with Islamabad back on track. 
The other was the formerly declared position of Pakistan since 
February 1992 that it had ultimately frozen its nuclear 
programmes. Given these position it was not impossible for the US 
and Pakistan to find common ground, that would allow them to 
return to the nuclear status quo ante and renewal of the US 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan. 
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration in 1994 had insisted 
on three conditions for lifting the Pressler Amendment against 
Pakistan firstly, to end the production of weapons grade Uranium; 
secondly, to stop the manufacture of additional nuclear weapons 
cores; and finally, to melt the existing nuclear cores. Michael Mc 
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Cuny, the US administration spokesman said on October 6, 1994 
that: "we have offered Pakistan the opportunity to work with us to 
achieve our non-proliferation goals, which could lead to a waiver of 
the sanction that we have imposed on the Pakistani entity".^^ 
Perhaps the most questionable aspect of this new US 
proposal was that, notwithstanding the failure that necessitated 
the 1990 application of the Pressler Amendment in the first place, 
it was once again projected as means of curbing Pakistan's nuclear 
ambition. The apparent assumption was that by resuming 
conventional military aid to Pakistan the US would gain "new 
flexibility" in persuading Islamabad to place certain constraints on 
its nuclear weapons programme, something which Washington had 
lost through appl5dng Pressler's blanket ban. According to this 
rationale, the Pressler law was a structural impediment to progress 
on non-proliferation in South Asia.^a But the flaw in this approach 
was that it did not take into account the fact that Pakistan did not 
shy away from its nuclear programme when the US, through its 
massive military aid during the Reagan years sought to bring 
about military parity with India.^* 
One Time Waiver 
President Clinton's South Asia Report (1994) on US non-
proliferation objectives referring to this region named capping, 
reducing and finally eliminating the nuclear weapon capability of 
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India and Pakistan as its prime concerns. Lynn Davis under 
Secretary for International Security stated in April 1994, that "we 
are looking at the possibility of a one time waiver of the Pressler 
Amendment which would have as its goal to cap the production of 
missile material by the Pakistanis and to do so in a verifiable way" 
so that Pakistan could receive the F-16 aircrafts.^' But much to 
the US surprise Pakistan had refused to accept verifiable cap on its 
nuclear programmers Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto instantly 
declared that Pakistan would not roll back its nuclear 
programme.3^ 
The proposal of Clinton administration was perplexing 
because supply of F-16 capable of delivering nuclear weapons 
could not promote non-proliferation. Lynn Davis said that, "the 
aircraft would be sold without the capacity of delivering such 
weapons, "she was obviously referring to the Pentagon assurance 
that the plane transferred to Pakistan would not have the racks to 
carry bombs. But as Senator Pressler pointed out "racks do not 
require any sophisticated technology and can be built by any 
comer garage mechanic".^^ 
While the US administration was defending the proposal to 
sale F-16s to Pakistan, Senator Larry Pressler expressed his 
determination to go to any length to prevent this proposed sales of 
F-16 and other military materials to Islamabad. Reacting to the 
proposal Pressler remarked it is bad enough that the 
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administration wants to sale a warfare, capable of delivering a 
nuclear weapons, to a volatile region. Now, it is seeking to rebuild 
the entire Pakistani Airforce. Instead of pursuing a responsible 
nuclear non-proliferation policy in South Asia, it seems the Clinton 
administration is conducting a Pentagon garage sale of military 
hardware and spare parts.^' 
By linking up the issue of sale of F-16s to capping of the 
production of fissile material, the State Department sought to 
project an impression that this step would be in the economic 
national security and nonproliferation interests of the United 
States. In one stroke, the Clinton Administration attempted to 
please the Look head Company, the Pakistanis and Senator 
Pressler and his colleagues in the Congress. 
Although, the Clinton administration did not succeed in 
resuming military aid to Pakistan, it had, however, gradually 
succeeded in restoring token economic assistance and some other 
non-military aid to Pakistan, despite the operation of Pressler 
Sanction with minimum or no opposition from other branches of 
the American government. Even commercial sales of the certain 
military spare parts to Pakistan also continued. It was, however, 
bound to face Congressional opposition to any of its plans to sell 
military hardware to Pakistan. Pakistanis, on the other hand, were 
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trying their best to acquire the approval of the US Congress; the 
ball was clearly still in the American court. 
Benazir Visits USA 
The unfinished business of negotiations between the USA 
and Pakistan over the resumption of the US military aid to 
Pakistan once again acquired new life when Pakistani Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the USA in April 1995. But just 
before her visit on March 9, 1995, two employees of the American 
Consulate General in Karachi were shot dead which jolted the 
relations. This increased the growing insecurity in the ruling 
Pakistan establishment about its ties with the USA. 
Meanwhile, the condition in Karachi and Sindh had already 
deteriorated to worse. The Clinton administration took serious note 
of this and at one stage had threatened to put Pakistan on the list 
of terrorist States and stop aid.^i Nine Democratic and Republican 
member of the Congress had urged the Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher to put Pakistan on terrorism watch list. In a letter to 
Christopher they had said "while Pakistan says it condemns 
terrorism in all forms and manifestation reports contradicts these 
assertion. The killing of the American diplomats and Pakistan's 
continued grooming of terrorist warrants a serious re-evaluation of 
the US-Pakistan relationship.*^ 
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Prime Minister Bhutto's visit was to seek visible reiteration of 
US support to Pakistan's ruling establishment and also push for 
lifting the Pressler Sanctions which had become an impediment in 
the US-Pakistan strategic collaboration. A seasoned Pakistani 
commentator termed the Bhutto's visit a "Make or Break Yatra" for 
the politically embattled Benazir. Well before her visit Pakistani 
government tried its best to soften US attitude towards it. Firstly 
came the "discovery that the man alleged to be the mastermind in 
the 1993 bombing of the New York, World Trade Centre, Ramzi 
Ahmad Yusuf was a Pakistani. He was quickly extradited to the 
United States, that was followed by the "discovery" and rapid 
extradition of Haji Mirza Mohammad Iqbal Baig and Mohammad 
Anwar Khan Khattak both indicated in the United States in 1992 
for drug smuggling*^. To improve its image and gain favour in 
Washington, Islamabad presented itself as being in the vanguard of 
"moderate" Islam, opposed to fundamentalism else-where 
especially in Iran, an emerging nuclear threat.'*^ Ms. Bhutto had 
said that Pakistan needs American support not sanctions to battle 
extremists. 
In fact, Benazir Bhutto was clamouring for a new basis for 
the US-Pakistan relationship, American recognition and 
presumably aid were asked for as a frontline State in the fight 
against religious fanaticism, sectarianism and all extremist 
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movements as well as the various manifestations of narcotic 
trade.*' 
During her sojourn in Washington Ms. Bhutto utilized a bulk 
of her time lobb)ring with Congress against the Pressler 
Amendment. Pakistani Prime Minister also highlighted the 
Kashmir issue and linked it with the nuclear issue to globalize the 
Kashmir issue, Ms. Bhutto stated that I urged an early resolution 
of the core issue of Kashmir which poses a great threat to peace 
and security in our region, it had retarded progress on all issue 
including nuclear and missile proliferation. This was 
unambiguously endorsed by Clinton when he said that obviously if 
the issue of Kashmir were resolved a lot of these issue we have 
been discussing here to day would be resolve themselves. At least I 
believe that to be the case reiterating the familiar US position that 
Washington would play a role in Kashmir only if both parties are 
willing to US play a leading role. Further, Bill Clinton said that he 
wanted a review of the Pressler Amendment that it is time we 
should seriously review the policy. He described Pakistan as a 
nation that aims to combine the best of the tradition of Islam with 
modem democratic ideals. President Clinton stated, America is 
proud to claim Pakistan among her closest friends and has been a 
good partner and more importantly has stood for democracy and 
opportunity and modernization. The indulgent description of 
Pakistan as a mature, moderate nation State was indicative of the 
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tremendous sympathy bordering on blind affection that permeated 
the Clinton administration. US was of the view that a strong 
Pakistan is the need of hour for peace and reconciliation and 
ultimately for dismantling weapons of mass destruction in the 
region. 
However, the Clinton administration could not succeed in 
giving any concession to Pakistan because a powerful lobby in 
Congress, led by Republican Senator Larry Pressler, was dead set 
against change, fearing that such a step would make mockery of 
the US non-proliferation concerns. During Ms. Bhutto's stay in 
Washington a group of fifteen US Congressmen wrote to American 
Defence Secretary, William J. Perry voicing their staunch 
opposition to any change in the Pressler Amendment, "we do not 
believe events warrants a repeal of the Pressler Amendment and we 
will resist all efforts to bypass or weaken this provision", they said 
in a joint letter to Perry."** 
US Pakistan relations further received a setback when the 
Washington Post, revealed that Pakistan was furtively constructing 
a new nuclear reactor giving Islamabad access to substantial 
quantities of plutonium for more powerful and compact nuclear 
weapons that it now possesses. To compound matters the 
Washington Post, reported that after initially denying knowledge of 
any such facility, the Pakistani Prime Minister back tracked and 
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conceded that such a project was in existence.*^ The Washington 
Post decided to pull this issue out of obscurity and timed it with 
the Benazir visit to Washington thereby, leaving the Clinton 
administration with little manoeuvering in assuaging the Pakistani 
sentiment over the Pressler Amendment. The Clinton 
administration, thus was faced with a great dilemma in 
harmonizing its global nuclear non-proliferation policy with 
Pakistan's furtive nuclear weapons quest. 
Although reports certainly created a new headache for 
Pakistan but it could not prevent Prime Minister Bhutto from 
getting Clinton's assurance for a revision of Pressler Amendment. 
For Islamabad the removal of the Pressler Amendment from the 
statute book arguably had more political and strategic importance 
than its military value perse. 
Benazir Bhutto's visit proved more productive for Pakistan 
than what was perceived at that time. Three significant gains for 
Pakistan emerged from this visit, first, the commitment by Clinton 
administration that US would not abandon Pakistan and confer a 
strategic dimension to the US-Pak relationship in the Post Cold 
War period. Second, acceptance by the US President of the 
Pakistani interpretation that Kashmir's is at the core of the 
acrimonious Indo-Pak relations, finally endorsement of the 
Pakistan position that the Pressler Amendment discriminates 
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against Islamabad and a US resolve to work towards a regional 
nuclear solution that perceives India's nuclear d)niamics only in an 
Indo-Pak context.'** 
Thus, Bhutto effectively articulated her case both to 
President Bill Clinton and the American public that Pakistan a 
formerly time tested friend of the US had now been abandoned. 
She harped on the theme of a new 'geo-strategic' contact with 
America, her visit yielded results just after few months of her 
return from Washington when US Congress finally passed the 
Hank Brown Amendment. 
The Hank Brown Amendment 
After several attempts by Pgikistan government over the years 
to get repealed the Pressler Amendment, the US Congress passed 
the Brown Amendment in November 1995. Named after American 
Senator, Hank Brown, the Amendment provided the transfer to 
Pakistan of all the previously embargoed lethal arms and 
equipment other than 28, F-16 combat aircrafts. Although, the 
Amendment, backed by the Clinton administration was introduced 
in the Senate with the Defence Authorization Bill in August 1995, 
but it was stalled successfully for months by the anti-proliferation 
lobby opposed to it. 
However, the determined Clinton administration, introduced 
the Amendment again in the Senate in September 1995, as part of 
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the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, this time it was 
adopted. The House Senate Conference Committee which met in 
October 1995, also accepted the Brown Amendment*' by decisive 
10-4 votes. These developments were followed by the adoption of 
the Brown Amendment as part of the Foreign Appropriations Bill of 
the US House of Representatives on November 1, 1995. The 
package permitted Pakistan to take possession of military 
equipment frozen in the US including 3PC orion air crafts. 
Harpoon missiles, C Nite multifunction Kits, M-198 Howitzer, 
Cobra Helicopter, TlQ-36 radars. Tow launchers besides spares for 
F-16s.5° It also gave the green signal for the renewed economic 
assistance loan guarantees by the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation and Export-Import Bank Lending. 
United States objectives behind the Hank Brown initiatives, 
which was written in the United States Defence Planning Guide for 
the Post Cold War era, published in 1992 were as follows "...with 
regard to Pakistan a constructive US-Pakistan military 
relationship, will be an important element in our strategy to 
promote stable security conditions in South-West Asia and Central 
Asia. We should endeavour to rebuild our military relationship, 
given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concern.'* 
Initially, Islamabad hailed passage of the Brown Amendment 
as a major victory. However, soon Pakistan realized that the 
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Amendment provided largely symbolic relief. As the Brown 
Amendment left intact the heart of Pressler Sanction, the ban on 
the US military assistance and government to government arms 
transfer. Pakistani establishment, nonetheless, was satisfied 
because the Clinton administration had finally acknowledged the 
inherent unfairness of the Pressler Sanction and tried to amend 
that. In effect, Pakistanis agreed with Brown Amendment which 
boosted Pakistan's defence and economy. 
The renewed US interest in Pakistan made strategic theorist 
Spykman, and his rimland concept more valid. According to him 
Pakistan as a viable rimland State could serve a dual US purpose, 
though on occasions Islamabad had become the tail that wagged 
the dog. The primary US aim is to secure the Gulf Oil^ ^ and 
"contain" the aspirations of Iran immediately and possibly Russia 
and China at a later date. The second strategic significance of 
Pakistan is its access to Central Asia which encompasses the oil, 
potentially crucial mineral, natural gas and the dependence of 
Russia, China and India on it made crucial to US establishment to 
control Central Asia.*® 
This is how US harmonized its regional strategy with an 
abiding national interest. Pakistan as a geographical entity and 
more specifically Pakistani army acquired a special niche 
warranting US indulgence. This is where the contradictions fall 
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into place. The Hank Brown Amendment not only being anti-India 
or pro-proliferation acquires a different context to the extent where 
Islamabad's nuclear transgressions are condoned to keep Pakistan 
plaint and committed to furthering US interest. Under the 
circumstances the US had obviously reverted to its Cold War policy 
of using Pakistan as an ally to safeguard American interests in 
South and West Asia. Since an ally or a client State has to be kept 
politically happy or stable, it has to be piped with economic and 
military largesse.** 
An American expert on South Asian affairs Harold A Gould 
had given a three fold answer to the question why the United 
States adopted the Brown Amendment. First, it reveals that the 
Cold War culture has survived Cold War. Two generations of 
American politicians and scholars were so conditioned to think in 
'containment' and confrontational terms about international 
security that they continue to do so long after the need to do so is 
irrelevant. Second, and related to first, a vast American defence 
industry and the politicians whose constituencies continue to 
derive economic benefits from its production lines, has a vested 
interest in perpetuating in Cold War Style of doing international 
business. Third, the Clinton administration is in some ways more 
naive about South Asia than were most of its predecessors, 
partially because Mr. Clinton himself seems to be so unattuned to 
the international dimensions of politics, and partly because, as far 
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as India is concerned, the advice he got came heavily from an 
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel, who was 
(a) pro-Pakistani and (b) out of her depth.^' 
However, no one was certain why President Clinton took the 
path which President Bush feared to tread in 1990s Pakistan's 
nuclear ambitions had been as clear as day light and yet the US 
officials and legislature for a ignored their dazzle and offered 
military package to their old client on a silver platter. According to 
an Indian analyst'* such a military package to Pakistan would 
appear to serve three purposes of the US: First, it would help the 
Americans in their efforts to win back loyalties of a former crony 
Pakistan. With Washington remaining wedded to its idea of 
projecting it as a "moderate Islamic State", and Pakistan 
threatening in the post-Pressler Amendment phase, to firmly align 
itself to either the Islamic bloc or Communist China the prime 
obsession of the Clinton Administration, it caused alarm in 
Washington. 
Secondly, an increasingly confident India would in the long 
term be a threat to the American hegemony in the region. The 
United States considered the democratic, India to be an 
unmanageable factor in its regional strategic planning. Compared 
to this, the US had not just the experience, but also continuing 
assurances from Pakistan that it will remain a reliable ally and co-
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operative partner in the US plans in the region.^7 Hence, this 
attempt to strengthen Pakistan by maintaining a balance of power 
in South Asia. 
Finally, the vast American military, industrial complex was 
keen to revive arms sales in South Asia, as the region was a major 
arms-import in the eighties. So, the Hank Brown initiative and its 
approval by the Clinton administration, was also designed to 
please the American industry as well as the electorate. Such a 
policy had echoes of the past, when the Neo-Realist school of 
political thought as enunciated by Henry Kissinger, had stated that 
"morality" ends at one's national borders- beyond which nothing is 
immoral if it helps in the furtherance of one's national interests. 
The US policy makers believed that revival of a kind of quasi-
alliance with Pakistan will give the US leverage in that country 
which was lost during the years of suspension of military supplies 
and other forms of aid due to Pressler Amendment. They claim that 
this influence can be used to contain Pakistan's nuclear ambitions 
and freeze the development and deployment of Ballistic Missiles." 
The US logic that the arms sales will give America greater leverage 
vis-a-vis Pakistan was a simplistic fallacy. During Afghan War, the 
US floated the same theory that the supply of arms will keep 
Pakistan away from perusing the nuclear path. But what 
happened? Having received billions of dollars worth of arms. 
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General Zia went ahead with his nuclear programme.^^ The US 
conveniently closed its eyes. Similarly the Reagan administration 
provided arms by the tonnes to the Afghan rebels in their fight 
against the communists. 
India's renowned defence expert K. Subrahmanyam has 
rightly observed: "This is not the first occasion for the US 
administration and legislature to commit a folly of this tj^je. They 
gave arms to Chiang Kai Shek and they ended up with the Chinese 
Communists. They supported the South Vietnamese generals and 
the results are now part of history. They sold enormous quantities 
of the arms to Shah of Iran and that benefited the AyatoUah. They 
supported Saddam Hussein and he turned against them. They 
armed Siad Barre of Somalia and General Aideed inherited those 
weapons. They armed Pakistan; ISI and Afghan Mujahideens. 
Those arms were later used in sustaining the civil war in 
Afghanistan, ultimately becoming sanctury of International 
terrorism.*° 
The US President's arguments that this policy of releasing 
military equipment to Pakistan would not effect the military 
balance in South Asia and that it would instead actually help 
strengthen peace, stability and democratic forces in Pakistan also 
proved facetious. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
sub Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on 
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September 14, 1995, Bruce Reidel Deputy Assistant Secretary took 
great pains to establish the point that India already had a 2 to 1 
superiority over Pakistan in conventional weapons and therefore 
the release of $ 368 million military equipment to Pakistan would 
not make a difference to the military balance in the region.*^ While 
advancing an argument of this kind he deliberately ignored the fact 
that India is four times bigger than Pakistan and its security 
responsibilities are qualitatively different and quantitatively larger 
than those of Pakistan. It also reveals a psychology that the US 
cannot resist the temptation to neutralize Indian strength 
whenever an opportunity permits it. 
Ring Magnet, M-11 Missile Issue 
Meanwhile, US-Pak strategic relations received a hiccup 
when shipment of a US military equipment to Pakistan under the 
Brown Amendment was put off in early 1996 because of Pakistan's 
suspected acquisition of sensitive nuclear equipment from China 
in 1995 and subsequent controversy over M-11 missile supplied by 
China to Pakistan, in violation of MTCR guideline, put the 
implementation of Brown Amendment in peril. Since the Brown 
Amendment did not entirely lift sanctions against countries that 
received help for an unsafe guarded Uranium enrichment facility 
thus, a major problem arose, complicating the implementation of 
the Brown Amendment and exacerbating bilateral trouble with 
China in face of the CIA reported discovery that the China's 
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Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had sold some five thousand 
Ring Magnets, which aid uranium enrichment to Pakistan.^^ 
Although, Pakistan reacted that it was not a violation of 
Brown Amendment but still Clinton administration thought that 
this was an attempt by Pakistan to smuggle laser equipment to 
measure precisely machined nuclear weapons components. 
However, instead of taking strict action and imposing 
sanctions against China and Pakistan, firing from a pea shooter 
into the air was the best response President Clinton found to the 
sale of nuclear related Ring Magnets. US merely freezed export 
credit to China for a month and delayed anns deliveries to 
Pakistan to deliver mildest of warning figainst nuclear 
proliferation.*^ These were inadequate measures well short of not 
sanctions. Earlier Clinton administration could not ignored the CIA 
report because the CIA director had confirmed the validity of the 
Ring Magnets transfer in an open Public Hearing of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee. This put the Clinton administration in an 
embarrassing position and in a spot over the issue of concealing 
crucial informations from the Congress during the debate and vote 
on the Brown Amendment. 
The US 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act stipulates harsh 
sanction, and sale of Ring Magnets should have resulted in the 
suspension of all export-import Banking if the US government 
concluded that the Beijing authorities had willfully approved the 
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Ring Magnet transfer. But the feeble and adhoc sanction was the 
Clinton administration's way of avoiding a direct showdown with 
Beijing. Except holding for a while arms package to Pakistan, no 
action was taken against Islamabad by way of sanction. Instead, 
Clinton administration further moved ahead to implement a major 
element of the Brown Amendment when $ 368 million equipment 
frozen by the Pressler Sanction and refund of $ 120 million for 
other items were released. It seemed that Clinton administration 
was protecting a burgeoning commercial relationship and 
mollifying a frazzled ally. It was nothing but a detestation for 
following the practices of his predecessors to give priority to non-
proliferation over trade and economic interests. 
Similarly Clinton administration did not take any action 
when US intelligence confirmed that Islamabad had resumed 
production of weapon grade uranium. Pakistan was exonerated by 
a mere warning. When the Deputy National Security Advisor 
Samual Berger went to Islamabad to emphasized US concern that 
if Pakistan continued with its nuclear programmes Clinton 
administration would have trouble in implementing the Brown 
Amendment,** 
More fissures arose in bilateral relations in Summer 1996. 
When intelligence agencies reported that Pakistan decided to 
deploy nuclear capable Chinese supplied M-11 missile. Further, 
CIA concluded that China was assisting Pakistan in setting up a 
factory near Islamabad. This created sensation in the United 
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states and South Asia. Thus, the intelligence information put the 
Clinton administration in an awkward position, since it suggested 
that the Chinese were dangerously violating MTCR guidelines by 
exporting missiles to Pakistan. 
Although MTCR guidelines imposes drastic sanction for its 
violation, which could have costed American companies billions of 
dollars in sales to China. But the Clinton administration turned a 
blind eye to this and took no action on the ground that the 
intelligence was insufficiently conclusive to justify the imposition of 
severe sanction.^* 
Clinton administration issued certificate to Pakistan on 
narcotics contrary to frictions it created. US policy makers also 
ignored human rights violations and Islamabad's role in the spread 
of global terrorism and its clandestine nuclear weapons 
programme. This proved the hollowness of US advocacy of nuclear 
non-proliferation through international regimes and conventions 
like MTCR, NPT and CTBT. The timid and "pea-shooter" approach 
of the Clinton administration also showed that US is no longer the 
sole superpower which could prevail its wish in the post Cold War 
world. 
What ever the reasons given or arguments advanced by the 
US administration in support of the Brown Amendment and not 
applying sanctions on the serious issue of shipment of Ring 
Magnet, M-11 missiles by China to Pakistan and US blind eye on 
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this contradicted the declared US policy objective of working for 
non-proliferation, MTCR and CTBT. The US restoring of military 
supplies to Pakistan and subsequent blind eye on Pakistan's other 
effort to achieve nuclear arsenal not only negated earlier US 
legislation aimed at penalizing Pakistan for its nuclear weapons 
programme, but was a clear political signal that it tacitly accepted 
Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation as a part of its strategic plan to 
secure its interests in South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. 
Thus "all the pious concern of the US for nuclear proliferation has 
been shown to be an eye wash in relations to an old and trusty 
ally"**. 
Hence, the thesis that with the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan's importance in serving US 
interests had diminished was not correct. Rather Clinton 
administration considered Pakistan an important partner in 
safeguarding its interest in the Gulf, on the eastern flank of the 
region. US also considered Pakistan a useful base for influencing 
political process in Central Asia. Further, it thought that a strong 
Pakistan is essential to counter its threat perception regarding Iran 
and Iraq. The US believed at that time that Pakistan was one 
country which if strengthened militarily and technologically can 
counter India's emergence as an effective regional power. US 
perception since the emergence of Pan-Islamic trends in World 
politics are that being supportive of Pakistan will contribute to 
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encouraging moderate Islamic forces and countering Islamic 
extremism. By the end of 1996 when Clinton completed his first 
term US was obsessed with all these factors and it was willing to 
pay a high price for collaboration with Pakistan, pretending that 
Pakistan is a secular State. Their obsession blinded them to the 
reality and Pakistanis exploited that obsession to serve their own 
interests. 
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CHAPTER - V 
PAKISTAN'S UNREQUITED FONDNESS: 
THE CLINTON'S SECOND TERM 
US-Pakistan relations seemed to be coming out of the post-
Cold War downturn during the Clinton's second consecutive term. 
Unlike past policies, US under Clinton's leadership made attempts 
to broaden security and strategic relations with Pakistan, the one 
time "Most Allied Ally*. The issue of non-proliferation was shelved 
for the time being. The changing US perception can be gauged from 
the statement of then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
Thomas Pickering when he said "we want to show that we do not 
consider South Asia the backside of the diplomatic globe".! 
Not withstanding the fact that bilateral relations were 
seriously ruptured over the issue of non-proliferation, shipment of 
Ring Magnets and M-11 missile supply from China, issue of 
narcotics, Islamabad's alleged support for the cross border 
terrorism during the Clinton's first term. US-Pakistan strategic 
relations shown sign of improvement, when Islamabad desperate to 
forge close relations, co-operated with US law enforcement officials 
in arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national charged with the 
fatal 1993 shooting of two CIA employees outside the agency's 
headquarter in Virginia. Further, Islamabad allowed the America to 
fly back Kansi to United States to face trial without having gone 
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through the normal extradition process. This action of Sharif 
government was widely criticized in Pakistan because United 
States had refused to bypass its extradition procedures in the case 
of a Pakistani air force officer being held in a US jail on drug 
charges. As a writer for the Nation asserted, Washington "rarely 
acts to circumvent its own laws. But expects others to waive and 
ignore theirs.'^ 
Despite, the renewed interest of Clinton administration in 
Pakistan after the arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi the Pakistani policy 
establishment was still under impression that Washington had 
only marginal interest in giving momentum to already derailed 
relations. Instead US was more interested in ties with India. Since 
the issue of F-16 remained unresolved even after the passage of 
Brown amendment in 1995. More-over, the US was doing little to 
assist Pakistani's faltering economy. Thus, half hearted US interest 
in Pakistan's problems strengthened the perception of policy 
makers in Islamabad that the US is a fickle friend. 
In the post Cold War period, Pakistan had become more 
hawkish in dealing with its two most pressing national security 
issue India and Afghanistan. The US-Soviet Cold War had ended 
but South Asia's Cold War continued unabated. Infact, India 
Pakistan tension had intensified during the 1990's because of 
Islamabad's backing for Kashmiri insurgents 
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The obsession of Pakistan with India and Islamabad's 
Afghan policy had become issue of friction in the US-Pakistan 
relations. Clinton administration expressed keen interest that two 
major powers of the South Asia should improve relations. The then 
US President while meeting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
during U.N. General Assembly Session in New York, urged 
Pakistan to resume dialogue with India. Nawaz Sharif responded 
positively for improved bilateral relations and urged a more active 
US role in Kashmir issue®. However, the tension intensified over 
Islamabad's continued backing for Kashmiri insurgents. 
Irrespective of US advice the relations between India and Pakistan 
remained at lowest ebb. India's efforts to broaden relations with 
Pakistan through trade were frustrated. The mantra pushed by 
hard liners in Islamabad was that nothing could be done to 
improve relations with India until Kashmir problem was solved. 
This hard line attitude of Islamabad had its be^mng on US-Pak 
relations. 
Similarly, Pakistan's Afghan policy become another irritants 
in the relations with United States. It was ironical that the place 
which brought US-Pak strategically so close in 1979 after the 
Soviet intervention was now drifting two countries apart. 
Islamabad had always been deeply involved with Afghanistan. The 
assumption of power in Kabul by Taliban with overt and covert 
support of Pakistan brought the issue of Afghanistan once again at 
fore front. Pakistan's Afghanistan policy was driven by its desire to 
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see a friendly regime in power-thereby supposedly ensuring 
"strategic depth vis-a vis India. Initially Pakistan supported Tajik 
dominated Rabbani government but soon realized that it is not 
serving Pakistan's interest. So it reverted to Pushtuns the tribal 
sibling of Pakistan's Pathans called Taliban. But due to strange 
and adventurous policy of Taliban towards women and foreigners 
Islamabad came under International criticism because Pakistan 
was held responsible for the rise of Taliban. 
By the end of 1997, US started to take more interest in 
Indian Sub-continent. To reinforce US interest in India and 
Pakistan, President Clinton sent Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright to the region to show that "after along absence, the United 
States at the highest level is getting back in South Asia game".* 
Her visit reflected the souring of bilateral relations during the post 
Afghan crisis or post Cold War crisis. Secretary of State discussed 
host of issues with the policy makers in Islamabad. Madeline 
Albright utilized most of her time deliberating about Nuclear 
weapons, issue of Afghanistan, Kashmir conflict etc. The visit was 
not only very fruitful for Pakistan because the US did not propose 
any military or economic assistance to Pakistan. Nevertheless, she 
asserted that Pakistan "will be able to count on continuing 
friendship of the United States."* 
The high point of Albright's visit was meeting with Afghan 
refugees in Peshawar, like that of George Shultze then Secretary of 
State who visited to Pakistan at the climax of Afghan crisis in 
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1983. Although, Shultz at that time had offered full US economic, 
military support for the Mujahideen because they were fighting for 
American cause against the Soviets. Contrary to the Shultz visit, as 
the geo-political situation had undergone tremendous change, the 
US was in no need of Mujahideen or Taliban so Albright voiced US 
opposition to Pakistan's Taliban policy and stated "we are opposed 
to their approach on human rights, we are opposed to their 
despicable treatment of women, children and their lack of respect 
for human dignity"^ 
More irritants surfaced in bilateral relations over anti-
narcotic measures. In 1998, for the third running year Clinton had 
to issue a waiver to avoid the imposition of sanction for lack of co-
operation in the anti-narcotics efforts. Meanwhile, a bitter dispute 
had arisen over the arrest of Pakistani national Ayyaz Baluch, an 
employee of the US Drug Enforcement Agency's Islamabad office, 
Baluch had been involved in an effort to entrap a Pakistani air 
force officer suspected of drug smuggling. Not informed 
beforehand, the Pakistani authorities were indignant and 
embarrassed when the air force officer was arrested in the United 
States. They retaliated by jailing Baluch for "Seducing" the air force 
officer to commit a crime. Intense "and some time angry 
diplomatic pressure was needed before Baluch was pardoned and 
permitted to emigrate with his family to the United States.*^ 
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US-Pakistan strategic relations received more set back when 
Pakistan imported missiles from North Korea. CIA reported that 
Pakistan had obtained North Korean Technology to develop a 
medium range missile, which was successfully fired over a range of 
nine hundred Kilometers on April 6, 1998. The Pjakistan's claimed 
that the missile gave them an edge over their neighbour India. But 
Islamabad denied the US assertion that the missile was modified 
version of North Korean Nodong-itself a variant of the Soviet Scud 
and declared that Pakistani scientists had developed the 'Ghauri' 
on their own. Rejecting the Pakistani position, the Clinton 
administration proceeded to impose sanctions against North Korea, 
and Khan Research Laboratories, where the missile was produced. 
This sanction had only symbolic effect because earlier sanctions 
already in operation barred dealing with the US in defence field.® 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST AND 
NON-PROLIFERATION 
US South Asia policy received a severe setback in May, 1998, 
when Bhartiya Janta Party led Indian government successfully 
conducted three underground nuclear-test on May 11, 1998 in 
Pokharan range of Rajasthan.' Further, to the more surprise to the 
world community unfazed India conducted two more Nuclear-tests 
on May 13, 1998 to complete its series of nucleai- tests for peaceful 
purposes. 10 
158 
Although, Sharif government had warned Clinton about 
Indian intention in April 1998, as Vajpayee government had been 
very clear about induction of nuclear weapons, soon after 
assuming power. But lulled by soothing comments in New Delhi, 
US officials thought that Pakistan was crying wolf regarding India 
and were satisfied that the India would not do anything which 
could trigger nuclear proliferation in the region.^^ 
However, Clinton administration was talcen aback, that 
immediately after entering office, Vajpayee had given a green signal 
for nuclear tests. *2 India's preparations at Pokhran was kept so 
clandestine by Indian Scientists, that they were successful in 
avoiding detection by the US Satellites. Thus, the nuclear test by 
India caught Clinton administration embarrassingly off-guard. 
India's five nuclear tests were jarringly out of step with the world 
community's substantial progress in recent years on the non-
proliferation front. Further, it did irreparable damage to the 
unconditional renewal of non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the 
successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) which was picking overwhelming backing from the 
international community. 
The Indian test once more put the nuclear issue on the 
centre stage of US South Asia policy. Terming them "a terrible 
mistake' apparently angry Clinton stated. "I want to make it very 
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clear that I am deeply disturbed.''i3 uS promptly imposed wide-
reaching sanctions against India mandated by the 1994 non-
proliferation act: United States cut off all aid, prohibited export of 
certain defence and technology materials, voted against loans by 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and urged other 
states to follow suit. Major industrialized nations joined in strongly 
criticizing the tests. But only Japan imposed sanctions as drastic 
as those of the United States, when it freezed aid to India, i* 
Indian nuclear tests alarmed Pakistan and Islamabad 
termed India's nuclear adventure as "reckless and highly 
provocative". Clinton administration's attention soon shifted to 
Pakistan. In the hope of persuading Sharif government not to 
follow India's suit. For this purpose President dispatched. Deputy 
Secretary of State Talbott to Islamabad. The envoy tried to bargain 
with Pakistan when they offered F-16, which had been stalled 
since October 1990 when the Pressler Sanction was imposed, more 
over the resumption of economic and military aid was offered to 
Pakistan to shelve its nuclear proliferation programme. Pakistan 
would gain the moral high ground internationally by not testing 
thereby global disapproval on India, i* 
President Clinton spoke himself with Sharif on the phone to 
underline US concern that Pakistan should not go nuclear. The the 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif responded that he had not taken a 
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decision but was under great domestic political pressure to show 
that Pakistan could match India. Publicly, he declared, "it is up to 
the international community" to address Pakistan's legitimate 
security concern in the wake of India's nuclear tests^*. Thus, 
implicitly Pakistan rejected US request to restrain in the wake of 
Indian nuclear test but assured Washington that it would not act 
in haste. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad said "there is no 
question of any renunciation of our option", we cannot ignore the 
aspirations of our people to meet the nuclear challenge imposed by 
India. 17 
Pakistani establishment wanted from world community in 
general and from US in particular the harshest possible 
punishment for India. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayyub Khan 
declared that invoking mandatory sanctions under US laws against 
India hardly constitute an effective response. Although, (G-8) the 
group of world's eight leading economic powers criticized India and 
agreed to oppose multilateral lending. Islamabad considered it 
inadequate when Pakistan's Foreign Minister said. "It is a matter of 
when, not if, Pakistani will test". The statement by Indian Home 
Minister L.K. Advani put more pressure on Sharif administration 
and surcharged the atmosphere in Pakistan in favour of nuclear 
test. Advani called on Pakistan to accept the new realities imposed 
by the Indian tests. Inspite of this. President Clinton remained 
publicly hopeful "that the Prime Minister and Pakistani 
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government would not go through a nuclear test And I believe we 
can ... work with them in a way which meets their security needs 
without the test '" . 
Thus, Pakistan was confronted with great dilemma either to 
pursue nuclear test or forego test. At one side, if Pakistan 
conducted test, the economic cost would be high because 
Islamabad's action would invite severe sanctions as imposed on 
India. The sanctions could nearly bankrupt Pakistani economy and 
it would not be able to withstand its implications. On the other 
hand, if Pakistan did forego nuclear test, it has the opportunity to 
bring major shift in Clinton administrations policy towards 
Pakistan. One that Islamabad had been seeking ever since the 
Pressler Sanctions were imposed in 1990. However, half hearted 
interest taken by Clinton administration during last six years and 
other difficulties over Pressler, missile etc, left Pakistani officials 
with little faith in Clinton's assurance and were skeptical whether 
Congress would agree to lift sanctions and approve F-16 aircraft, 
substantial economic and conventional arms assistance package. 
Pakistan did not only face international pressure but also 
there was mounting domestic pressure on the government that if 
Sharif did forego test he would have to pay a heavy political price. 
This put the survival of the government in peril. Not only the 
opposition Pakistan Peoples Party and Pro-Islamic Parties, but 
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many in his own Pakistan Muslim League were vociferously 
clamouring for Pakistan to match India. In a meeting with 
newspapers editors, the Prime Minister was reportedly told by Arif 
Nizami, editor of the widely read and influential Urdu daily Nawai-I 
Waqt "there is going to be an explosion soon it will either be a 
Pakistani nuclear test or you being blown out of office".^ ® 
Pakistan made a formal request to Clinton administration 
that Islamabad needed a US security guarantee against India to 
hold ofl" from testing. The President Clinton said that he could not 
give this assurance but reiterated his intention to cut through the 
knot of laws blocking aid and give Pakistan the tools needed to 
defend the country. This assurance, however, was not good enough 
for Pakistan to fulfill its security demand. On May 28, 1998, 
Pakistan exploded five underground nuclear devices in Chagai 
region of Baluchistan. 
The Pakistanis across the political spectrum or loyalties 
celebrated on the successful test. A proud Sharif declared, "today 
we have settled a score,,. our hand was forced by the present 
Indian leadership's reckless action"*" and further said that 
International sanction over nuclear tests against Pakistan would 
be unjustified. 
Thus, Pakistan had two basic compulsions which forced it to 
conduct nuclear test. Firstly, it had to prove to India in particular 
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and the world at large that its nuclear capability is not a fib but 
very real. Secondly, which was more vital to the survival of the 
Nawaz Sharif government was the dire need to reply to Indian tests 
with identical display of nuclear prowess. 
For US the nuclear test by Pakistan was a big 
disappointment as Islamabad ignored President Clinton's repeated 
pleadings not to conduct test. The US-Pakistan strategic and 
security relations which promised rise, because of New Delhi's 
action, reached at the lowest ebb with Pakistan's matching reply to 
India. Thus, Pakistan lost an opportunity to strengthen its 
bargaining position vis-a vis, the United States. 
President Clinton commented sadly, "By failing to exercise 
restrain in responding to the Indian test. Pakistan lost a truly 
priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its 
political standing in the eyes of the world". But simultaneously the 
statement by Presidential press Secretary Michal Mecurry, gave 
great respite to Islamabad when he said that Clinton remained 
angrier at India because, "Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was honest 
and straight forward in the description of the decision he was 
wrestling with, and India manifestly was not.^i 
Pakistan came in for a lot of flake from worid community for 
its tests. UN Security Council "deplored' Pakistan's test and urged 
both countries to show restrain. Nevertheless, on May 31, 1998, 
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Pakistan tested the sixth nuclear device, one more than India had 
tested. This signaled the ensuing arms race in South Asia. The 
foreign Ministers of the five declared Nuclear Weapons States and 
the permanent members of the UN security council urged in 
Geneva Declaration to India and Pakistan to take steps to reduce 
the danger of nuclear war; sign the CTBT, ban fissile material 
production and to show restrain in missile testing and 
deployment.22 
The Clinton administration announced wide ranging 
sanctions against Pakistan under the 1994 non-proliferation act. 
The US cut off all aid and any material which could be used for 
defence purpose, voted against loans by the World Bank, IMF, 
Asian Development Bank.23 
As was feared earlier that sanctions might sink Pakistan's 
shaky economy proved right. Emergency was declared in the 
country almost immediately after the announcement of the nuclear 
test and austerity measures proposed by Nawaz Sharif was 
indication of high price that Pakistan will have to pay for taking its 
bomb out of basement. Moreover, Pakistan faced debt payment 
problem and unless it received fresh financial help from the IMF. 
The government in panic froze foreign -currency bank accounts 
which created havoc for foreign companies working in Pakistan. 
This damaged country's international credit. 
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However, some efforts were made in Washington to ease 
sanctions when Senate and House of Representatives voted to 
exempt agricultural credits from the sanctions. In other words US 
wanted to protect her commercial interest in Pakistan. Because 
sanctions barred agricultural export credit which was injuring 
farmers in US. Recognizing that the rigidity of the 1994 legislation 
deprived the President of any flexibility in trying to deal 
diplomatically with Pakistan, Congress voted in a separate action 
to give the chief executive authority to waive all sanctions, 
including those imposed by the Pressler Amendment.** 
The entire nuclear issue which began in Indian subcontinent 
witnessed US tilt in favour of Pakistan. It was ironic that severe 
sanctions were imposed on India but strangely enough even after 
Islamabad ignored President Clinton's repeated pleadings not to 
conduct tit for tat tests', the US attitude towards Pakistan 
remained soft. Clinton administration continued to find excuse for 
Pakistan. 
President Clinton's efforts to dissuade Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif from testing included such blandishments as the repeal of 
the Pressler Amendment - a piece of legislation that the Pakistan 
hated with visceral intensity as well as offers of fresh military and 
economic aid as Clinton even climbed down from his Presidential 
heights and telephoned Nawaz Sharif several times, ultimately of 
no avail. 
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Referring to the President's persistent bid to battle for "sanity 
on the subcontinent" White House Spokesman Mike McCuny said 
on May 28, 1998, "I think it would be accurate to say that the 
Prime Minister clearly struggled with what was apparently, for him, 
a very difficult decision. He knew the costs, he understood exactly 
the President's argument... iDUt I think he clearly felt the pressure 
and burden of both domestic political opinion and also the reality 
of the pressure he faced in the region because of the decision by 
the government of India. He sounded in short, like some one who 
is very pained by a very difficult decision" .2* It seemed that US was 
defending Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear test.^* 
The White House spokesman also sounded quite sad that the 
sanctions mandated by Glenn amendment^^ would apply with 
equal severity to India and Pakistan. Although, both countries had 
conducted nuclear tests, MaCurry felt there was a qualitative 
difference in the way the two countries had handled their nuclear 
compulsions. "The tonal quality of the way we have addressed this 
decision by Pakistan. I would suggest to you is a different, and we 
would acknowledge that there is a difference in the way these two 
government have dealt with the United States with respect to this 
test,"27. 
It seemed that the spokesmen had forgotten Pakistan's past 
record. When it had been less than "straight forward" over the 
several years when it clandestinely acquired nuclear material, 
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missile and other relevant technology form China and North Korea; 
Moreover, the transfer of these technologies was banned by the US 
law and global treaties. 
State Department Spokesman James Rubin also turned out 
to be a pro-Pakistani. He displayed a tilt not only in favour of 
Pakistan, but also its benefactor China which for long had been 
the 'Holy Cow' of American foreign policy. Asked about the China 
angle complicating the Indo-Pak Nuclear matrix, Rubin admitted 
that there had been serious concern in the past about Beijing's co-
operation with Pakistan, "But we all have to bear in mind the 
evolution that has occurred in China's policies, including a 
commitment that we believe they are honouring not to assist 
unsafe-guarded nuclear facilities especially those in Pakistan and 
other countries of concern".2* In other words James Rubin was 
saying that India can not justify its test on ground of Beijing-
Islamabad alleged collaboration. Rather it was India's explosion 
which forced Pakistan to respond. 
Another significant sign of the tilt was Washington's reaction 
to the "a^ressive rhetoric" emanating from New Delhi and 
Islamabad. When Home Minister L.K. Advani warned Pakistan to 
halt intervening in Kashmir the State Department went ballistic 
and called in Indian Ambassador, Naresh Chandra to express 
unhappiness. But there was not much reaction when Pakistan 
Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayyub Khan went around making 
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incendiary statements, including a pointed threat that since Indian 
cities were bigger, their casualties in missile attack would be 
larger. 
However, Pakistan's sixth test, to even the score with India, 
left little room for those who were sympathetic to its position in the 
US. Many senior US officials who attempted to justify the Pak tests 
as an inevitable to India's tests felt betrayed. Thus, the tilt for all 
practical purposes wilted.^^ 
That was evident in the even handed statement from Clinton, 
when condemning the sixth test US President said, that Pakistan 
and India are contributing to self defeating cycle of escalation. 
State Department Spokesman Rubin also deplored and said that, 
we are very disappointed that Pakistan continues to ignore the 
calls to exercise restrain that were made by the International 
community after its first tests. 
As the US policy makers were reconciling with new realities 
in South Asia where two antagonistic nuclear power had emerged. 
Clinton administration was trying to calm down excessive jingoism 
in India and Pakistan to avoid any further escalation of arm race in 
the region. In the, meanwhile the development in Afghanistan drew 
Washington's attention towards Afghanistan, where Taliban had 
been achieving phenomenal success, in capturing and controlling 
most of the Afghanistan. They appeared to be close to total victory 
over their arch rival ethnic groups of Uzbek-Hazara and Tajik 
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called the Northern Alliance. The rapid stride by Taliban created 
concern in Washington about the future of Afghanistan. 
Recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
and by no other country. Thus, Taliban by their treatment of 
women, their tolerance, drug trade and most significantly their 
willingness to provide a heaven to International terrorist 
contributed to acquire near-pariah status in United States.^*' 
Further, the active ISI support for the Tjiliban became a 
important source of friction, in already troubled relations with the 
United States. There was growing concern in Washington that the 
Taliban like movement presumably supported by Pro-Islamic 
political parties and fundamentalist element in ISI and Pakistan 
military is ominous sign in general for the region and in particular 
for Pakistan with far reaching implications. 
The terrorist attack on US embassies in Neiirobi, Kenya and 
Daressalam, Tanzania, that took more than two hundreds lives, 
shook and enraged the Clinton administration. The administration 
overnight started operation to nab culprits responsible for this act 
of terror. When intelligence agencies concluded that the attacks 
were organized by Osma Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian living 
in exile under Taliban protection, Afghanistan and Taliban 
occupied centre stage in US policy.^i The Clinton administration 
also envisaged the possible Pakistani role in its operation against 
terrorism. 
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The Clinton administration did waste little time when on 
August 21, 1998, it struck back to take revenge. US Navy warship 
launched cruise missile against Osama Bin Laden's training camps 
in Afghanistan and also targeted a factory in Sudan supposedly 
linked to the Saudi fugitive. 
However, missiles attack drew sharp criticism from Pakistan. 
As the strike killed 11 Pakistan, because Washington did not 
inform Pakistan before hand of the attack this was considered by 
Pakistan as the infringement of its sovereignty because US used air 
space without informing Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
even telephoned Clinton to complain about the US action. There 
was growing misperception in Islamabad. To end this 
misperception Gen Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff Visited Islamabad to make clear to General Karamat 
that the missile fl3dng through Pakistani air space were American, 
not Indian and were aimed at Afghanistan.*^ 
As the air strike could not target Osama, US turned towards 
Pakistan to press the Taliban to hand over Bin leaden. Islamabad 
responded positively but also warned that fiercely held Afghan 
customs regarding hospitality would render its efforts fruitless. 
Although, this was an opportunity for Islamabad to gain favour in 
Washington by arranging for the capture of Osama. However, the 
action could have costed Sharif dearly both in Pakistan, where 
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Laden had become an anti US cult hero, and in Afghanistan, 
friendly Taliban would have been annoyed. 
F-16 ISSUE SOLVED 
The US-Pakistan strategic relations witnessed a thaw in 
1998 when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited 
Washington on December 2, 1998 for his first visit to US as Prime 
Minister. The visit was arranged in the background when Talbott 
talks did raise hopes that India and Pakistan are willing to sign the 
CTBT; this was path breaking news, as both countries had 
previously 'spumed' this. They had agreed to join in multilateral 
negotiations looking forward a ban on the production fissile 
material, and more importantly they had expressed willingness in 
principle to strengthen their control over export of nuclear items. 
Pakistanis had great hopes from the Sharifs visit. It was 
expected that Clinton administration would ease sanctions, press 
the IMF to relax its lending terms, clear up the still unresolved 
F-16 problem and apply greater pressure on India to negotiate over 
Kashmir.^® 
The US-Pak relations dramatically swung up side when 
President Clinton while greeting Sharif at White House had a 
pleasant surprise for him, a concrete proposal to solve the F-16 
issue. But, this US action was not as simple as it was made out by 
Clinton administration. Washington become serious only after the 
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Pakistan formerly moved to initiate legal action against the US 
government as a last resort to recover their money which they had 
paid well before the imposition of Pressler Sanction in October 
1990. Thus, when justice department hinted that Islamabad was 
likely to win in legal battle. The Clinton administration decided to 
solve the issue of F-16 at the earliest to avoid an embarrassment. 
Moreover, US also accepted a Pakistan suggestion to cover the 
remaining amount by providing $ 140 million of wheat and other 
commodities on grant basis over the coming two years.^* 
The trip of Sharif marked a significant triumph for Pakistan. 
The issue of F-16 was resolved after a long eight years when 
Pressler Amendment was invoked for the first time, in a manner 
that was satisfactory to Pakistan. 
The relations between India and Pakistan reached at 
its zenith in post Cold War years when Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee undertook a historic visit in mid February 1999 to 
mark the resumption of bus service between India and Pakistan. 
The Clinton administration was obviously delighted over the highly 
successful visit by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when two countries signed 
*Lahore Declaration'. Since, US always attempted to engage two 
arch rivals in dialogue in order to improve relations. Lahore 
Summit raised hopes that tension will reduce between the two 
countries because finally India-Pakistan understood the dangerous 
implications of nuclear weapons.®^ 
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The US Role in Kargil Conflict 
However, Lahore expectations proved short lived Lahore 
spirit received devastating blow when India realized in May 1999 
that a large number of insurgents with Pakistan backing had 
crossed the line of control in the far north of Kashmir to occupy 
15,000 foot positions near Kargil, Given the high altitude and 
strategic positions held by intruders, it became quite tough to 
evacuate them. This action of Pakistan to internationalize 
Kashmir dispute brought the already volatile region on the brink of 
War. 
But the move by Pakistan to draw leverage by 
Internationalizing Kashmir issue boomeranged and resulted in a 
major political set back for the Sharif government. Similarly, the 
government of India was doubly embarrassed because at the one 
hand, this was a great betrayal by Pakistan of 'Lahore Declaration'. 
On the other hand Kargil misadventure was done at the time when 
India was serious to improve relations with Pakistan, Moreover, the 
Indian intelligence was caught napping, since Kargil infiltration 
started taking place well before Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited 
Lahore.^ ® 
India reacted forcefully employing massive air power 
for the first time in Kashmir to evacuate intruders. With little 
success to India initially, it raised the fears that India would 
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broaden the conflict by striking across the line of control. This 
intensified worries in Washington. Clinton administration could 
not ignore Kargil operation as fighting could widen and spin out 
control raising the nightmare scenario of war between the two 
states armed with nuclear weapons. 
With the situation in Kargil having all ingredient of war, the 
US government responded vigorously. President Clinton telephoned 
Sharif to urge him to have the forces withdrawn. To underline 
Clinton's message General Anthony Zini visited Islamabad,^'^ 
brushing aside Pakistan's claim that it was not directly involved in 
the Kargil operation and lacked control over the Mujahideen, the 
US urged Islamabad to ensure that the intruders pulled back 
across the line of control very soon.^ ® This pro-Indian stand of 
Clinton administration and when even the Chinese were not willing 
to support the Pakistani position, left Pakistan internationally 
isolated and Sharif government realized that its gamble had failed. 
Now Islamabad was desperate to find a way out of Kargil 
imbroglio. Sharif expressed of desire to meet Clinton. He visited 
Washington on July 4, 1999. According to a participant in the talk 
Nawaz Sharif seemed like a drowning man looking for a miracle, 
hoping that some how the United States would bail him out. After 
the long discussion Pakistan accepted Draft Statement which 
indicated that he would "urge" the Mujahideen to withdraw across 
the line of control and restart the stalled Lahore process with 
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India. Pakistan in exchange gained Clinton's promise that he 
would take an active interest in efforts to address the Kashmir 
problem.3» 
The US role in Kargil crisis evoked considerable public 
attention. According to many commentators it was a paradigm 
shift in the US policy towards South Asia it was viewed that 
Washington Declaration' signed between Nawaz Sharif and Clinton 
opened up new vistas for future co-operation between India and 
the United States. 
There was no denying the fact that Washington exerted 
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right from the start of the Kargil 
crisis both at the bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure the 
withdrawal of intruders from line of control. 
However, it would be wrong to perceive that US has acted 
out of love for India or endorsed India's Kashmir policy. The US is 
hardly driven by altruism in the matters of international relations. 
Thus, a paradigm shift in US South Asia policy had not occurred.*^ 
The US had its own reasons to take tough posture against its 
traditional ally Pakistan. In the first place, the phenomenon of the 
crumbling of the Pakistan State and its coming under the 
domination of various extremist groups and a rogue army might 
have led the US to take a realistic view on Kargil based on its own 
national security interests, secondly, as President Clinton was in 
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last year of his term he wanted to ensure a future role for him as 
trouble shooter'. The joint statement issued by Nawaz Sharif and 
President Clinton in Washington on July 5 was manifestation of 
the increasingly significant role that the Clinton administration 
envisaged to play in what it regard to be "a nuclear flash point". 
The real significance of the joint statement was that the 
President Clinton would take a personal interest in encouraging an 
expeditious resumption of bilateral efforts between India and 
Pakistan to resolve all the dispute including outstanding Kashmir 
dispute. Thus, Pakistan practically succeeded in dragging the US 
into the Kashmir conflict as an international mediator. This was 
Islamabad's strategic ploy to enhance its position in the conflict*! 
vis a vis India. 
To sum up, the conflagration in Kargil provided the perfect 
opening for Washington. As the US efforts brought the end of 
Kargil conflict, the US assumed a de-facto role to play in future 
Kashmir though not as a mediator. According to Stephan P. Cohen 
a South Asia expert, the US has a specific role between the two 
sides as a facilitator. One may not call it mediator, but facilitation 
is also a form of mediation. Thus, Clinton-Sharif agreement put an 
extra burden on India to accept US facilitation. 
PAKISTAN'S FOURTH MILITARY COUP AND US ATTITUDE 
The fallout of the Kargil fiasco appeared very soon on 
Pakistan political map when on October 12,1999 Sharifs 
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democratically elected government was toppled in blood less Coup 
d etat by General Pervez Musharraf. This was reassertion of the 
military's dominant role in the Pakistan's polity after an interval of 
11 years. The military this time, however, was able to wrest 
political power not because the top brass conspired to over throw 
the civilian government. Rather, the inability of the political elite to 
manage the political crisis and the gradual erosion of civilian 
institutions encouraged the military once again to over through the 
civilian government which stood discredited by the people because 
of its autocratic slyle of functioning.*^ 
The United States was presumably well aware of army take 
over in Pakistan much before it actually took place and the 
circumstances leading to its occurrence. In fact, Washington was 
buzzing with a rumour of a possible military tussle between the 
government of Nawaz Sharif and coup leaders for about a month 
as Sharif government tried to pin the responsibility on the military 
for ill-fated Kargil plan. Sharif also anticipated a coup, to avert the 
threat of coup Prime Minister dispatched his high-profile brother 
Shahbaz Sharif to Washington, to press for US warning against a 
military take over. Thus, three weeks before the change over in 
Pakistan, Clinton administration warned the Pakistan army 
against taking any extra-constitutional measures and strongly 
pleaded for the continuance of democratic government. Nawaz 
Sharif himself attempted a pre-emptive strike against the Army 
178 
Chief General Pervez Musharraf. As the army chief was returning 
to Karachi from Sri Lanka, the Government announced his 
dismissal. Moreover, the Karachi airport control tower was 
instructed not to allow the plane carrying Musharraf to land, even 
though it was dangerously low on fuel. The episode backfired for 
Sharif, after the military became aware of the events, reacting 
swiftly, the army arrested Sharif and his colleague. By the Time 
PIA flight finally landed in Karachi, Musharraf had become 
Pakistan's chief executive.'*^ 
There was scant regret in Pakistan about the 
departure of Sharif government, rather people hoped that military 
would bring back the country on right track. There was no 
resistance, not even any demonstration or murmur from the 
civilians against the coup. Even National Assembly members 
belonging to Nawaz Sharif s own party the Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML) preferred to remain silent. 
The reaction in abroad to the coup was of sever criticism. 
Although, the Clinton administration was well aware of Sharifs 
falling reputation however, military take over was un-acceptable to 
Washington as it was against the US support for democracies. The 
Clinton administration responded strongly, Washington imposed 
additional sanctions that were legally required in the case of the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government.'*^ 
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The seeds of the military takeover were sown during the 
battle of Kargil when under the pressure of the Clinton 
administration, Nawaz Sharif agreed to pull out troops much to the 
opposition of the Army General, conceading a political victory to 
India. The Pakistan army genuinely felt let down' when blame of 
the Kargil fiasco was imposed on them. The army also took 
advantage of Nawaz Sharifs alienation from the power base and 
unpopularity with the masses due to largely autocratic rule, his 
successive ousting of the President of the Republic, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court and Former Chief of Army Staff 
General Jehangir Karamat his crack down on the voice of dissent 
political as well as press, economic doldrums and wide spread 
corruption. In such situation the Army could well understand the 
mood of the nation and repercussion of their taking over. The army 
proved right when over two third of the Pakistan's people 
supported the army takeover.'*' 
The Clinton administration was eager to see the return of 
democracy in Pakistan but its hope was dashed because General 
Pervez Musharraf did not give any time frame for the restoration of 
democracy in Pakistan. The chief executive made amply clear that 
he would have to set the county's economy right and deal with the 
rampant corruption. He further declared that 'real' democracy 
would be established in Pakistan with provision for accountability 
of the politicians and devolution of power to Pakistan's four 
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provinces and that the army would stay 'in power as long as it was 
absolutely necessary' for putting the country on the right track'*^ 
The US-Pakistan relations improved little when Clinton 
administration some what softened its stand towards the military 
rulers in Pakistan after its initial outpourings against them. The 
United States officially welcomed General Pervez Musharrafs 
unilateral military de-escalation and troops withdrawal from its 
international border with India as well his offer of dialogue to 
diffuse tension between the two countries. President Clinton 
himself admitted that Tie was pleased by what he described as 
'conciliatory tone' Pakistan's new military ruler took towards 
India.'*^ 
The US Ambassador in Islamabad said that the Washington 
was heartened by the military ruler's pledge to TJsher in real 
democracy' in Pakistan. The World Bank South Asia regional 
Chiefs statement was another evidence that US attitude towards 
army take over has under gone change. As he said it was not the 
Bank's look out what type of government a particular country has, 
but how efficiently and in which sector it uses the loans it 
receives.** The statement was significant because the World Bank 
is largely controlled by the United States. 
As Pakistan has strong connection in the Muslim countries 
particularly among the oil rich Arab nation. Clinton administration 
rightly realized the ineffectiveness of sanctions. 
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Clinton administration also drew the conclusion that 
isolation of Pakistan for longer period could backfire. As Pakistan 
could draw the sympathy of the Middle Eastern countries and in 
turn trigger a clash of interest between the US and the Muslim 
countries. It was also feared in Washington that Pakistan the lone 
Muslim country to possess nuclear capability might take a more 
hard line attitude by assuming the leadership of the Islamic world 
and pose a threat to the US strategic and economic interest in the 
Persian Gulf. To avoid such a possibility the Clinton administration 
opted for what is called in diplomatic jargon "construction 
engagement'.*' 
THE CLINTON VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA 
The US President Bill Clinton visited Islamabad on March 
25, 2000, this was the first time a President had been to Pakistan 
in more than thirty years, after Richard Nixon toured Lahore in 
August 1959.'° The expectations from visit in Pakistan was not 
high because before going to Pakistan US President Bill Clinton 
had a vary successful visit to India. Meanwhile the murder of the 
thirty five Sikhs in Kashmir by terrorist to draw the Presidential 
party's attention towards Kashmir made matter worse for Pakistan. 
The Clinton administration reacted strongly to the terrorist activity 
and stressed that violence was not the way to solve the dispute. 
Further, he called two countries to respect the line of control. The 
US even went to the extent of alleging that some elements in the 
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Pakistani Government were supporting terrorism* ^  This strong 
rebuke spoiled the party before it was staged and was not the 
desired way to create friendly environment on the eve of high 
profile visit by the US President to a disenchanted ally. 
However, in contrast to the warning to Pakistani 
establishment Clinton administration showed perceptible change 
in US policy towards India during his five days in India. His well 
crafted address to the Indian parliament was enthusiastically 
received by the members of Indian Parliament. During his course 
of visit to New Delhi, Agra, Hydrabad, and Mumbai President kept 
the Indian policy makers and masses in good humour. The US was 
now more interested in India because of its huge markets for 
American Investors. This was a shift in US policy towards New 
Delhi, as President Clinton did not press India to sign CTBT. 
Clinton administration completed a successful visit to India "in 
order to start a new chapter" in Indo-US relations. And he did 
achieved success in that.*^ 
Clinton's short stop in Islamabad was far from being warm. 
Since this trip was made at the moment when Islamabad had a 
military General as head of the State. There was not much 
expectation from Clinton's visit in Pakistan because of changing 
perception of the US towards Pakistan. 
Moreover, the President made this trip when there was 
differing view of policy makers in Washington whether the 
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President should go to Pakistan or not in prevailing circumstances. 
There was serious security concerns posed by anti-American 
terrorist groups, as three months before his trip to Islamabad the 
terrorist fired rocket at the American Cultural Centre in Islamabad. 
Further, the presence of dreaded Al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden 
aggravated the security condition in Pakistan. 
Washington was also wary that the visit might put the 
Presidential stamp of approval on the Musharraf regime and the 
continued deadlock over the issue of CTBT was another hurdle in 
his visit to Pakistan. However, finally Clinton visited Pakistan 
keeping all doubts at bay. The Clinton administration thought 
keeping Musharraf engaged is must in order to exert any influence 
on his policies.53 
President Clinton had five hour of official visit to Islamabad 
on March 25, 2000. He had a talks with chief Executive Musharraf 
on host of issues of bilateral as well as multilateral concern. 
American President exuded much empathy towards Pakistan and 
its problems. Although, the substance of his massage was blunt, 
but he did not criticize MusharraP* while stressing that he had 
come to help a friend in difficulty. Simultaneously, he expressed 
concern about the direction which Pakistan was going. The US 
President argued that Pakistan could improve relations with India 
through bilateral talks. Clinton made it clear that the United 
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states is prepared to help Pakistan on Kashmir issue but could not 
mediate in this dispute and that Islamabad had to deal directly 
with India. Although, Clinton accepted and declared Kashmir is 
most 'dangerous nuclear flash point' on the world yet could not use 
his weight because of India's stand of no third party mediation. 
According to National Security Advisor Berger Pakistan, Chief 
Executive responded with his own hard line construct on Kashmir 
"Musharraf obviously has a strong and passionate view" on this 
issue. Although, the general indicated willingness to deescalate on 
Kashmir, he still stressed that Pakistan would not act 
unilaterally'*. 
The next important agenda which Clinton had with 
Musharraf was Taliban issue. The export of terrorism from 
Afghanistan and refuge and support given by ruling Taliban regime 
to Al-Qaida become issue of friction in US-Pakistan foreign 
relations. Thus, Pakistan's Afghan policy had always been of great 
importance for US-Pak relations. The US wanted Pakistan to 
restrain Taliban and urged Taliban to be more forthcoming. 
Musharraf s response to the Clinton was that Pakistan is ready to 
help US but stressed how difficult it was to deal with the "people 
who believe that God is on their side. 
The irritants between two countries remained unsolved as 
earlier. The issue of non-proliferation and conflict over Kashmir 
could not make progress during the President's visit. As Pakistan 
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was preoccupied with India and expected Clinton to criticize India's 
Kashmir policy. Instead US President categorically stated to the 
General Pervez Musharraf that there is no military solution to 
Kashmir. This was rebuke of Kargil misadventure.s® 
The high point of Clinton's visit was when he addressed the 
people of Pakistan and stated that I am here as a friend- a grateful 
friend who values our long partnership; a concerned friend who 
cares deeply about the future course of your country; a committed 
friend who will stand with the people of Pakistjm as long as you 
seek the stable, prosperous, democratic nations of your founders 
dreams. 
He also counted Pakistan's contribution in rapprochement 
between China and United States, and Islamabad's role in 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and co-operation in 
fight against terrorism. 
The US President also expressed concern for democratic 
government; relations with India. He advised for respect of the line 
of control and endorsed 'Lahore Declaration'. Moreover, he was 
also worried with nuclear proliferation in the region. He said "I ask 
Pakistan to be leader for nonproliferation. Are you really more 
secure today than you were before you tested nuclear weapons"? 
Thus he tried to remind the devastating impact of nuclear war and 
its negative effect on economic development. ^ ^ 
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In the end it can be concluded that by not skipping Pakistan 
altogether President Clinton shown US interest in Pakistan. People 
in Pakistan were pleased that President did not ignore their 
country out rightly. However, as one Pakistan said "this is a very 
painful thing for us only five hours in Pakistan and five days in 
India.'** This was the realization of Pakistan that United States 
has chosen India and was once more dumping Pakistan. 
The US-Pakistan strategic relations did not see any sign of 
improvement even after the visit of the President Clinton to 
Pakistan. The Washington's perception about Islamabad did not 
change as there was no interlude in the US campaign for 
restoration of democracy in Pakistan and the US demand for ban 
on the so called Islamic militants 
Thus, if President Clinton's visit dealt a serious blow to the 
expectations that many Pakistani entertained that Washington still 
had some regard for its former ally in South Asia. The events that 
followed, such as the exile of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's decision to unilaterally withdraw 
troops along LOC in Kashmir raised suspicion that Islamabad was 
caving in under Washington's pressure.'* The decreasing strategic 
significance strengthened the perception in Islamabad that India-
US relationship is assuming a strategic and military dimension 
which could pose new challenges to Pakistan. 
187 
The September 11 Attacks and the Rediscovery of Pakistan as 
Frontline State 
The fateful events of September 11, 2001 shook the United 
States to the core. With two hijacked planes crashing into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Centre, another into the US Military 
Headquarter at Pentagon. This was the biggest single attack on the 
US mainland for over two centuries causing massive loss of life and 
property. The attack on US, the sole super power on the earth had 
great implications for the regional matrix in South and South West 
Asia in a most unexpected manner. It appeared that the destiny of 
nation State in the region had undergone tremendous change. 
Apart from Afghanistan no other State felt the impact of the crisis 
more than Pakistan. The policy makers in Islamabad faced over 
night an act of balancing domestic policy with foreign policy as it 
posed threat to the very State structure of Pakistan from possible 
disaster.fio 
Till the September 11 attack Pakistan was engaged in 
evolving a strategy for breaking its increasing isolation in 'comity of 
nation' as a Tailed State'. General Pervez Musharraf led military 
government was considered an international pariah by many 
countries including United States of America. But the terrorist 
attack on WTC brought the sea change in the geo-strategic position 
of Pakistan. All of sudden Pakistan was Rediscovered as a front 
line State' for the vital role it had to play in the fight against 
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terrorism. Its own geographical location once brought Pakistan too 
close to US. It seemed that year 1979 has revisited when after 
Soviet intervention US discovered Pakistan as front line State'. 
President Bush immediately declared "America was now at 
war against terrorist' and vowed to find and punish those 
responsible for the attack. Soon Bush administration sought 
international co-operation in its fight against terrorism. President 
Bush made it clear that there can be no neutral ground in the new 
war, the nations were either with the US or with the terrorist.*^ 
The US intelligence agencies as well as media almost 
immediately pinned the blame on dreaded Osama Bin Laden and 
his Al-Qaida network for the September 11 attack. Since Osama 
Bin Laden a guest of Taliban government in Afghanistan had long 
before become nemesis of US, Thus, the focus of the new war 
swiftly shifted on Afghanistan and in almost equal measures on 
Pakistan. Initially Washington urged Taliban and put pressure on 
Pakistan to use its proximity with Taliban to hand over Osama Bin 
Laden to US in order to avoid war. But as Taliban rejected US 
demand to handover its 'guest' the attack on Afghanistan became a 
matter of time. 
To access the land locked Afghanistan the US government 
put immense pressure on General Pervez Musharraf government to 
support US in its efforts against terrorism. Soon, Pakistan under 
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great international pressure succumed and decided to give its 
*unstinted' co-operation to the United States. With its successful 
exploitation of the moral outrage and assisted by an extremely 
vigorous campaign by the government and media. The US 
succeeded in obtaining widespread support around the world. The 
UN Security Council unanimously condemned the terrorist attack 
and supported some kind of retaliation. For the first time in its 
history North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to 
invoke article 5 of the treaty. Which declares attack on one 
member as an attack on all members. The US Congress sanctioned 
$40 billion at the disposal of the President for the operation 
'enduring Freedom'.®^ 
The attack on Afghanistan did not last long. The Taliban left 
Kabul without much resistance paving the way for formation of 
broad based government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. 
The Bonn Accord' ^^  was signed by the representative of all the 
ethnic factions organized by United States. 
Pakistan support to the Taliban in the past if studied deeply 
reveals that it was the result of logical thinking that there should 
be a friendly government in Kabul to minimize the threat to 
Pakistan's security. To this, however, another dimension was 
added during the post Soviet struggle for power in Afghanistan 
when the concept of 'strategic depth' was bom in the minds of 
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some ISI planners to over come the lack of geographical depth 
against India in case of an armed confrontation, the idea arose that 
a strategic alliance of some sort with Afghanistan could provide the 
necessary depth to Pakistan. Thus, this was a pragmatic approach 
that stemmed from security and strategic considerations.^* 
For Pakistan Afghan crisis posed both challenges and 
opportunities. General Musharraf calculated that if Pakistan joins 
'anti terror coalition cobbled together by the United States of 
America, Pakistan would suddenly find itself in good books of US 
and other Western Countries. On the other hand if Pakistan did 
not joins US led coalition it faced risk of being declared a terrorist 
State' or supporter of terrorism. Moreover, Musharraf thought that 
aligning with US in war against terrorism would put massive 
pressure on India to accommodate Pakistan on Kashmir. It was the 
best available option to go with US to avoid India's attempt to 
isolate Pakistan. Thus, this single decision by military 
administration unlocked all doors which had till that time been 
barred to Pakistan. With the reemergence of Pakistan as 'Front line 
State' it received massive economic aid and grants as Bush 
administration lifted sanctions against Pakistan under section 508 
of the foreign aid bill,®' Thus, issue of democracy, nuclear 
proliferation and CTBT were relegated to the background. 
The Pakistani decision to align with US was not popular with 
the religious parties and some other politicians, who considered it 
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sell out of national interest and betrayal of the Taliban whom 
Pakistan had been nurturing for the last one decade. Anti 
American and Anti Musharraf demonstrations were organized by 
extremist elements. Nevertheless, Pakistan permitted the use of its 
soil, air space by US forces, reluctantly, in the face of US demand, 
pressure and possible bulling. This decision of government came 
under much criticism, mainly on account of the government's 
capitulation.** Thus, Pakistan faced two pronged pressure when 
religious parties declared that an attack on Taliban is an attack on 
Islam*''. There was threat that Pakistan might succumb to an 
Islamic revolution, dissolve into chaos. But all this proved empty 
rhetoric and army was able to contain protests against the US 
campaign within bounds. 
The defeat of the Taliban strengthened Musharraf s domestic 
as well as international position. In Post September 11, United 
States treated Pakistan as key working partner, eventually 
recognizing military regime in Islamabad. Now General Musharraf 
turned democrat. Further in post Afghan crisis Musharraf wielded 
more power. He declared himself President in order to increase his 
legitimacy. 
General Pervez Musharraf tried to counter the losses to the 
economy with appeal to the international community. Almost two 
decades ago, when confronted with a similar situation. General 
Zia-ul Haq had openly demanded more aid from Washington in 
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return for Pakistan's co-operation against Soviet's intervention in 
Afghanistan. Once again Afghanistan increased the bargaining 
position of Islamabad. He pointed out that the economic fall out of 
the war against terrorism fell disproportionately on Pakistan. 
Musharraf appealed to the international community to help 
alleviate the situation by arguing that *we are helping you with 
your problem, but you need to help us with ours'. The response to 
Pakistan's plea was positive when Washington announced a $ 1 
billion aid package for Pakistan which included $600 million in 
direct aid and $ 300 million line of credit through OPEC for its firm 
investing in Pakistan. 
Moreover, Pakistan received aid from other countries too. 
The European Union cut tariffs and raised the quotas for Pakistani 
textile exports. Canada converted Pakistan's debt into a social 
development programme. Japan signed debt rescheduling 
agreement for $550 million as well as provided smaller amount of 
direct aid. The international community contributed separately, 
and very generously, for the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan as 
US provided $600 million to help them."* 
US-Pakistan strategic collaboration in aftermath of 
September 11, could not fulfill Pakistan's expectation. Pakistan 
soon after the end of military action, realized the US interest in 
Pakistan was fading as America achieved its goal. Within a year 
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Pakistan was put under pressure to change the country's policy 
against its will. With President Bush urging Pakistan to stop 
infiltration and export of terror it made clear that Pakistan has not 
acquired any leverage vis-a-vis India. 
Pakistan mistook American support in post 9/11 as a 
blanket endorsement for its policies vis-a-vis India as if the new 
nexus with Washington had a strategic dimension as well. Further, 
Pakistan failed to appreciate Indian ability to link its goals 
regarding Kashmir with the US led "War on Terrorism' ^'-Pakistan 
also failed to secure debt write off and greater market access 
particularly from the US. 
An assessment of the political, economic gain received by 
Pakistan in the wake of Afghan crisis reveals an imbalance. The 
losses far outweigh the benefits because the expected US support 
is not forthcoming. 
The most significant impact of the Afghan campaign on the 
United States has been that the US has gained military presence in 
the most strategically volatile region. Not only has US gained 
military foot hold in Afghanistan but, it also provided US presence 
in Afghanistan. Which bolstered US strategic position in South and 
South West Asia. The geo-political location of Afghanistan makes 
US stakes more high in the area. Now US can superwise the 
activities of *Rogue states' Iran, Iraq, China and Central Asia from 
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a place, which borders these countries. Thus, the follies of the 
Taliban threw the whole region into turmoil and provided United 
States opportunities to entrench in the region. With US firmly 
entrenched in Afghanistan both militarily and economically, 
Pakistan's strategic 'depth theory' became irrelevant.'''^ 
The Afghan crisis and the dramatic change in US policy 
towards the military regime in Pakistan reveals bluntly how 
national interest is the most potent driving force behind the United 
States policies in international relations. The US rhetoric about 
human rights and democracy proved to be a hoax. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding chapters have delved into the dynamics of 
complex US-Pakistan strategic relations. On the basis of this 
discussion one can now attempt to draw some broad conclusions 
about the factors responsible for shaping the nature of this 
strategic relationship and the possibilities of cordiality and causes 
of friction and tension in the foreseeable future. 
The US-Pakistan strategic relations over the years have had 
the roUercoaster character, marked by so many ups and downs. 
The relations have seen number of stages, initial hesitation, 
alignment, detachment, tilt, disenchantment, re-alignment and re-
detachment and lately the rediscovery of a frontline state. 
United States had emerged from World War II as the world's 
strongest and most prosperous country and soon become the 
leader of the Anti-Communist bloc in the Cold War. Henceforth its 
policy revolved around the dominant objective of containment of 
international communism all over the world. This demanded 
strategic nexus and military pacts to accomplish the global 
security system against communism. 
The United States having taken measures to contain the 
advancement of communism in Europe, now turned its attention 
towards Asia. Initially, Washington showed only modest interest in 
the Pakistan, and it attempted to have closer ties with larger and 
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more important India. But as India chose a non-alignment policy, 
Pakistan became an attractive potential partner in security 
arrangement for containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East. 
Pakistan's geo-political location played significant role in 
concluding strategic relations with United States. Pakistani 
perception of aligning with US was totally different. Since Pakistan 
was in frantic quest for an ally who could remove its sense of 
insecurity visavis India. It thought that friendship with US would 
bolster their defence. Thus, both countries needed each other, 
though with divergent policy perceptions and orientations. The 
United States was guided by its global policy of containment and 
Pakistan was motivated by its perceived threat from India. 
Pakistan's foreign policy makers took advantage of the many 
opportunities inherent in the Cold War environment by using the 
right rhetoric in the right direction and at the opportune time. 
Pakistan extended unstinted support to the US stand during the 
Korean War and subsequently when the latter signed peace treaty 
with Japan. The outright opposition of India and Pakistan's 
unequivocal support at critical juncture when US prestige was at 
stake, certainly left deep impression on the mind of Americans. All 
these development led to the US estrangement from India and 
intimacy towards Pakistan. 
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Pakistan's pre-occupation with India kept it running for 
support all over the world to strengthened its defence. Pakistan 
entered into military pacts (CENTO, SEATO) and concluded mutual 
defence pacts with US which resulted into Pakistan obtaining 
massive military aid. The supply of arms to Pakistan become issue 
of friction when it used US arms against India in the 1965 war, US 
placed an embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan because 
these arms were primarily meant for use against the communist 
countries. Thus, Pakistan became conscious of inherent dangers of 
over reliance on single source of supply of weapons. Pakistan 
established a new military relationship with communist China; 
which ultimately become 'trusted ally' of Pakistan in late 60's and 
70's, Similarly, when Pakistan did not get enough support from US 
and China during 1971 War with India, Pakistan joined non-
alignment. Pakistan too frequently shifted its allies because of its 
fickle friendship with US. 
Infact, Pakistan and US had their own preoccupation and 
priorities. The former was too obsessed with India from which 
emanated its threat perception that India could destroy it. 
Unfortunately this conviction grew stronger when India become 
instrumental in the loss of East Pakistan in December 1971, 
Similarly, United States was always preoccupied with Cold Wai" 
rivalry. It saw every move of Soviet Union with skepticism 
Pakistan was never on the top of its priority. The US was a global 
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power and economically most advanced. Pakistan although an 
important Muslim state was economically poor regional power 
whose security interest did not extend much beyond its neighbours 
India, Afghanistan, Iran and China. Thus, it was "a union of un-
equals". 
US Pakistan relations had been bedeviled even in the 
seventies. US imposed Symington-Glenn Amendment to security 
Assistant Act which forbade US military and economic aid to any 
country engaged in acquisition or production of nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with the result that all 
military aid to Pakistan was frozen. 
However, the fall of the Shah regime in Iran in 1979 and the 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the same year 
produced new glue to bind the two countries together. The Soviet 
adventure in Afghanistan become turning point' for Pakistan-US 
strategic relations. Pakistan geo-strategic landscape led the 
American policy makers to 'rediscover' the strategic importance of 
Pakistan. The Carter administration emphasized Pakistan's new 
role as Tront Line State' against the possible Soviet expansion. The 
past deterioration in bilateral relations came in for reappraisal. The 
change in US policy underlined that whenever and whereever US 
national interest lies it would not hesitate to take U-turn in order 
to achieve its objective but once its goal was accomplished it would 
leave Pakistan in the lurch. 
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The Afghan crisis strengthened Zia's bargaining position 
which was reflected when he rejected $ 400 million aid offer as 
mere 'peanuts'. President Zia infact thought the leaders of the 
United States were in a state of panic after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and that was an opportune time for him to extract the 
maximum commitment from them for more reliable and durable 
relations in future. 
The strategic and security relations received great boost 
during Reagan years. United States provided massive military and 
economic aid to Pakistan in order to check Soviet expansion. $ 3.2 
billion aid package was extended and it was to be spread over 
1981-87. Moreover, US Congress cleared another $ 4.2 billion 
military and economic aid package for Pakistan for second spell of 
six years (1987-92). Beside this Pakistan received many 
sophisticated and extremely lethal weapons including F-16 fighter 
aircraft from USA. 
US- Pakistan co-operated in Geneva negotiation held under 
the UN auspices to find a solution to the Afghan conflict. However, 
soon smooth course of Pakistan US close co-operation came under 
serious strain on the question of formation of an interim 
government in Kabul, prior to the signing of the Geneva Accord. 
Pakistan refused to sign the accord unless there was prior 
agreement on interim government in Kabul. The differences were 
so serious that Islamabad expressed frustration over American 
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attitude and exhibited a sense of betrayal at the hands of United 
States. Nevertheless, the Geneva Accord in April 1988 and the 
subsequent Soviet puUout in Feb 1989 were the obvious results of 
successful Pakistan-US collaboration over a decade on Afghan 
issue. It could be concluded that collaboration on Afghan issue 
was more designated and pursued to suit American interests than 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan-US strategic relations radically altered in the Post 
Afghan conflict or in Post Cold War period. The disintegration of 
Soviet Union and subsequent end of Cold War brought rapid 
change in international scenario. In 'new world order' the 
unrivalled super power abandoned its Cold War global security 
strategies and with it Pakistan's strategic significance diminished 
in US military thinking. Now Pakistan left to face the post Afghan 
civil war on its own. It shattered Pakistan's dream of acquiring 
'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan's attempted rapprochement with USA fell apart 
during Gulf War even though it has provided all possible support 
to US. The bilateral relations received further set back when in a 
surprise move the US administration on October 1, 1990 
suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan under the 
1985 Pressler sanctions following renewed fears that Pakistan had 
developed nuclear weapons. Although, for more than a decade, the 
US officials found reasons to look the other way while Pakistan 
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moved steadily closer to becoming a nuclear power, which was 
particularly true only during the War in Afghanistan, when 
Pakistan served a key US purpose against Soviet Union. But after 
the end of Cold War Washington was not to turn a blind eye on 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan strived hard to wriggle out of stringent Pressler 
Law. A number of official visits were undertaken by Pakistan to 
pursue and convince that Pakistan did not possess nuclear 
weapons but all those efforts fell on deaf ears. When Pakistani 
policy makers felt that they would not prevail over their patrons on 
resumption of economic and military aid, they tactfully tried to link 
up the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and Kashmir dispute 
together. 
Benazir visit in 1995 to United States proved fruitful for 
Pakistan as she got commitment by Clinton administration that US 
would not abandon Pakistan. This conferred a strategic dimension 
to US-Pak relationship. She also succeeded in convincing US that 
Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan. 
The passage of Brown Amendment in October 1995 brought 
great respite for Pakistan. It cleared the way for resumption of 
American arms supply to Pakistan and provided an aid package 
worth of $ 370 million under provision of the Hank Brown 
Amendment. 
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The passage of the Hank Brown Amendment renewed US 
interest in Pakistan because Clinton administration considered 
Pakistan an important partner in safeguarding its interest in the 
Gulf on the Eastern Flank of the region. Washington also perceived 
that strong Pakistan is essential to counter its threat perception 
regarding Iran-Iraq. 
The US Pakistan relations during the Clinton's second term 
were marred by Pak's obsession with India. Taliban factor and 
nuclear issue caused friction between the two contries. But efforts 
were put in to improve relations. Secretary of state Madeline 
Albright came to Pakistan but this visit was in contrast to the 
Shultz's visit at the climax of Afghan crisis in 1983. 
One of the major irritants between US- Pakistan has been 
nuclear weapons. In bilateral relations US as a boss always tried to 
dictate Pakistan's nuclear policy. However, Pakistan nuclear policy 
makers ignored all the allurement and threat of US when in May 
1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. US imposed sanctions 
against Pakistan under 1994 non-proliferation act. Thus, Pakistan 
lost an opportunity to take advantage of India's misadventure. 
The Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan raised the 
specter in the United States that conflict over Kashmir could 
trigger the first use of nuclear weapons. Finally, American 
intervened to save the situation in South Asia from going out of 
hand. 
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The President Clinton's visit to Pakistan in year 2000 did not 
bring any perceptible change in relations as both countries differed 
on major issues such as Kashmir dispute, Pakistan's Taliban 
policy and question of terrorism and democracy. The fateful events 
of September 11, 2001 did recast the regional matrix in South and 
South West Asia in a most unexpected manner. The destiny of 
nation states in the region have undergone a change unlikely to be 
reversed in near future. Apart from Afghanistan no other state has 
felt the impact of the events more than Pakistan where ruling elite 
has had to cany out acrobatic maneuvers in its policy to prevent 
the very state structure of Pakistan from possible disaster. All of 
sudden Pakistan's geo-strategic significance was rediscovered by 
United States as a front line state' in fight against international 
terrorism. Thus, Pakistan's geographical location once again 
brought it closer to its erstwhile benefactor. It seemed that year 
1979 has revisited. To access land locked Afghanistan the United 
States came to realize Pakistan's inevitability. All past deterioration 
in the relations came in for reappraisal. Pakistan joined anti terror 
coalition to end its isolation and avoid being declared terrorist 
state. More importantly to deny India any opportunity to group 
with America against Pakistan. 
The future course of US-Pakistan relations is hazardous to 
predict because of wide swing of the past half-century. What we 
can note are certain constant factors that will remain important. 
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Geography will continue to give Pakistan strategic importance as 
the juncture of Western, Southern and Central Asia. There are 
three reasons why geo-strategic location of Pakistan will be 
important to the US. To tackle the growing influence of Russia-
China-India in the region and preempt China, Iran, India axis. 
Pakistan's geo-political proximity to the Central Asian Republics 
and Middle East is also a plus for it. The US needs to gamer 
support of a moderate Muslim country to fight Islamic terrorism. 
As Pakistan is a leading Islamic state, the coming of an extremist 
Islamic regime in Islamabad would have profound negative impact 
not only on the sub-continent, but throughout the Islamic World. 
US interest lies in avoiding such a development. 
Since India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states. How 
Islamabad and New Delhi manage their nuclear rivalry will have an 
implication far beyond the subcontinent. Averting a nuclear 
holocaust on the subcontinent will be a key US policy goal. This 
will keep Pakistan and US engaged in the years to come. The 
future course of the US-Pakistan strategic relations would also 
depend on whether the interest of the two countries are 
complementary or divergent. Further, American assistance to 
Pakistan would depend on the utility of Islamabad to promote US 
foreign policy objectives. It seems Afghanistan is going to loom 
large in near future on bilateral relation as both countries have 
agreed to fight against the menace of terrorism. 
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It must be clearly understood by US-Pakistan policy makers 
that to establish reliable, creditable and durable relations both 
countries have to leave all real or imaginary apprehensions, fears 
suspicions and mistrust. Irritants should be removed through 
diplomacy, cooperation, negotiation and attitude of give and take. 
US has greater responsibility to carry burden of relations because 
of its power and influence. It is only then and then alone that a 
lasting, durable, strategic relations beneficial for both can be 
ensured. Hence, a long term objective of conciliation and strategic 
friendship should not be lost sight of which is essential for 
peaceful co-existence. 
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